THE CRISIS OF CITIZENSHIP IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF INDIGENE-SETTLER CONFLICT IN JOS-NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, PLATEAU STATE

BY

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JUNE, 2015
DECLARATION

I, Ghani Dass Mohammed hereby sincerely declare that the data contained in this study are the product of my original research. The works of other authors referred in the study have been appropriately referenced and acknowledged. I therefore, declare that the thesis has not been submitted to any institution or organization for examination.

Ghani Dass Mohammed  
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CERTIFICATION

This thesis titled “The Crisis of Citizenship in Nigeria: A Study of Indigene-Settler Conflict of Jos-North Local Government Area, Plateau State” by Ghani Dass, Mohammed Registration number M.Sc./Soc-Sci/06802/2008-09, meets the requirements for the award of Masters of Science (M.Sc.) Degree in Political Science of the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria approved for its contribution to knowledge.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the Almighty Allah (S.B.W) who granted me the strength and prosperity and in His infinite mercy I have achieved this academic height. The work is also dedicated to Professor Ayo Dunmoye, a very patient academics.
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Ghani Dass Mohammed
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ABSTRACT

The thesis examined the crisis of citizenship in Nigeria with particular attention to indigene/settler conflict in Jos-North area, rooted on the basis of land ownership use. Elite theory is adopted to guide the analysis of this work, the theory posits that society is divided into few who have power and allocate values for society and many who do not have power and also do not decide public policy. This give an opportunity for the elite to manipulate the citizenship on the basis of indigene settler. Both primary and secondary source of data collection is employed. The primary sources of data collection for the research were structured questionnaire format, views of the respondents in the open ended questionnaire. While the already existing literatures, periodical and other materials relevant to the study constituted the secondary sources of information. The research findings unfolds that the crisis in the Jos-North is rooted on the basis of the land ownership, politics clothed with religion. The findings also unveil that ethnicity contributed greatly to the escalation of the crisis. The research therefore, recommends that the perpetrators in the conflicts must be arrested, tried and punished to serve as deterrence for others. Also individual who has lived and worked in a study area for a period of 10yeas and who made his obligation should also be allowed to enjoy the right and privileges that are due for an ‘indigene’. The research also recommends that inter-marriage should be massively encouraged to address or reduce the dichotomy of indigene/settler issue, since we all migrate from somewhere. The above, when considered will help resolve the recurrent crisis of citizenship, indigene/settler conflict in the Jos North Local Government Area, Plateau State and Nigeria at large.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Towards the end of the twentieth century, socio-political changes have happened in various places. Ethnic minority groups have been striving to shake off long usurpations, to cast off the yoke of distant suzerains and to take their own destinies in their own hands, this happened simultaneously with the move by religious groups to influence the social, political and economic relations in the society (Guardian, February, 1993). In Nigeria since the beginning of 1990s ethnic and religious crisis have been taking place throughout the country. This was part of the national question that can be ignored only at the expense of the nation. Little wonder therefore, that the recent United States intelligence report about sub-saharan Africa predict Nigeria’s failure in fifteen years. Although the government has since discredited the report as being far from the reality, but she did not condemn it in totality (Leadership, June, 2005).

The current resurgence of ethnic and religious violence going on throughout the country, and which has been taking different forms and dimensions, can directly be linked to the growth of population and development of communication, which have widened the political and economic awareness of the people of Nigeria. The development has also created the problems of citizenship all over the country. In Jos-North Local Government Area, Plateau State, this state of affairs has created the crisis of indigene/settler which caught the government unawares.

On general note it is pertinent to say that before 1991, harmonious relationship characterized the life of the people of Jos-North Local Government Area. The Hausa, Fulani co-existed in the area without much problem.
However, things began to change at the wake of 1990s when elections of Jos-north local government council and chairmanship were held in 1991, as the new local government area was created. Soon after the relationship between the two major ethnic groups, Hausa and Berom, became strained at the time when a Hausa man Malam Sama’ila Mohammed emerged as the elected chairman of Jos-North local government area in 1991. Consequently, it is evident that Plateau State has witnessed series of ethno-religious conflicts which were manifested through the indigene/settler dichotomy, between 1991 and 2010. As stated earlier, many people lost their lives and properties and rendered homeless as refugees across various neighboring states, like Bauchi and Kaduna states among others.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The serious study of ethnic identity conflicts in Nigerian can be seen in the works of Nnoli (1978, 1989, ed. 1988). Which have examined contemporary forms of ethnic conflict in urban-setting in both colonial and post-colonial African societies. This position appears to have shifted further by other studies notably by (Egwu Nnoli). Have noted the development of a rural variant of ethnic conflict based, on ideology of land, especially in central Nigeria. Other studies such as that by Mustapha (Nnoli ed. 1998: 2751) have observed processes of continued social segmentation and fragmentation that at a time, appears to lead to exclusion and pedded access to groups to land and full citizen identity especially in Northern Nigeria.

This has not only questioned ethnic identities but also increased identity formation and boundary redefinition. This also appears to have given vent to conflicts and issues of citizenship status, a negative sense of belonging and a host of problems sometimes – referred to as the National question. It is quite evident that at the moment
indigene/settler conflict unlike ethnicity before it (Nnoli, 1978), show a highly mutant character. It continues to resonate sometimes with politics (Nasarawa-Toto) and it seems connected in some way with class. It is also important to observe that indigene/settler forms of identity conflict resonate with a distinct recurring ethnic variable anchored to land rights. This form has witnessed a steady virulence or extreme harmful and persistence that is yet to be adequately explained.

They also appear to be distinct in character from more ethnic conflict and indeed have surpassed the latter in volatility and scale. Evidence from the study Area (Jos-North), Nasarawa-Toto, Southern Kaduna state, and Southern Nasarawa State indicates that indigene/settler conflicts can involve several ethnic groups in tactical-alliances against the targeted (‘othered’) ones who are to be eliminated from a given territory. It is thus because of these problems that we are motivated to search in more directions for empirical evidence that could help to explain the violent indigene/settler eruption especially in Jos-North local Government – Plateau State.

The study also seeks to explain how an overt clash between – land rights combined kinship ties against citizenship could help explain indigene/settler conflict. It is quite apparent that identity or kinship ties (which so far appear to fuel the conflict), are far stronger than any other ideological fronts and secular platforms (such as citizenship) at the moment. What does one make of a conflict in both rural and urban settlements about claims to land ownership with ethnic identities as fronts and with the volatility of even ethnic cleansing?

The use of such theories as the territorial imperative in Egwu’s on the agrarian question and Rural Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria (Nnoli, 1998:53) and Elite theory by Pareto Mosca (1939:20), pluralism by Otite (1999) provide some useful guide. They however, do not yet fully account for the multidimensional-character of the conflicts.
How are indigene/settler conflict motivated by land ownership claims under the cover of ethnic identity related to struggle for power? To data, several studies have described the feature using a plethora of theories but with far too little empirical data to explain these problems. To what extent does politics play a role in either cause or escalation of the conflict and why?

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study seeks to probe the problems through the following research questions:

1. How does the land ownership led to indigene/settler conflict?

2. What role does the elite played in the manipulation of the concept of citizenship?

3. What is responsible for the present occurrence of indigene/settler conflict in the Jos North Local Government Area?

1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The study hopes to attain the following goals:

i. To explain through primary data the material root causes of indigene/settler conflict in the Jos North Local Government Area, Plateau State.

ii. To examine the role of political elite in the manipulation of the concept of citizenship.

iii. To understand the factors responsible for the present occurrence of the Jos-North conflict.
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

While a lot of effort have gone into documenting the imprint of colonial rule on the demography and economy of Africa societies, very little has been done in the area of inter-ethnic relations. Several scholars such as Rodney (1972), Ake (1980) and Nnoli (1980) have noted the disarticulated character of African–economy as a result of manipulative colonial policies. Unfortunate, far too little effort has been seen very recently in dealing with the quite social relations of African societies in the last hundred years (Akinwunmi 2006, Odeyed, 2007).

These perhaps accounts for the weaknesses of concepts vying for explanation of persistence ethnic-prone conflict in Africa. Many concepts have ignored this essential character of the social-needed to fill this critical gap.

The study is encompasses more than just the characteristics of identity conflict in an area that provides a distinctive sample of a new form of conflict – the persistent problem of violent confrontation between “indigenes” and “settlers” in the Jos-north local government Area-Plateau state. It provides a very critical link-between the theoretical concepts and empirical problem of this form of conflict by providing primary data from the field.

The work is also significant in examining the situational and mutative characters of identity conflict which has not been adequately accounted for in many areas. It therefore provides a basic step from which to explore further important aspects of the conflict such as exclusionary-basis of identity platforms. It is for example meaningful to undertake a close examination of the indigene/settler thesis in explaining ethnic identity conflict in the Jos-north local government of Plateau state.

Apart from the terrible toll in human and material resources so far, it is quite obvious that identity contestations if not sour of Nigerian nation. The logical opinion
is to start by a thorough study which alone can avail a proper and meaningful understanding of cause and effect in a dynamic and dangerous phenomenon that presently threatens the very existence of Nigeria (Alubo: 2006:4). The study of indigene/settler conflict in the Jos-north Local government area, provides a rare sample to achieve the objective.

The threat of indigene/settler conflict is even more unsettling because it has been noted to be related to constitutional recognition of indigeneity in the Nigerian definition of citizenship (section 147:3 of the 1999 constitution (as amended) and as earlier mentioned. How then can non-inclusive membership of a country as shown in the demands of say Jasawa of Jos-North Local Government Area of Plateau state and the Tiv of Taraba and Nasarawa states guarantee Patriotic citizenry – which is free and able to contribute to a fully integrated society? The very quality of Nigeria citizenship is challenged by indigene/settler confrontations and questions the character of the state that offers quite obviously unequal priviledges of such membership. For as Dunmoye (2005) observes, Nativity or indigeneity provide social and political privileges, while settler status disempowers. To date, several attempts (Nnoli; 1978, 1989, 1998; Alubo, 2006; Otite 2002) have mostly identified and described the ethnic and territorial character of this form of conflict. The study will therefore avail more understanding of this problem particularly in the Jos-North Local government Area of Plateau state with perhaps the high plurality and identity conflict in Nigeria.

We are also interested in undertaking in the study of indigene/settler conflict in the Jos-North local government Area Plateau state a better understanding of the issue of land ownership and the role of politics and religion in Nigeria. It is intended to see for instance how land and other socio-economic opportunities features in the
identity conflict. A position partially explored by Egwu (Nnoli ed. 1998) in which he however focuses mainly on the agrarian basis of the problem.

We could therefore move further and be able to show the real benefactors of this conflict. Several of our case study in Jos-North provide the opportunity to acquire more knowledge from field data which would no doubt move research forward in this area of interest. Then the sheer persistence and volatility of this conflict in the area of study makes for compelling interest. Analysts have noted the much higher frequency of identity conflict in the Jos-North local government Area than in any other particular conflict of its time in contemporary Nigeria (Alubo: 2002:2, Imobighe: 2003:14, IPRC 2003). The Jos-North which is found in the North Central of Nigeria is certainly characterized by a diverse plurality in Nigeria whose major strength perhaps lies in its sheer diversity which in this conflict is under a serious threat.

1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study covered Jos-North local government area, Plateau state involving indigene and settlers. The choice of Jos-North was informed by the fact that the area witness many indice of indigene/settler contestation mainly due to the fact that it hosts the highest number of Hausa and Fulani community than any of the Local government in the State (Plateau).

The study will also involve some of research assistance which might post challenges in the data collection phase of the work to be done.

1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

A number of problems have some implications on the accuracy of data, findings and conclusions of the study. The major limiting factor is that of financial constraint.
The un-willingness on the part of some respondents to cooperate with the researcher is yet another limitation. Some respondents refused either to be interviewed or accept the questionnaire. Others accepted but did not return the questionnaires after completing them. Those who accepted to be interviewed were not free with the researcher as some based their answer on sentiments.

The official data on crisis of the study area especially the compensation to the victims of the crisis were kept as top secret and were difficult to access. The procedure for the researcher to get the facts and figure about this subject was not easy.

Despite the above limitations, the use of more than one data gathering technique gives us the hope that information from these sources will exhibit a relatively high degree of internal consistency possible for having a valid conclusion.

1.7 HYPOTHESES

It is apt that scientific generalization is necessary in a research of this nature. This is because scientific generalization expresses an empirical relationship between concepts in the form of a generalized condition. A generalization is the simplest form of explanation. Here we are concerned with one form of generalization that is the probabilistic generalization frequently referred to as a proposition.

This work will be guided by the following prepositions:

a. Land and power are key motivating sources of indigene/settler conflict in Jos-north Local government, Plateau State.

b. Political elites are key brokers rather than citizens in the indigene/settler conflicts in the study area.

c. Religion is used as catalyst to mobilize support of the people in the study area. More especially the so-called indigenes.
1.8 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

In the course of conducting this research, various terms and concepts are used. More importantly, meanings of some key terms / concepts like settler, indigene, conflict, religion and ethnicity shall be defined. According to Dunmoye (2008):

i. **Indigene:** The concept of indigenship, particularly as it is used in Nigeria connotes the notion or perception that the indigenship of a particular society, group or region confers certain rights which others should not enjoy by virtue of being ‘strangers’ such right include (but not limited to) education and employment opportunities, land, political participation and even the right to produce traditional leadership of the community.

ii. **Settler:** The term settler is used most frequently by a community who have established control over a particular territory, to refer to a different other community or people who have recently arrived relative to the period of the arrival of the first community (‘Natives’ ‘indigenes’). It has an exclusionary implication in that, those termed as settlers are usually excluded from enjoying the rights and benefits of indigenuity.

iii. **Conflict:** Conflict may mean a contradiction arising from – difference in interests, ideas, ideologies, orientations, perceptions and tendencies, which exist at all levels of society. Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both.

iv. **Religion:** Religious identity and ethnicity are closely associated. Simply put, religion is the relationship between man and God as concerned with the problem of human destiny, life and death. In the Nigerian context however, when religion is mentioned all minds readily go to Islam and
Christianity. Islam and Christianity are considered as universal religions thus providing important defining elements of pluralism and hence more useful in the discourse on religious conflict. Incidentally, these two religion are catalysts for violence in Nigeria today. As a form of identity, religion is amenable to a wide range of discursive centres. For instance both conservative and revolutionary strands can be found within one particular religion as is well exemplified by both Islam and Christianity.

Finally, by indigene/settler conflict we mean the distinction between formal ‘national’ citizenship and ‘local’ citizenship and the associated patterns of exclusion. Intrinsically linked to this is the pattern of exclusion. Those who see themselves as ‘natives’ or ‘indigenes’ exclude those considered to be ‘strangers’ or ‘settlers’ from enjoying certain rights and benefits which they are entitled to enjoy as citizens after fulfilling the civic duties such as payment of taxes.

Furthermore, their relationship – between members of one ethno-religious group or another or generally among ethnic groups in a multi-cultural polity such as Nigeria, is characterized by a lack of cordiality, heightened mutual suspicion and leads to a tendency towards bloody clashes. These bloody clashes have over time claimed tens of thousands of lives and unquantifiable amount of money.

v. **Pluralism** refers to the idea that in society power is dispersed among a variety of groups. According to Mouv Griffione (1993) pluralism can be equated with diversity, which include race, language and religion. Pluralism on this note may be seen as the specific institutional arrangement for distributing and sharing government power to the
doctrinal defence of these arrangements and for an approach for gaining understanding of political behavior (Kariel, 1968:164).

vi. **Exclusion:** This is a discrimination meted out to people on the basis of ethnic, regional, religious and gender identities (Adesoji and Alao, 2009). On this note, those who see themselves as “natives” or “Indigenous” exclude those considered as settlers or strangers from enjoyment of certain rights and benefits that they are out to enjoy as indigenes upon fulfilling certain civic duties such as the payment of taxes.

vii. **Citizenship:** This connotes “every person born in Nigeria on or before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to any community indigenous to Nigeria” (1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria).

Citizenship also refers to rights ascribable and attributable to the individual as a member of a political community. It applies to and endows a person with full political and civic rights within the context of the modern state.

1.9 **ORGANIZATION OF WORK**

The study divided into five chapters. The first chapter contains an introduction to the study, statement of the research problem, research questions, objectives, scope, limitations and conceptual clarification. Chapter two dealt with literature review and theoretical frame work. Chapter three deals with the historical background of Plateau states, and Jos-North local government area in particular. Chapter four examines the presentation and discussion of the conflict perspective and causes of the conflict in Jos-north local government area, plateau state. While chapter five discusses the
conclusions and recommendations for improved inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations and the prevention of the crisis of citizenship in Nigeria, and the settler/indigene contestations in Jos-north local government area, Plateau state, respectively.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.1 Conflict as a Phenomenon

The issue of the crisis of citizenship is a central factor in Nigerian politics particularly in connection to settler / indigene contestations. This chapter reviews available literature that has relevance on the issue of settler / indigene contestations. The available literature will be presented in different views of how the crisis of citizenship have been the dominant factor in Nigeria and Jos-North Local Government Area of Plateau state in particular. The theoretical perspectives however, are drawn from various studies on African communities and those on Nigeria respectively.

Taiwo (2006) posits that ethnic and religious groups co-habit and co-exist together in Nigeria, it becomes imperative to begin this literature review by posing a fundamental question as to why do conflicts occur? However, different scholars, depending on the perspective in which they are looking at the concept of conflict, have defined the term in different ways. Making a distinction between conflicts and disputes Sprangler and Burgess (2005:1) state that conflict "involves deep-rooted moral or value differences, high-stake distributional questions, such as who dominates whom. Fundamental human psychological needs for identify, security and recognition are often at issue as well". Differences therefore constitute a core element in conflict. Sprangler and Burgess (2005:1) further add that "people will not compromise fundamental values. Conflict in this perspective is considered as differences in values resulting from interaction among groups. We however want to add that some conflicts can also be generated by an infringement on values of one
party by another”.

For Radcliffe (1994:3) conflict is a 'divisions'. Such division could be over class, religion, linguistic or gender issues among others. Kupolati (1995:225) added that conflict is also 'disturbances'. Such disturbances could be caused by social or political differences. He defines conflict on the basis of its outcome.

Constintino and Merchant (1995) defines conflict as fundamental disagreement between two parties (quoted in Spangler and Burgess, 2005:2). While Yarns observes that "Conflict" is a state rather than a process" (quoted in Spangler and Burgess, 2005:2). He adds that "people who have opposing interests, values, or needs are in a state of conflict which may be latent or manifest". This implies that conflict is an expression of differences, divisions, or oppositions of interests or values. Or conflict is viewed as an expression of the feeling of threat over self or group interest.

Similarly, Dike, (2001) observes that conflict exists when two people or group want to carry out acts which are incompatible with those of individuals or groups. Conflict of course, is inevitable in a society because of inherent differences such as values, interests, opinions, goals, and aspirations. In most cases in nearly all societies the above mentioned natural differences of people are mutually contradictory and antagonistic. (Dike, 2001).

Leed (1975) observes that usually there are functional and dysfunctional conflicts. Functional conflict reflects the differences and variety of human opinions and activity which exist in the society. If, however, this form of conflict is suppressed altogether, a society becomes static and stagnant, lacking the development of new ideas and institutions to take the place of out model ones. While dysfunctional conflict sometimes involves an unhealthy destructive disagreement between two or more
people.

According to Elaigwu (1975), human and societal conflicts are often multi-variable and multi-dimensional in causation. He further maintains that conflicts may be caused by actions which lead to mutual mistrust, polarization of relations, and/or hostility among groups in apparently competitive interaction within a country. They may even result from frustrations arising from unsatisfied human needs - physical, psychological, social, economic and others.

According to Eliagwu (2005:29), conflicts may also arise from explosion of identity as groups begin to ask for greater participation and rights. Threatened identities of groups have also led to crisis in a state. Seeming cultural incompatibility among groups with different communication styles could generate conflicts in a polity. In addition, demonstratable and/or perceived inequality and injustice expressed through competitive socio-political, economic and cultural frame works, have been known as potent causes of conflict, as groups react to the perceptions of the situation.

The principle of power sharing and perceived political and economic domination by one group or the other in the state can lead to the frustration and disenchantment/alienation of one group or the other from the polity. Eliagwu, (2005:29) in this regard stated that it is therefore, difficult to adequately identify causes of conflicts in contemporary Nigeria.

Conflict, according to Coleman (2005), is a struggle which grows out of the interplay of two of the opposing forces in a plot or action. Thus, in political, religions or military angles, like in the dramatic or theatrical equivalence or analogies, it is conflict which provides the elements of interest and suspense. Judging from the above it can be deduced that conflicts is inevitable, so long as there is disagreement in
interest between two or more parties.

2.1.2 Conflicts in Nigeria

The concept of conflict implies the use of violence on persons and groups of persons. It often manifests itself, as suggested by Obsershall (1978:291), severally in the form of groups violence such as riots, rebellions, strikes, civil disorders, demonstrations, protest matches and gatherings. The basis for such violent conflict includes economic, political, cultural, religious, ethnic and other social factors and considerations (Obsershall, 1978:291).

Similarly, urban ethno-religious violence in Nigeria are civil conflict spurred by negative ethnic and religions prejudices but rooted in greed and deep-seated socio-economic injustices and exploitation. Ethnicity, or more precisely ethnocentrism, is nearly always used pejoratively in the literature (Egwu, 2000; Otite 1990; Bullock and Stally-Brass, 1977). It denotes all attributes of a people bounded by well-defined culture, which uncritically presupposes superiority of the groups. Seen in this way, ethnicity is often an instrument of rivalry and dominance rather than cooperation and integration in group relations, especially in the context of plural societies. It has been at the root of most urban civil conflict in Nigeria. In most cases it never acts alone but works in close association with divisive political, economic or social (typically religions) gripes in national development process (Nnoli 1978; Kukah, 2003; HRW, 2003 a-b). The religions divide, for instance, is often an emotive tool, which aligns perfectly with ethnicity to polarize individual and communities for sectarian struggles and conflicts.

According to Kukah (1993:132) the ethnic/religious tool is ultimately used for group assertion where, ethnic groups for instance, angle for their perceived share of wealth, security, participation, equity and justice in national life. Such group or
ethnic assertions, in a plural society like Nigeria, often degenerate into sectarian struggles and conflicts which urban civil violence is a typical example (Kukah 2003:36).

Studies in communal conflict and civil violence have generally focused on the role of the state in conflict generation or mediation, the class question, the gender or regional disparities; constraints on citizenship rights and conflict resolution mechanisms (Nnoli, 2003; Toure, 2003; Egwu, 2001).

Muazam (2002:186) observes that in modern Nigeria ethnicity and religion remain the two most potent identities for socio-political realignment and bases of competition on resource control and allocation. In contrast to Muazam's view, Solomon Leith (2001) identifies four underlying and cultural causes for ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. Viz: Geographical and demographic characteristics, which has to do with the colonial legacy of forging over 200 ethnic groups together into one state and initially into three regions. The economic resources; that is unequal distribution of natural resources among regions and the problem of how to manage the inequalities for the benefits of all have created incessant political tension. The third factor is religion, which has been a decisive factor for over half a century now, with mutual fear, mainly between Muslims and Christians in the North and South. The fourth factor being the military; where authoritarian military government adopted a kind of "divide and rule" approach to keep themselves in power and sometimes to flame ethnic tensions to draw attention away from themselves. Jackstraw's (2002) assertion corroborates Leith's (2001) postulation by saying that "yet increasingly nowadays conflicts arises where no functioning state exists". But the said scholars failed to realize that ethnic tension also occurs where state exists, notably in Nigeria.

Kelechi (2004) succinctly observes that most Nigerians irrespective of their
nationalist claim have the tendency to first identify with their ethnic roots before identifying themselves as Nigerians. And, as Nnoli (1980) argues, ethnicity is the fundamental basis for identity and political cleavages in Nigeria. He further maintained that ethnicity is like a two-side sword - it tends to be the basis for communal identity and security (primordialism); but, it is also a basis for exclusionary practices (instrumentalism), which sometimes result in conflict. For primordialists, especially Shills (1979) and Geertz (1978), ethnic identity characterized by language, religion, region, blood, race and culture are inherent in all social formations and have a tendency to resist change. Thus, inspite of the evolutionary nature of historical change in the context of modernity, primordialists are of the view that ethnic identities are immutable and therefore present in modern states. As Robertson (1971) notes, to the extent that ethnopolitics, social structures and political process are trumped by individual identity, ethnic groups act as a collective, there by foregoing individual for collective interests. Thus, at the end of the cold-war and given a general decline in world conflicts, primordialists would point to increased conflicts in Africa and Eastern Europe - Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc. as an illustration of their argument (Robertson, 1971).

However, modernization theorists do not see issues of ethnicity as issues that necessarily have been solved. They argue that a movement from authoritarian systems of governments toward a democratic type will ensure unity rather than fragment the different nationalities forced together in Nigeria by colonialism. Hutchinson and Smith, (1996:8) argued that “ethnic identities are important resource that political elites employ in securing the support of the masses as a strategy for gaining a desired good. These goods or goals are measured in terms of wealth, power, and status and ... joining ethnic or national communities helps to secure these ends
either by influencing the state or in certain situations, through secession”.

Scholars and other observers concur that discrimination by government on the basis of ethnicity and place of origin is a major contributor to ethnic and ethno-religious violence all over the country. Millions of Nigerians who live outside the socio-political space within which they can affirm their indigeneity suffer exclusion and are exposed to all kinds of humiliation. While some have endured deprivations in passivity, others have contested their exclusion leading to a spate of communal conflicts. In many instances, this has assumed the dimension of violent conflicts with dire consequences for development, national unity and the resolution of the National Question (Egwu, 2005).

Lucian Pye (1979) observes that ethnic and religious conflicts are mere relic of an outmoded traditionalism doomed to be overtaken by the incursion of modernity that these conflicts were experienced by the so-called modernized developed societies of Europe and America. However, the emergence of these conflicts in the former USSR, Canada and parts of Europe in modern times has put this perspective in crisis. This view of modernization locates the factors responsible for the various problems of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria, being a modernizing society and suggests that because of the rapid rate of social and economic changes being experienced, ethnicity and religious instability contingent on the process of modernization are inevitable. From another angle Marxists dismissed ethnicity or religion as mere epiphenomenon, which had to disappear eventually, given the appropriate changes in the mode of production. Maphai (2000) observes that Marxists doctrine has reduced ethnicity to "either misunderstood or false consciousness, or a purely surface reflection of more basic and more important class variables". Marxism expects that "class circumstances would become the main line of division between people erasing the earlier lines of
tribe, language, religion and national origin (Nnoli 1995:303). Briefly speaking, for both liberals and Marxists, ethnic or religious consciousness is simply externally imposed and will eventually be dissipated by economic inter-dependence and secularization.

At the conceptual level, scholars have tried to come to terms with the ambiguous nature of the two concepts. Nnoli (1978) opines that in Africa, ethnicity represents a principle for organizing powers central to intra-class struggle. Correctly understood therefore, ethnicity is about mobilization and politicization of ethnic group identity drawing on those elements that mark out the group as language, culture, territory etc. But it takes on greater meaning in competitive situations and where available resources are scarce in relation to the interests that grow around them. Tracing the origin of African ethnicity, Mamdani (1998), related it to the problem of bifurcated nature of the colonial state, which organized rural and urban power differently. He concludes that it is a mode of organizing power and fragmenting resistance with the state playing a crucial role in its production. Ake (1995) explains that conflicts arise from the construction of ethnicity to conceal exploitation by building solidarity across class lines. Conflicts arising from appeals to ethnic support in the face of vanishing legitimacy and from manipulation gains which are not ethnic problems, but problems of particular political dynamics which are pinned on ethnicity. Invariably the central motive of power acquisition subscribes to ethnic identities, which the lengthy domination results to conflicts.

Horowitz (1978) views conflict and other related conflicts as culturally diffused, because cultural differences are among the differences that usually divide ethnic groups. Thus the Nigerian nation-state which is made up of multi-ethnic groups of varying sizes and influence that are culturally unique from each other on the
basis of language, social organization, values, belief and other cultural attributes is amendable to crisis. In other words, sectarian loyalty by most tribes in Nigeria weakened the allegiance to the central government. This is due to incessant demands for recognition by various ethnic groups, leading to settler/indigene contestations.

Mare (2000) asserts that ethnicity is a culturally specific practice and a unique set of symbols and beliefs, especially the way in which an ascribed identity is given contemporary construction through socialization and mobilization in cultural and political movements. Or it is a belief in common origin involving sometimes, the existence or belonging to a group defined in opposition to others. The attempt by Mare to identify these elements of ethnicity helps to close the gap between those who, on the hand take ethnicity as an expression of primordial inheritance, and those who understand it as something historically or socially constructed (Egwu, 1992:16).

In a constructive or an elaborate manner Egwu (2002) identifies five critical points raised in the elaboration of ethnicity in the works of Cohen (1989), Nnoli (1978; 1989), Otite (1990) and Osaghe (1992). The first point is that ethnicity exists in a polity in which there is variety of ethnic groups (pluralism). Second, it is characterized by exclusiveness, the common consciousness of being one in relation to others. Third, it is a tool of competition for individuals and groups for scarce public goods such as contracts, employment, political, appointments, scholarships, access to land as well as opportunities for lucrative trade and commerce. Fourth, it is primarily a political phenomenon in so far as it has much to do with the allocation of values. In fact it is a state-linked category rather than an archaic survival mechanism of the African people with other cleavages such as class and religion. It is therefore, not a fixed form of consciousness, but situational as it alters its form, place and role in the social process (Egwu, 1993:18). This also forms the deliberate act of a state to
maintain the status quo, which consequently may lead to settler/indigene conflict. Beliefs, according to Muktar (2007) have consequences for social actions and are more complex than ethnicity because it is emotion laden.

Similarly, Pitchard (1979:21) recognizes the difficulty in the study of religion especially penetrating the "inner essence of religion, particularly for the unbelievers and those who have not undergone the religious experience under investigation. However, this does not in any way implies that one must be a believer to study religious phenomenon because what matters ultimately is not so much the validity of religious beliefs as in the effect of such beliefs on social action and change (Baret, 1994; Egwu 2002:29). Therefore religion only serves as a tool that derived sympathy on one against the other, as ethnicism deepened.

Kukah (1993), observes that in Nigeria any discourse on religion takes our minds to Islam and Christianity because they are the two dominant religious beliefs in the country. In addition, these two religions are considered universal and served to provide important defining elements of pluralism. Incidentally, these two religions that form the catalyst for violence in the country are colonially invented. In the specific colonial context, it was a subtle instrument of control and hence, an integral element of the colonial ideological warfare (Egwu, 2002:18). This phenomenon of using religion as a political tool still persists in Nigeria for more than four decades of independence, which recently in some places metamorphosed into settler/indigene divide. The issue of manipulation as rightly observed by Usman (1987), serves particular political and economic end had long been recognized that most of the religious turbulence in the country were engineered by imperialism and Zionist, Arab action to subvert, contain and crush the revolutionary movements and progressive governments Usman, (1987:7), Ibrahim (1991) contends that, much as the
'manipulation thesis' sheds some light on the role of religion in contemporary Nigeria, a lot remains to be explained. For example, it does not answer the question of why people are susceptible to manipulation. We argue rather that the resurgence of religion fundamentalism among Muslim and Christians can be explained by the fact that religion has become an arena of accumulation, and not merely about the control of the theological space as religious movement do provide material support for their adherents such as helping them to secure employment, organizing marriage and naming ceremonies as well as other material interventions to cushion the effect of the economic crisis Usman (1991:125).

In respect of the Christian community, there has occurred a fundamental "shift from the ideological to the mundane in motivational conceptions" (Kukah, 1993:75). Just as there is no homogeneity in ethnic group there is also diversities even within a given religious setting. This is common to both Islam and Christianity. For example, among Christians, Catholics, Protestants and Pentecostals are immersed in doctrinal disagreement just as there disagreement between Sufi and anti-Sufi sects, Izala and Darika sects among Muslims. Infact religious affiliation tends to overlap as ethnic identity becomes part of religious identity. We can buttress this with the example of Zangon-Kataf people in Kaduna state, Sayawa of Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi state and the recent Berom and Hausa/Fulani in Plateau state. In all these cases Christianity provides the rallying point for the natives while Islam provides primary element in the definition of Hausa/Fulani ethnicity respectively.

Looking from another perspective Ibrahim (2002) argues that ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria are primarily rooted in the crisis of citizenship. He cited numerous examples which include the well known and standing fratricidal wars between the Hausa and Kataf (Ayab) in Zangon-Kataf in Southern Kaduna, the
protracted Jukun/Tiv conflicts in Wukari and the Chamba and Kuteb conflicts in Taraba states as well as the deadly confrontation in Nasarawa state between Bassa and Ebirra. In these cases, different ethnic groups are pitched against one another. But similarly conflicts have been recorded within groups who share the same historical and linguistic affinities as the examples of the Ife/Modekeke crisis and Umuleri /Aguleri conflict have clearly shown Ibrahim (2002:3). More recently, in 2008 through to 2009 the city of Jos which has attracted the appellation "Home of Peace and Tourism" for its long history of inter-ethnic tolerance and harmony, experienced an unprecedented ethno-religious violence. Like the examples cited above, violence has its origin in the crisis of citizenship (Ibrahim, 2002:4). This problem has recently transformed into the settler/indigene contestations.

Suberu (1999:13) is of the view that the Political Bureau of 1986 has long discovered the problems of ethno-religious minorities in Nigeria. In its report, the Political Bureau lamented the manner in which the process of state building in Nigeria has reduced the nation's ethno-religious minorities and other socio-economic vulnerable groups into constant objects of "neglect", oppression, discrimination and “bigotry”. Acknowledging the incompatibility of these oppressive tendencies with the national commitment to the establishment of a just and egalitarian society, the Political Bureau (1986) argues for a more direct and effective role of the government in ensuring a fairer distribution of national resources and leadership positions, in enforcing the various provisions on human and socio-economic rights, and in sustaining the principle of official neutrality or impartiality in religious affairs, which was order of the day. Which also ascertain fears of the minorities in many part of Nigeria. But the government of the then used the Bureau Report to sustain its power.

Suberu further explains that, the Political Bureau (1986) also recommends the
immediate enactment of a national legal instrument on human minority and socio-economic rights, the protection of inter-governmental advisory boards on minority problems (Suberu, 1999:13).

Conflict can hardly be discussed outside the concept of pluralism. According to Smooha (1975:69) plural society is characterized by co-existing but distinct cultural diversities and compulsory social institutions. The plural nature of the Nigerian state makes her an ideal study in conflict. Whether we view conflict as normal or abnormal, it is a recurring natural fact. It is inherent in all social, economic or political settings - characterized by ethnic, religious and other forms of pluralism. Conflict is the very essence of most formal and informal social organizations and processes, such as ethnic groups as well as state and local governments where appointments and promotions are made. The location of sites and facilities, such as markets and grazing lands, generates conflicts and when these are not resolved, their negative consequences are felt beyond the immediate environment of the parties in conflict (Smooha, 1975:69).

According to Coser (1968:30) conflicts are said to have their objective bases in society. The concept is daily validated over access to a variety of limited resources which are created and distributed within a defined establishment and location: chairmanship position, power and status, markets, water sports for animal and posture routes, jurisdiction of chiefs and kings, leadership of political parties etc. Conflicts are real and serve in the above circumstances in the achievement of goals or the maintenance of claims. An illuminating definition of conflict as proferred by Coser is that:

*Social conflict may be defined as a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate...*
their rivals. Such conflicts may take place between individuals and collectivities. Inter-groups as well as intra-groups conflicts are perennial features of social life (Coser 1968:30).

In this instance, conflict refers to act of conscious opposition between identifiable actors, people or human element over scarce resources. Similarly, it is an integral aspect of social existence and indeed human history is a succession of conflict and conflict resolutions. In the same vein, conflict, like culture, is a way of life. This is due to human relations which differs in perceptions, goals and aspirations.

Reviewing literature with regards to citizenship and indigene/settler divide Mamdani (2002) outline three types of agency that interest him. The first is citizenship, centred on the majority and political minorities as outcomes of the democratic process. In this he explore how the notion of citizenship, civil society and political majority/minority have been changing over the past decade. Concerning ethnic identity, Mamdani stated that Banyar-wanda is East Africa’s largest ethnic group. He further argue that Banyar-wanda national of Uganda considered indigenous because of their ancestral presence on Ugandan soil predating the colonial beginning of colonialism while those who came to Uganda in the colonial period as non-indigenous migrants.

Under indirect-rule state, according to Mamdani (2002) the type created British colonialism in Uganda, only those considered indigenous were said to be with ethnicity; legally, they were defined as belonging to races. Similarly, under colonialism, only races had full rights, not ethnic groups. However, after independence Mamdani posits, the tables were turned; full citizenship rights could only be claimed by those considered ethnically indigenous. This deduce that the society in question shifted their qualification to citizenship from races or earlier
migrant to ethnic basis. Example were also advanced in the NorthKivu where research has shown that Banyaratshury were considered indigenous, but Banyar maissi were not. This possible because Banyarmasisi lived in Congo before the Belgians colonized it, whereas the Banyamasisi came to Congo after it was colonized by the Belgians. This invariably shows that colonialism was the dividing line between who is indigenous and who is not. It also depicts that the independent state of Congo identifies its own with the birth of the colonial state.

On the basis of nation-state, Mamdani analyzed how state defines indigeneity as cultural and has through history actively pursued cultural assimilation of all immigrants into mainstream French culture. The German state defines indigeneity as biological and has historically tended to safeguard the biological purity of German nation through policies of ethnic cleansing. This then, was the background to the first major political crisis in both Uganda and Rwanda.

To understand the historical formation of Hutu and Tutsi in the word of Mamdani, one need to look at the historical formation of the Rwanda state. That Hutu and Tutsi were not ethnic identities. Tutsi was an identity of power. It is not that all Tutsi were in power, but simply that whites-including poor whites were associated with power. Furthermore, he emphasized that social and political gains of the 1959 revolution in Rwanda cannot be dismissed, the fact that land reform and the reform of governance had been experienced. But it failed to overcome the political legacy of colonialism. This is because the political identities was created by the colonialism. Particularly, Hutu as an indigenous, Bantu and Tutsi as alien Hamites. In the same vein, this activities politicized indigeneity.

Citizenship in contemporary Congo, in the word of Mamdani (2006) as in contemporary Uganda, has two dimensions: Civic and ethnic. Citizenship in this
context with regard to civic, refers to individual rights, which are civil and political, and are stipulated as such in the constitution. In contrast, ethnic citizenship refers to group rights. These are social and economic, and normally referred to as ‘customary’ right to land and the right of access to customary courts (Mamdani, 2002).

In Congo, the Mobutu regime had a conflicting attitude to Congolese, Banyar wanda. Whereas the 1972 decree by Mobutu has granted citizenship to 1959 refugees, the 1981 law emphasized ancestry over residence. Similarly, the Congolese conference of 1991 considered the citizenship question in 1991 as the basis of citizenship. In this regard, we agree with Mamdani’s view that this agency of identity, saw itself as ‘native and its target as alien’.

Mamdani concludes by challenging three common-sense propositions. The first concerns the citizenship crisis in the great lakes region. This crisis is not about scarce resources, though it is connotated to it. It is about defining access to resources. Citizenship does not entitle one to resources but it entitles one to enter the struggle for resources. This also make people to understand the debate over resources around the world. He cited instances, with the United States that children of slaves had to struggle to be recognized as Americans, African Americans. In United Kingdom, children of immigrants from colonies demand that they be recognized as black British. He further stated that in South Africa, the children of privileged immigrants, yesterday’s colonizers, now recognize that it is Africans who will be entitle to enter the struggle for resources, and so now demand that they too be considered Africans.

Mamdani posed a question, that if political identities can be redefined from natives and settlers to residents and non-residents, is it not a moving away from defining the right of existing minorities to changing the very definition of who is a minority?
Judging from the Mamdani’s view with regards to citizenship, and as a contribution to knowledge, the area of concern is majorly on ethnicity, race and colonial legacy as a pre-requisite for citizenship, indigeneship and settler, particularly on the great lakes region of Rwanda, Uganda and Congo. More especially Banyaruthuru and Banyar Masisi, Tutsi and Hutu as well as Banyarwanda. Some of these ethnic differs in the region. But did not concentrate in a particular place as it is in the case of Jos-North, Plateau State.

Dunmoye (2008) in his part posits that one of the major constraints of national unity and political integration in Nigeria is the inexactitude of the constitutional provisions on citizenship. There are conflicting provisions that abfuscate the qualifications of a citizen. Over time, Nigeria ‘s political leaders and analyst alike have been pre-occupied with the debilitating problems of ethno-religious conflicts and perceived or imagine marginalization in the political and economic realms. He further reiterated that the fundamental flaw in Nigeria’s citizenship is often neglect of the issue of “partial” citizenship that are conferred on those often referred to as “settler” or “non-indigene” in social interaction in general.

Dunmoye further maintained that controversies and contestation over citizenship rights in Nigerian federation have become major source of disagreement and political conflicts that often threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria. In the word of Egwu (2006), the core of these contestation and debates on the citizenship rights ascribed to the individual in the liberated discourse on the one hand, and concern for group in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural setting. Specifically, he pointed out that the question is centered around the distinctions between formal “national” citizenship and “local” citizenship and the associated patterns of exclusion. This is identity based on ethnicity, religion, region and gender.
Egwu advanced the citizenship debates by reiterating that those who see themselves as ‘natives’ or ‘indigeneous’ exclude those considered to be “strangers” or “settlers” from enjoying certain rights and benefits which they are entitled to enjoy as citizens after fulfilling their civic duties such as payment of taxes. In agreement with Dunmoye and Egwu (2008 and 2006), the issue of natives/indigenes and strangers/settlers dichotomy, is tied to ethnic lines.

Ethnic instigated contestations over citizenship right in Nigeria according to Dunmoye (2008), emanate from colonial heritages, cultural pluralism and the peculiar political economy of the Nigerian State. Advancing the citizenship debate, Dunmoye adds that in contemporary Nigeria, indigeneity is the basis upon which rights and entitlements are given, and not citizenship. In the light of this, indigeneship is now superior to citizenship. This contestation takes the form of the fundamental questions “who owns the land? or who was the first settler on the land? Just like in the case of Jos-North Local Government Area, Plateau State.

In Dunmoye (2008) Mamdani with particular reference to Equatorial and South Africa, poses the questions “when does a settler become a native?” He maintained that globalization and the economic reforms have created economic opportunities with attendant social dislocations.

The process is creating a situation where a lot of people are in transit, scavenging for economic opportunities. These migrants come into collusion with other people who regard themselves as “natives”. Social cohesion is threatened as competition for economic opportunities create a state of flux. Africa, citizenship and identity are subjected to stresses (Nyamnjah, 2006 Alubo 2006).

In Nigeria, when does a settler become an indigene and citizen? It is obvious that given this scenario, there are no citizens in Nigeria but citizens of Nigeria (Taiwo,
Nativity or indigeneity provide social and political privileges, while settler status disempowers. This was earlier observed in the previous chapter. In this view therefore, ethnicity is a major factor in determining the dichotomy between “native/indigene” and a “settler” or “stranger”.

The literature reviewed on citizenship has laid much emphasis on the ethnicity as the determining factor to citizenship and indigeneship. However, it becomes very difficult to locate who is an indigene and who is a settler. This is because there is widespread manipulation of the concept “Citizenship” in the study areas. Thus, the indigene/settler conflict with bitter integration. Which is the gap this work seeks to fill.

As a contribution to knowledge it is a fact that since 1999 Nigeria has been democratizing. It is expected that various ethnic groups will integrate, yet some ethnic groups are chanting that some are indigene while others are settlers and this forms the background of our study on the crises of citizenship and indigene/settler conflict in Jos-North Local Government Area, Plateau State. This also forms the gap to be filled as stated thereof.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theories act as foundation of analysis especially if the analysis is social science oriented. Theoretical frame work therefore provides a focal guide within which to test our propositions, verify our variables. For this purpose Elite theory is adopted to guide the analysis and as well theoretical framework.

Elite theory had posited that power resides in and is always in the control of a network of elites. The proponents of Elite theory include Pareto Mosca, Robert Mitchels, C. Wright Mills, Ortega Y. Gasset among others. They also maintained that public policy, is by and large the mirror image of elite interest.
In order to understand public policy, one has to examine the socio-economic status as well as power relations within the community. The underline premise of elite theory is that the masses are basically apathetic hence, elites are left to dominate the policy-making process (Haruna, Dlakwa, 2003:7). The major thrust or rather tenets/claims of Elite theory are summarize as follows:

a. Society is divided into few who have power and allocate value for the society and the many who do not have power and also do not decide public policy.

b. Elites are drawn mainly from the upper socio-economic strata of society.

c. The movement of non-elite to the elite class must be slow and continuous so as to maintain stability and avoid revolution.

d. Elites always try to defend the status quo-ante so as to protect and preserve their undue advantages over the masses.

e. Influence and power always flow from the elites at the top downwards to the masses.

f. The vast matter of people are destined to be ruled by the selected few (H. Dlakwa, 2003).

In recent years however, the study of elites has come to occupy a prominent position on research agenda of political scientists, historians and other scholars in the social and behavioural fields. The elite theories originally developed in the classical literatures of the Greek by Gaeteno Mosca, Vilfredo and Robert Michael as mentioned earlier, has been progressively reassessed in the light of contemporary inquiries.

Elite theory with regard to state seeks to describe the power relationship in modern society. Which maintained that a small minority consisting of a members of
economic elite and policy planning network hold the most powerful democratic election a state possess.

This is done through position incorporations corporate boards and influence over policy – planning networks financial report of foundations or positions with policy decisions of corporations and government (H. Dlakwa, 2003 in Robert Michael 1939:50).

Elite play major roles in shaping political phenomena. Politics cannot be studied properly without identifying the ruling class of the governing and non-governing elites and measuring their respective roles.

Renzo Sereno (1975:179) on his part pointed out that elite theory reduces the study of politics to the study of power relations. He further stressed that if power proves to be inadequate principle for understanding politics elite theory will collapse. This means that any attempt to alter the elite theory will breed it extinction in operation.

Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) believed that elite in different occupations and strata of society generally come from the same class: a higher stratum and the lower stratum class. Pareto’s focus of inquiry was the governing elite which he believed rules by a mixture of force and cunning. It is force which regards predominating.

Pareto also developed the concept of circulation of elites, where he points that “history is a graveyard of Aristocracies”. To him every society there is an elite from higher to lower levels and from lower to higher levels resulting in a considerable increase of generated elements in the classes which hold power and on the other hand in an increase of elements of superior quality in the subject classes. This leads to the ultimate extinction of every elite group in society. Further maintains that the dissolution of the elite group makes the social equilibrium leading to instability
Similarly, Mosca introduced the concept of the “sub – elite, composed practically of the whole new middle class of civil servants messengers of industries, scientists and scholars and treat it as vital elements in the government of society. “The stability of any political organism he writes, depends largely on the level of morality, intelligence and activity that this second stratum has attained.

Mosca attaches a great deal of importance to what he calls the “political formula” which is equivalent to Pareto’s “derivation”. That in every society the governing elites tries to find a moral and legal basis for its being in the citadel of power and represents it as “the logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted (Mosca 1939:50).

Robert Mitchels (1949) associated the elite theory with what he refers to the “Iron Law of Oligarchy”. By this theory he posits that most democratic modern societies and the most advanced parties have been unable to escape the “iron Law of History”. The central focus of Mitchell’s theory is the element of “organization”. Stressed that “Immanent Oligarchy Tendencies”, exist in every kind of human organization which strives for the attainment of definite ends.

Leadership according Mitchels is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life. Old order and civilization must exhibit Aristocratic features (Mitchel’s 1949:4). The majority of human beings based on Mitchels assertion are apathetic, indolent and Slavish and are permanently incapable of governing. They are susceptible to flattery and obsequious in the presence of strength. Leadership easily takes advantages of these qualities to perpetuate themselves in power. Revolutions sometimes occur in history and tyrants are disposed, but new tyrant arise and the world goes on as before (Mitchels, 1949:40).

Based on the above thought of the elite theory, the following are its strengths:
a. The elite theory prevents the involvements of large number of people in the decision – making that may end in time consuming and cumbersome.
b. It reduces the study of politics to power relations, in that if power proves to be inadequate principles for understanding politics, elite theory will collapse.
c. Elites tries to find a moral and legal basis for its being in the citadels of power and represent it as the logical and necessary consequences of doctrines and beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted (Mosca, 1939:50).

The strengths of the elite theory in power relations, equally call for its weaknesses which can be analysed below:

a. The theory does not recognize the contribution of the masses in decision making, since they (the masses) are apathetic with unconscious mind.
b. The theory does not condone a radical change since the elite want to maintain the status quo-ante.
c. The theory also create a gap between the masses and those that occupied the political power, which invites conflicts.
d. The elite theory is Eurocentric since most of the proponents of the theory are non Africans.

In justifying the above theory in the study area, it is evident that Jos – North is characterized by heterogeneous or rather pluralist community. Where political elite religious elite, and organizational elite exist. But the political elites have politicize the citizenship on the basis of “indigene and settler”. This concept is manipulated in terms of employment, political power and admissions.
The same political elites that politicized citizenship on the basis of indigene ship and settler, were call up on in various committees of enquiry to investigate the causes of the conflict, and make recommendations for the lasting solution to the conflict.

This theory has also justified our proposition in the earlier chapters and rhyme with Robert Mitchel’s view of “Iron Law of Oligarch” that in every society there must be political elite.

However, in the study area the matter still remain apathetic, hence due to their unconscious mind were used by the political elite to execute the conflict.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This work broadly adopts or rather utilize both primary and secondary methods. The source of data in this research includes the close and open ended questionnaire. This was complemented by personal observations of the researcher though with absolute care and avoidance of pre-concieved ideas so as to achieve reliability of research findings. The respondents had their view examine through the questionnaire method. While the review of work of eminent scholars, policy gathered from materials such as text books, journals, magazines and alike formed the secondary source of data. This is in addition to reports of various commissions/committee of inquiry as well as information based on internet source.

3.2 CLUSTER SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

This technique was employed to divide the population of the study area into ward cluster for convenience. This technique involves sampling in successive stages, such that at each stage, selection is made.

The table below captured the distribution of the total population and the sample size according to the ward of the local government under study is presented in a tabular form.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>No of wards of the Local Governments</th>
<th>Total population per ward</th>
<th>Sample size per ward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Abba Nashanu Ward</td>
<td>42,349</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ali Kazaure Ward</td>
<td>29,924</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Dalhatu Ward</td>
<td>33,605</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Katsina Ward</td>
<td>32,107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sarki Arab Ward</td>
<td>30,189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Gangare Ward</td>
<td>49,274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Naraguta ‘A’ Ward</td>
<td>42,982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Naraguta ‘B’ Ward</td>
<td>32,344</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Tudun Wada-Kaban Ward</td>
<td>47,117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Jenta Adamu Ward</td>
<td>50,336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Tafawa Balewa Ward</td>
<td>47,290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>437,217</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ward sample size of the study was obtained through the use of the following formula:

\[
\text{Ward Pop.} \times \frac{\text{sampling size}}{\text{One}}
\]

\[\text{e.g.} \quad \frac{29624}{212408} \times \frac{500}{1} = 139\]
1. SAMPLING PROCEDURE

Multi-stage cluster sample technique was used to cover the population of Jos-north Local Government Area. Jos-North is made up of eleven electoral wards. The local government has a population of 437,217 people according to (2006) Population census. Recently, the NPC projected population is approximation of 439,217 people out of which 500 sample size targeted through structured questionnaires. Systematic sampling method was employed or rather used in the most populous polling unit in each of the selected electoral wards.

3.3 POPULATION OF THE STUDY

The target population is male and female in the five major ethnic groups in the conflict, cutting across all the existing ethnic group in the area covered by the study. The first category of our respondents and the information obtained here was through questionnaire from across section of the public (the inhabitant of Jos-North Local Government Area) youths, civil servants, students, self employed, women divorce, farmers and teachers. The second category of the respondents comprising of key stakeholders in the study area. The informants within this category were reached through unstructured interview.

3.4 SAMPLING FRAME

The study area is Jos-North Local government, which has eleven (11) political ward. Multi stage cluster sampling technique is employed to divide the population of the local government into ward cluster of convenience. This technique involves sampling in successive stages such that at each stage, selection is made. (Bello A, 2008:6).
3.5 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE

This was done through tabulation method, which is a method of transferring data from its gathering instruments to a tabular form. The data was analyzed through the use of quantitative and qualitative descriptive methods of analysis to summarize the results of the subject under investigation. Through quantitative descriptive analysis method, the researcher made use of simple percentage and frequency distribution tables to sum the mass of the information that was generated during the field work. The interviews with stakeholders through the use of qualitative method analysis.

However, the data obtained is limited by the financial constraints, confidentiality of the official data, unwillingness of some respondents to accept the questionnaire or to be interviewed. Despite the limitation, the techniques employed gives us the hope that the information from these sources will exhibit a relatively high degree of viable conclusion.

As demonstrated in Table 4.2, the respondents to the questionnaires for this research were drawn mainly from the major ethnic groups that make up Jos-North local government area. Each of these tribes forms the twelve wards. Attention was given to even distribution of the questionnaires among the five major ethnic groups and others within the Jos-North local government area. This is in order to have fair representation and views of the respondents in the study area. One hundred questionnaires were however administered each to five major ethic groups namely; Berom, Hausa, Fulani, Anaguta and Affizere. These ethnic group were selected using cluster sampling method with structured and open ended questionnaire, and they include Christians, Muslim, Single, Married, Divorce, Civil servants, Business persons, Students and Farmers in the local government. Out of this number, the total
number of 462 respondents in this study a total of 95 representing 20.5% of the respondents were Berom. It is also evident from the survey that 8.0% of the respondents representing a total of 37 were Afizere. It also indicated in Table 4.2 that, 28 or 6.1% of the respondents were Anaguta while 196 representing 42.4% of the respondents were Hausa-Fulani. And 27 or 5.8% of the respondents were Jarawa others constitutes 16 representing 3.5% of the respondents. While the number of responses was 63 representing 13.6%.

It should also be understood that the Hausa-Fulani constituted a high number of respondents, followed by the Berom ethnic group. These groups also are central in the contestations. The frequency distribution is captured in Table 4.2.
CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORY AND SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF JOS NORTH L.G.A

JOS-NORTH:

4.1 A BACKGROUND HISTORY AND THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE CONFLICT

Jos-North local government area is a plural society, defined by cultural-institutional diversities of the ethnic groups of various populations and with people practicing two main religions- Islam and Christianity. Similarly, Jos-north is a very complex area with behavior and relationship of individuals and strategic social institutions.

It is in recognition of these facts that we intend to give a brief historical background of the area in terms of the people, their culture and political life. The issue raised include the influences of Islam, colonial rule, land ownership, leading to indigene/settler contestations as well as the existing problems among the people. It is only in this way that the current crisis can be put in its proper historical context/antecedents.

Jos North is in Plateau state located at latitude 8.40 longitudes 9.90 North with a total land area of about 130k^2, is situated over 1,500m above sea level and has a cool temperate temperature better than most parts of the country and known in the past as the world famous tin, mining producer. (Plateau State Water Board Technical Paper, 2006). Jos-north became a local government area in 1991 when additional local government were created in that same year. Based on the 2006 population census of Nigeria, Jos-north Local Government Area has the total population of 437,217.

The present Jos-north local government area represents the following wards:
i. Abba Nashehu Ward
ii. Ali Kazaure Ward
iii. Dalhatu Ward
iv. Garba Daho Ward
v. Ibrahim Katsina Ward
vi. Sarki Arab Ward
vii. Gangare Ward
viii. Naraguta “A” Ward
ix. Naraguta “B” Ward
x. Tudun Wada-Kabong Ward
xi. Jenta Adamu Ward
xii. Tafawa Balewa Ward


The historical interpretations of Jos north and the basis for the indigene/settler contestation had made us to understand that the history of Jos before, during and after colonial rule and the philosophies surrounding such interpretations of the history, have contributed immensely to the prevalence of the Jos crisis. According to Best, (2008) such historical interpretations form the justification for the claims made by primary parties to the crisis for political participation in its traditional and modern bureaucratic forms and for the quest for prominence, each over the other.

It is in view of the foregoing that Dunmoye (2008) maintained that controversies over citizenship rights in Nigerian federation have become a major source of disagreement and political conflicts that threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria. He added that those who see themselves as “natives” or “indigenes” exclude those considered to be “strangers” or “settlers” from enjoying certain rights and
benefits which they are entitled to enjoy as citizens after fulfilling their civic duties such as payment of taxes (2008:133).

The implication of the Dunmoye’s view with regards to extreme exclusion in the study area, particularly the Hausa and Fulani who were also prompt tax payers. But excluded on the basis of indigene and settler dichotomy. In this regards, we agree with the Dunmoye’s view.

Tied to the issue of historical interpretations of Jos and the basis of the conflict, the Hausa-Fulani leaders argue that there was no Jos before they arrived the area in the beginning of the 20th century. That what constitute Jos town at the moment was virgin land, and that they founded Jos, even though within the territory of indigenes. A section of the Hausa-Fulani contends that Jos was a Zango, a transit camp for people traveling from the north to the south. They add that pre-colonial Jos was part of Kasashen Bauchi (the land of Bauchi), implying that the Bauchi Emirate had authority over the area. Mahdi Adamu (1978) also contend that the Kasashan Bauchi include the entire Plateau state and beyond, right down to Benue state. The reference to Bauchi here is by virtue of its having become the most prominent emirate authority in the area following the Danfodio Jihad that began in 1804. In traditional Hausa-Fulani emirate view, therefore, the Jos Plateau was apart of the Bauchi Emirate. Bauchi Emirate indeed used to address the Massif highland territories of Plateau state as dar-aljabal (i.e. Plateau was part of Bauchi Emirate located on a rock).

4.2 PLATEAU STATE

Plateau state is one of the thirty-six states that make up the Nigerian federation. It has seventeen local governments, distributed among the three senatorial districts of North, South and Central. The first area under consideration in this research is Plateau North Senatorial District made up of Jos-North, Jos-South, Jos
East, Bassa, Riyom and Barkin Ladi Local Government area. The local government areas in the Plateau Central Senatorial Zone include Mangu, Pankshin, Bokos, Kanke and Kanam, while in the Southern Senatorial Zone are Wase, Langtan North, Langtam South, Mikang, Qu’an Pam and Shendam local government areas. With total population of 3,206,531 (National Population Data, 2006).

The name Plateau is derived from the nature and character of the bulk of the land mass of the state. The land in most of the Plateau north and Plateau central is flat, and resembles a calabash turned upside down. It constitutes the area sometimes called the central Nigerian Highlands with a picturesque landscape formed by a massif table land ranging everywhere from 1200 to 1800 metres above sea level (Plateau state government, 2001). Nigerian rivers derive their head waters from the Plateau. The high Plateau is traditionally referred as the Jos Plateau because of its flat landscape and relatively cool weather. Much of Plateau north and central senatorial districts with the exception of Dangi and parts of Kanke local government areas, fall into this description. There is also the lower part of the state, the bulk of which is in the Southern senatorial district. This area has warmer weather than the up land.

The ethnic groups that populate the state believe they migrated from somewhere else centuries back and settled where they are at the moment. Some of them especially those from the Chadic group, were most likely ejected from their earlier northern locations by the turbulence that characterized the rise and fall of states in Hausaland and ancient Kanem Borno empire region to the north (Best, 2004). However, Berom people dismissed the fact that Plateau was ever subdued by Bauchi, or came under the authority of Bauchi Emirate before colonialism. They query how Bauchi could have laid claim to the Plateau when in reality, all the attempts made by the pre-colonial Bauchi emirate to conquer and subjugate the area after the Danfodio
jihad were rebuffed and repelled. Bauchi Emirate authorities always lived in the belief that the Plateau was part of their sphere of jurisdiction (Du Elders’ Council Plateau State Government, 2001).

They further contend that at the inception of colonialism, the British employed the policy of indirect rule. This system retained the traditional institution they met on ground-based on the Post-Danfodio jihad emirates. The adaption of indirect rule they posit, meant relying essentially on the emirates of Northern Nigeria. These were more developed than other Chieftaincy institutions, where available, as the case was on the high Plateau. It was when indirect rule started that the high Plateau was administered as part of Bauchi province, because Bauchi was the nearest emirate to the Plateau. In the words of the Plateau state government:

>This was based on the misleading information provided at the emirate palace, on the Psedu claims of emirate administration overall the non-Muslim polities in the highlands. Accordingly, the whole area of the highlands was called Bauchi Plateau. This lasted from 1902 to 1926. (The Heritage and Hope, (p.2), Plateau state government, 2001).

To buttress the above submission, Anthropological studies commissioned by the colonial authorities (Philip, 2009) led to a better understanding of the Plateau polities. Thus in 1926, the Plateau, made up of the non-Muslim polities, was separated from Bauchi province following the introduction of Pagan administration, and administered as Plateau province. The Berom and Anaguta were in Plateau province, but the largest portion of the Afrizere people were left in Bauchi province. Many non-Muslim parts of Northern Nigeria were similarly reorganized. It was in 1976 that some more Afizere people were brought back to Plateau state to join their kin in Gwong District. Even then, many Afizeres were left in Bauchi state (Philip, 2009).
The Anthropological Studies Commission (in Philip, 2009) further stressed that prior to 1900, there was no urban center, as understood today, in Jos or in any where on the Plateau that, the group that inhibited the Plateau lived in small communities of clans and villages, and had their political leadership based on such clans or tribes, with varying degrees of functions and different levels of development. The area that is today called Jos fell into the farm lands and hunting land of the indigenous groups, namely Berom, Anaguta and Afizere. The people lived in other settlements like Kabong, Du, and Gwong (Du Elders’ Council, 2001:20 in Best, 2004). Even though the indigenes disagree over the ownership of Jos, they all agree that they had a high level of interaction among themselves through these land designations.

The Du Council of elders stressed their disagreement by emphasizing that the origin of Jos as an urban centre can be traced to the tin mining industry founded after colonial intervention from 1902. Naraguta village, six kilometers north of Jos, was the first administrative head quarters of Jos. The capital was relocated from Naraguta to Jos in 1914, mainly because larger deposits of tin were discovered there, and because there was more land and water in Jos. In 1915, the colonial administration granted Jos the status of a second-class township after which the town was mapped and laid out. The town was divided into three main clusters in line with the typical colonial fashion of designing cities. The first category was the Government Residential Area (GRA), where European and other foreigners, as well as Native town, which was inhabited by the Hausa in the main town. Thirdly, there was the Township, that comprised of other Nigerians and foreigners. This division granted the incomers access to land in Jos, and the Hausas were the single largest group to have settled in the new city within the first forty years. Others, such as the Yoruba,
Urhobo, Igbos, etc. also came in within the same period. These incomers according to Berom, contributed to the growth of the economy of the township in numerous ways. The Hausa, by virtue of their large number inevitably led the way in the growth of Jos.

They added that, Jos grew very rapidly after the early layout not only because of the mining industry, but also because of the massive infrastructural development put in place by the colonial government. Notably, the opening of Bauchi-Zaria light railway in 1915 which linked Jos, as well as the Eastern Railway in Port-Harcourt via Enugu and Makurdi to Jos, and the road network from the South and to the north, all contributed in no small way to the blossoming of Jos. The electricity industry from Kwall (1925) and Kurra Falls (1930) (mining areas) were also contributory to the growth of the town. These later developments brought in a large number of incomers to Jos from the Southern part of the country either as technical hands or people engaged in commercial and other related pursuits. The economic, commercial and political significance of Jos continued to expand both during the colonial period and even up to, and beyond independence in 1960. This development was later to constitute the bases for competition and conflict between the ethnic and religious groups which inhabit the city. This competition turned political with the Hausa perception of their being deprived of their rights in a city they founded and led for long. Their political pursuits and search for justice on the premise of this belief heightened the possibilities for conflict (Ibid).

4.3 CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE AND CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN JOS-NORTH

Perceptions are believed to be a major source of conflict. Thus, one of the main task of conflict analysis (Best S.G. 2004). The first section of this work, is to
present the perceptions of the parties to the Jos-north crisis of Plateau state. These perceptions show the psychological world views and foundation for other levels of conflict for the parties. Perceptions compete, and may not necessarily be right, but they contribute to representing how primary parties to the conflict, and sometimes how secondary parties come to see the conflict. Perceptions also help in escalating and protracting the conflict. As a matter of fact, it is an uphill task for conflict analysts to validate and resolve conflicting perspectives because parties do not believe these because they are right or wrong but they do so just because they do. This work as stated earlier provides a synthesis at the end of this section. The chapter in the first part attempts to capture how the parties view the conflict and how they view each other.

4.3.1 Hausa Perspective of the Conflict

The Hausa narration has it that they established Jos and nurtured it into a modern city without help from any of the indigenous ethnic groups in Jos. They argue that Jos was established from about 1902 out of a virgin land, with one of the indigenous groups in its immediate vicinity. A leader of the Hausa community in Jos, the Turakin Jos Alhaji Inuwa Ali (2004) succinctly captures this view as follows:

Historically Jos is a Hausa settlement and this had been confirmed by Mr. Ames a colonial Administrator who gave the population of Jos town in 1950 at 10,207 out of which 10,000 people were of Hausa/Fulani origin. Before the arrival of the British, the present location of Jos was a virgin land and the situation as could be seen show no concentration of Beroms or any of the tribes in the neighbourhood as being seen in the heart land of Jos town. (Turakin Jos, in Richard 1979).

This position is further advanced and maintained by several other publications by Hausa/Fulani scholars and sources. Col. D.A. Umar (Rtd.) makes an attempt to
explain the historical foundation of Jos. He dismisses the claims of the Anaguta, over the ownership of Jos, and concludes that Jos belongs to the Hausa/Fulani, who in his view are the real indigenes (Ahmad, 2005).

He further maintains that:

*Historically Jos belongs to the Hausa/Fulani and they are the real indigenes. What is happening today in terms of rejection is just distortion of history which will bring more difficulties and complex questions than solutions* (Ahmad, 2005).

The earliest Hausa settler non-indigenes initially settled at Naraguta village, some six kilometers north of Jos, but the colonial authorities relocated them to Jos where there was more land and more water. Most of the early settler non-indigenes came from Kano, Bauchi, Katsina, Borno etc. The movement of the Hausa population into Jos was to support tin mining, which the colonialists had opened in Jos in the early years of the 20th century. Traders, butchers, koranic teachers and other artisans also followed the mining population. Other wider Plateau indigenous ethnic groups also moved into the city for either commerce or to join the tin mining industry. These include Plateau groups like Ngas, Ron, Mupun and Mwaghavul (Lawrence, 2001).

Hausa/Fulani claims to ownership of, and indigeneity to Jos, are based on a number of considered factors. First is their belief of having founded Jos from a “virgin land”, and then having nurtured it into a modern town. Second is the belief that they outnumbered any other group in the city up to 1950 and presumably to date. Thirdly, they have contributed to the economic growth of Jos and now are in control of the economy to the envy of the indigenes. Fourthly, they opine that they ruled the town traditionally, and produced eleven Hausa/Fulani rulers up to 1947, after which they were maneuvered out of that stool. Fifthly, they point to the presence of the Islamic justice system based on the Alkali courts to service the needs of the
Hausa/Fulani population in the Jos Native town until the 1950s. Sixth, the naming of major streets and areas in Jos with Hausa names, further discussed below, is also used to support the claim to Hausa ownership (Ottie, 1990).

The seventh argument is that they have no other place they can call home, as they cannot fit into or be acceptable to wherever they or their forefathers might have come from. Eighthly they point to their political contributions having been elected and appointed to represent Jos at different positions of responsibility dating back to the colonial times. Some of these electoral gains are those of Alhaji Garba Baku­zuwajere as the first representative of Jos in the Northern House of Assembly, Alhaji Isa Haruna as representative at the pre-independence conference of Nigeria, Alhaji Audu Danladi to the Constituent Assembly in 1978, etc. with several others following subsequently. As such they see no basis of being denied indigene status and indigene forms in Jos North Local Government Area.

The Hausa/Fulani history attached great significance to traditional leadership in Jos. They argue that because of the importance of leadership to the Hausa Community Bauchi Emirate appointed a District head with the title of Barde for the earlier Settlement at Naraguta. After that, another called Sarki Bunu who was said to be the younger brother of the Emir of Bauchi first settled at Naraguta (Ahmad, 2001:1) was appointed from Bauchi before the movement of the headquarters to Jos. In all, according to the Hausa/Fulani, a total of eleven Hausa Chiefs ruled Jos as Sarkin Jos (King of Jos) up to 1947, the last of them being Ishaku Gwamna who died in 1947. According to Ahmed (2001), the available record kept by colonial administration and oral testimonies, it was certain that during the more than 50 years of Hausa rule, thirteen rulers features with the title of Sarkin Jos. Oral testimonies
speak of Bunu and Barde as the first and second among the Hausa rulers who were turbaned and sent to Naraguta by the Emir of Bauchi before 1902. Others were:


Source: Ahmad (2001:10)

He further add that, after the status of the Hausa, Sarkin Jos was reduced to Magajin Gari which was the first style introduced by colonial administration to knock Hausa’s out of the administrations, five successive people were appointed with such title as follows:

1. Magajin Gari Mammadi
2. Wakilin Gari Dankarfilla
3. Wakilin Gari Usman Na Garba
4. Wakilin Gari Dan Karfalla

Ahmad (2001) further emphasized that some ethnic groups in northern Nigeria migrated to their present origin probably due to the rise of Jukun Empire or free themselves from the Jukun yoke. He adds that their migration to Plateau (i.e. Birom) landed them first at Ashone from Ashono according to Birom tradition, they moved to Riyom from where the expansion of the tribe took them to Machi, Afang, Assob, Rim, Jalkuru, Ron Gyel, Zawan, Heip Wang and Foron. Which made up the then Southern part of Jos division. Hausa emphasized that based on the foregoing, it is incomprehensive that the Birom people would lay claim to the ownership of Jos.

Hausa also make reference to a book titled “contemporary changes in traditional societies” – The Aguta of Nigeria, that the ancestors of the Anaguta had always lived in Gwong (Present Nasarawa Gwom) and that their elders believed their forefather emerged from holes in the ground in the vicinity of their present settlement. They argue that the Anagutas have no definite tales of migration or any elaborate tales of origin. Furthermore, they add that the Anagutas rejected Biroms affiliation to their origin on the grounds that they did not recognize any genetic connection between them and Birom people (Ahmad 2001).

Hausa/Fulani claim that “… the town was by 1912 referred to as ‘Hausa settlement of Jos’. They further make reference to colonial administrator Ames, noting that:

“the Hausa/Fulani inhabited what is presently known as Jos before the coming of the colonialists and before the Hausas Jos was an unoccupied virgin land. The Hausas have been there since the beginning of the century. No Birom had a house in the heart land of Jos. (‘He continued’). … as close as 1950, there were only 10,207 people in Jos town of which 10,000 were Hausas” (Ames, 1912).
Hausas agree that historically, each of the tribes claiming ownership of Jos must have migrated from other places. For example Jarawa, Mwaghavuls, Ngas and part of Anaguta migrated from Bornu to Bauchi and later migrated from Bauchi to present places in Jos division of Plateau. They argue that, historically, Gbongon Jos, Dr. Fom Bot claimed that Biroms migrated from the old Gobir Empire in the present Kebbi/Sokoto state that is Madawa, a border between Niger Republic and Sokoto. From this historical fact, according to Hausa perspective, it could be seen that the Hausa/Fulani are the only tribe that have migrated to Plateau. Even at the time of migration the Biroms, Jarawa and Anaguta should have arrived from the same day, but still each recognized their individual territory, then why are each of them denying Hausa’s territory as well as claiming? (Ahmad, 2001).

The sixteen independent district heads as at 1927 -1968 include:

**Table 4.1: District Heads in Jos 1927 - 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DISTRICTS</th>
<th>DATE OF INSTALLATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mallam Chai Nang</td>
<td>District Head of Jal</td>
<td>1/11/1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mallam Maigari Maijinku</td>
<td>District Head of Buji</td>
<td>11/2/1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mallam Pam Tok</td>
<td>District Head of Ikipang</td>
<td>12/9/1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mallam Abdul Doya</td>
<td>District Head of Amo</td>
<td>14/11/1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mallam Pam Dalyop</td>
<td>District Head of Vwang</td>
<td>29/4/1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Mallam Dung Rwang</td>
<td>District Head of Kwon</td>
<td>14/10/1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mallam Ashi, Dodo</td>
<td>District Head of Kwon</td>
<td>10/10/1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Mallam Shehu Muh’d Sarki</td>
<td>Sarkin Gari Bukuru</td>
<td>1/12/1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Mallam Nga Dangyang</td>
<td>District Head of Gyel</td>
<td>1/12/1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Mallam Nyoro Gwok</td>
<td>District Head of Gashish</td>
<td>30/6/1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Mallam Dalyop Gwong</td>
<td>District Head of Bachit</td>
<td>14/4/1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Mallam Pwajok Dalyop</td>
<td>District Head of Kuru</td>
<td>13/4/1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Mallam Sani Dankaka</td>
<td>District Head of Jere</td>
<td>10/4/1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Mallam Dodo Do</td>
<td>District Head of Riyon</td>
<td>17/15/1968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In buttressing the above nomenclature, the Hausa people add that before the establishment of the British system of administration each district was virtually independent of the rest except for family ties which in some cases ran across district boundaries. They also claimed that before 1902 Jos was independently a Hausa enclave as they had Sarkin Garin Jos not Wakilin Garin Jos then. They tried to differentiate between Jos Native Town and Jos Division consisting of other tribes. The district head of Amo (Mallam Sambo) was the chairman of the council. It was later that permanent chairmanship was proposed (by the colonialists for their own interest) and Mallam Rwang Pam was chosen in 1947 as the first class chief of Birom with a title Gbong Gwom at a status of third class chief.

The Hausa perspective further states that in 1955 the entire division was united under one local administration, as a result the paramount chief of Birom at that time was made the head of the administration and a second class chief of Birom with the new title of Chief of Jos in the same 1955. While narrating how the Hausa/Fulani were robbed of their stool. The book “This is Jos” stated:

“... it was not until 1951 after innumerable agitations (instigated and decided by the colonial masters) that the status of Chief of Jos was reduced to Magajin Garin Jos and the area (was maneuvered to) become known as Birom N.A. later changed to Jos N.A in 1954 (because many districts out of Jos division were not Birom speaking areas). That was when chief of Biroms became the chief of Jos”. (Ahmad, 1954:3).

A slight digression from the perspective of Hausa-Fulani with regards to the ownership of Jos. Ahmad (2005:1) is of the following view:

“that the city of Jos and adjacent Bukur town (henceforth Jos/Bukur) in Plateau state, Nigeria have over fifty ethnic groups with no single group large enough to claim majority position. Among the bigger indigenous groups are the Birom, Jarawa, Anaguta, Hausa Angas Goemai Montol, Mwoghavul, Rukuba and
Ron-Kulere. Birom, Jarawa and Anaguta are the only ones who claim to be indigenes of Jos city. (2005:1).

However, these three groups themselves migrated to Jos from elsewhere: Birom were from the South of Jos, Jarawa came from Bauchi, and Anaguta from East of Jos. Thus others mentioned here might not be from the city of Jos historically. He adds that, the groups living in Jos so far seem to lack a precise history of migration (see Arnes, 1934 and Weekly Trust, 15/5/2004), emphasized that it is assumed that the issues on settlement and migration etc. in the Jos/Bukuru area tend to be purely historical. Also stated that among the immigrants who settled in the region are the Yoruba and Igbo. In recent years, Hausa native-speakers from various dialect areas, namely Bauchi, Daura, Gudiri, Hadeja, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto (including Kebbi and Zamfara) in Nigeria and few from Niger Republic as well as some speakers of minority languages in northern-eastern Nigeria migrated to Jos and Bukur in large numbers. Due to linguistic and socio-economic constraints, the various local communities in the area use Hausa as a second language (L2) in addition to their first language (L1). Hausa therefore became the medium of inter-ethnic communication i.e. lingua franca (Weekly Trust, 2004).

4.3.2 Berom Perspective of the Conflict

According to Best (2004), the Berom posit that they had securely settled and had autonomous administration in Jos along with the Anaguta prior to the coming of the colonialists. The colonialists after arriving and making Jos an administrative centre, then brought the Hausa to the city to assist as labour force in the tin mines. The Berom state that they had a traditional name for the area called “Jot” meaning a water spring. This, they say, was corrupted by strangers like Europeans and Hausa/Fulani and changed to Jos. The spring’s location, according to the Berom, was
around Gangare area, behind the Jos ultra-modern market. The springs is said to have now been destroyed by human development activities. The Berom add that the city later expanded to other areas of Jos as known today. Example given of places with Berom names that have been renamed with Hausa and stranger names are:

**Table 4.2 Hausa / Berom Names of Jos North Local Government Area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Berom Name</th>
<th>Hausa Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabong</td>
<td>Gada Biyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwuri</td>
<td>Angwan Soya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuwelnyap / Gmong</td>
<td>Nasarawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laranto</td>
<td>Katato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jot</td>
<td>Gangare/Garba Daho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tite</td>
<td>Jenta Apata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakra</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rot Noro</td>
<td>Mi Kazakre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gura Lahmetjei</td>
<td>Angwan Rogo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>Mai Adiko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berukuru</td>
<td>Bukuru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Philip (2004:20)

Berom maintained that, these Hausa names, to Berom, are those of Hausa individuals and key miners that were employed for the convenience of the Hausa people. The list according to them is endless, and it goes beyond Berom land to affect every part of the Plateau where mining took place. In Bokkos, Mangu, Bassa local government areas, etc. where tin mining took place they also took place. Examples are: Dorawan Babuje, Gindin Akwati, Dogo Nattawa, Mai Idon Taro, Tenti Babba Tenti Karami, Mai Kataka, Kantoma, Gande, Dutsen Lamba, Mangu Arna, Mangu Hausawa etc (Philip, 2004).

Another pillar of Berom perception is their insistence that they were never conquered by the Fulani Jihadists following the Dan Fodio jihad at any point in history. They add that the Hausa only felt able to come to Berom land following, the British conquest of the land and imposition of their Pax Britannica. This opened the gate for the influx of the Hausa settler, non-indigenes from the far north into Jos.
Fulani also moved in the Jos Plateau for pasture around the same period. The greatest number of Hausa migration to Jos occurred during the period of the second world war, 1939 – 1945, as a result of the demands for tin plates to execute the war. The northern provinces had to meet certain allocations in the labour demands made by the colonial administration. They dismiss the Hausa claim to having ruled Jos, maintaining that such presumed rulers were appointed as leaders of the Hausa settlements in the tin mines and had nothing to do with the Berom and other indigenes. They opine that having failed to conquer the indigenes through Danfodio Jihad, the Hausa cannot claim Plateau was part of Bauchi land (Best, 2004).

The Berom further noted that they were reluctant to cooperate with the earliest colonialists, the European miners, the Hausa migrants, and the Fulani pastoralists in the early years of their arrival because they did not trust them. The Berom were used to living alone and etc. preferred to continue with such life as they refused to work for the white miners and colonialists especially for free leaving them with the option of recruiting labour from the Hausa communities of the far north. According to the Berom, when the Hausa first came, the Berom attacked and killed some of them because they did not accept them. The Berom similarly tried to chase away the cows of the Fulani and did kill some. Wherever the Hausa people sat, usually on stones, the Berom people used to burn the stones with fire in the belief that the Hausa strangers carried diseases that could kill them. Earlier attempts had been made to introduce Islam, which the Berom rejected. However, they later gradually accepted Christianity which was introduced by European Christian missionaries (Philip, 2009).

Finally, the Berom note the absence of reciprocity in the Hausa stronghold states of the far north. They have maintained that other Nigerians, including the Berom, do not receive the kind of treatment which the Hausa/Fulani are asking for in
Jos, in the far northern states controlled by the Hausa. They then query the intentions of the Hausa in Jos. They fault the sense of history of the Hausa pointing out that they are insensitive to their origin. Thus, they migrate to settle in place and thereafter feign ignorance of where they came from.

“… wherever they migrate to and settle becomes their starting and ending point of history”. Berom people also criticize the Hausa for refusing to integrate into the local culture and customs of the Berom and other indigenous ethnic groups in Jos, and they believe this refusal is out of contempt for the Berom and their other neighbours. Part of the evidence they point to is the refusal by the Hausa to learn and speak the local language, eat local food, accept the local religion, or even give their daughters in marriage to the Berom people. They have instead chosen to maintain a secluded life within their closed communities.

In conclusion, the Berom reiterate that Jos is not only Berom land, but “… is our Jerusalem and is indigenously inhabited by the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere”. They add that they are the indigenes of Jos, and that they had co-existed peacefully with the Anaguta and Afizere in the area. These are their fellow indigenes. While they admit that the Hausa are citizens of Nigeria and are entitled to the privileges of citizenship of the country, they maintain that they are not indigenes of Jos (Best, 2004).

4.3.3 The Anaguta Perspective

According to Suberu (1999), the Anaguta perspective agrees with the Berom and Afizere perspectives to a limited extent. It opines that the Hausa/Fulani have no share in Jos as it is not their heritage, and that the land does not belong to them. They add that even though they might have been instrumental to the early life of Jos, this does not grant them the indigene right they are asking for, since they did so within the
land area and territory that belonged to the indigenes. The Ujah Anaguta, the prominent ruler of the Anaguta ethnic group made it clear that the Hausa/Fulani have nothing to do with the traditional rulership of Jos. He added that their claim to having ruled Jos in the past is baseless since they did not conquer the area in any pre-colonial battle, or indeed any battle after then they dismiss the idea of Hausa chiefs as rulers with no authority of office, and representing only Hausa settler mining populations on the Plateau. However, he argues that this is political, and anybody can benefit from it, and aspire to its leadership. However, the traditional matters should be left to the indigenes. He also contends that the Hausa should not seek to be indigenes since they know they are not, they are settler non-indigenes. They are residents and citizens, and should be only so recognized.

In a wider sense, the Anaguta see themselves as the true and indeed only indigenes of Jos, more so against the background that the original seed that led to the establishment of Jos during its transfer to the site, plus what was known to the Hausa world as Jos ahead of colonialism was Naraguta village. They add that both the white men and the first Hausa settler non-indigenes met the Anaguta before any other group in Jos. The Anaguta original name for Jos is Uzheashi, meaning a place where people gather. The location of Uzheashi, to the Anaguta was around the present Kasuwan Nama to school Lana in Jos town. They maintained that they were the first of all the indigenous groups to come to Jos. All the electoral wards in Jos, according to the Anaguta, are in their territory (Suberu, 1999).

The Anaguta agree with Berom and Afizere on farmlands, which they believe have identifiable boundaries. However, they opine that when it comes to the ownership of Jos, it is Anaguta property and territory. They even add that they gave out most of the land owned by the Berom in Jos to the Berom free of charge. During
the creation of Jos-North local government in 1991, the Anaguta were initially passive, because according to them, they did not quite understand the implications, but they had hoped it was for development. They now think that they need a space of their own. Whereas the Berom are in four local governments and the Afizere in two at the moment, the Anaguta can only be found in Jos-North local government area. They explain that they have gone into cooperation with other indigenes out of little or no choice since they need them for their success. Given a choice however, the Anaguta would be happier in a local government of their own.

The major area of disagreement between the Anaguta and Berom, as well as the Afizere, is in the area of traditional rulership of Jos, and traditional rulership is itself a function of perceptions of ownership. The present law of ascension to the throne of the Paramount ruler of Jos allows the Anaguta and Berom to contest for Gbong Gwom of Jos stool, but does not include Jarawa. However, all three indigenous groups believe that they are each eligible for and entitled to the Jos traditional stool (Best, 2004:33).

4.3.4 The Afizere Perspective of the conflict

The Afizere agrees with both the Berom and the Anaguta about the Hausa/Fulani whom they see as settler non-indigenes and persons who do not reciprocate the good gesture of their hosts. They dismiss the Hausa/Fulani as a group that has no right in the traditional authority and land of Jos. Beyond this point, the Afizere disagree with both the Anaguta and the Berom. They argue that Jos belongs to the Afizere language, which the colonialists and other strangers misspelled as Jos. This was located around the present Ahmadu Bello Way, Beach Road to the Museum. They add that the traditional boundary between the Berom and the Afizere is at the Bukuru low cost bridge and that the infiltration and consolidation of the Berom
population in Jos was made possible by the initial mistaken placement of the larger segment of Afizere under Bauchi province by the colonial administration, even after the commencement of ‘Pagan’ Administration which led to the severance of the large part of the Plateau from Bauchi Province. However, because they have coexisted with the Berom for long and want peace, the Afizere are less pushful about these traditional boundaries. The Afizere dismiss the Anaguta claim to township of Jos, maintaining that the Anaguta had to hide under Afizere protection during the pre-colonial period, to save them from the plan by the Rukuba to exterminate them. This, to the Afizere, explains why the Anaguta were given Afizere tribal marks as a security cover.

The Afizere argue that it was their people who either gave out the land for most of the physical development that has today taken place in Jos, or who received compensation for such lands, and that documents are available to this effect. The Afizere also have their own names for different locations in Jos, as do the Berom and the Anaguta, as well as the Hausa. Laranto is Ranto to them, which they argue the Berom corrupted to Laranto: Tudun Wada is called Gyese, while Wild Life Park, which the Berom call Mado, is called Dong by the Afizere, etc. the Afizere are more worried about the renaming of key parts of the city by the Hausa/Fulani, which to them, represents a worse form of threat than the claims of the Berom and Anaguta. Like the Anaguta, the Afizere contend that they gave out a large part of the lands claimed by the Berom in Jos to them, free of charge (Mapal, 2000).

4.3.5 Fulani Perspective Of The Conflict

According to Fulani perspective on Jos conflict, Best (2005:35) is of the view that it has nothing to do with them, as they are not interested in the political issues that generated the conflict. They add that they never attended any meeting anywhere
about Jos, have never shown interests, and they have never been consulted about the issues in the conflict such as chairmanship, etc. As such, they never expected the conflict. The conflicts they know about are those that emanated from crops belonging to native farmers being accidentally destroyed by cattle belonging to Fulani pastoralists and then unjustifiably and innocently attacked by the Berom and Irigwe, and those other people that attacked them. Some of the Fulani people that were killed, according to them, had never been to Jos in their entire lives, and know nothing about the conflict in Jos. Thus, they resorted to taking revenge after they came under attack and for the Fulani, they could die in revenge because it is fundamental to their culture and philosophy.

The Fulani believe they have a crises of identity since they are hardly accepted as indigenes anywhere in the state, and because their traditional normative practice of moving from place to place in search of good grazing land for their livestock, makes it difficult for them to stay in one place for a long time. Based on the feeling that they receive unprovoked attack, they decided to take “defensive action”, interpreted by indigenes as sporadic retaliatory armed attacks (Mapal, 2000).

4.4 CAUSES AND PATTERN OF CONFLICT IN JOS-NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

As noted in the previous discussion, the crisis of citizenship with particular reflection to indigenes/settler contestation in the Northern part of Plateau state (Jos-north) became more pronounced between the years 1991 – 2010. The crises have been attributed to different causes but the pattern has remained the same virtually in all the aforesaid conflicts. The 1991 and 2001 crises were caused by sharp disagreements between the Hausa-Fulani (settlers) and the Berom (native) over political power of the Jos-north local government area. Similarly, in 2001, like the
previous ones, began with the appointment of a Hausa/Fulani candidate Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), a federal government programme in Jos north local government. The appointment sparked protest and rejection from the indigenous groups on the one hand, and jubilation from the Hausa/Fulani on the other hand (Daily Trust, 2010).

4.4.1 Remote Causes

It is evident that the creation of the Jos-North Local Government by the Ibrahim Babangida regime in 1991 was the remote cause. Where Berom ethnic group protested the development. Particularly over the appointment of a Hausa Chairman in the Jos North Local Government Council. In 1998, a small incident between a Berom and Hausa degenerated into the Bukuru Gyero road fracas, leading to violence, destruction of property and loss of lives.

At the bottom of the Jos conflict is the competition for political control as well as the issue of indigeneship. The competition and conflict springs form who is an indigene and who is not, and the rights and privileges derivable from being an indigene. Thus indigeneship is not a mere status but a status that begets specific political, economic and psychological benefit. These reasons variously taken together can be categorized into political, economic, social and religious.

4.4.2 Political Factors

Between 1991 and 2007 there were several outbreaks of communal violence in Jos-north. Election to the Jos-north local government council and chairmanship were held in 1991, soon after the new local government was created. The winner of Jos-north chairmanship was Samai’la Mohammed – a Jasawa. But the indigenes
complained about his appointment of other Jasawa to key positions in the local
government, and most especially about the fact that he began issuing indigene
certificates from Jos north to Jasawa, as well as to Afizeres, Anagutas and Beroms
(Suberu, 1999).

When General Abacha, appointed Col. Mohammed Mana as military governor
of Plateau state there was mass protest from the Berom ethnic group. However, the
day-to-day management of local governments was left in the hands of their existing
Directors of Personnel Management (DPMs), pending further instructions. These
came early in 1994, when the military governors throughout the country appointed
five-person “care-taker committees” to run the local governments. The man
appointed by Col. Mana to the chairmanship of the Jos-north caretaker committee, in
early 1994, was Alhaji Aminu Mato, a Jasawa.

Mato was not acceptable to the Berom natives. On 5 April 1994 they staged a
protest at Government House in Jos, against his appointment or indeed the
appointment of any Jasawa as chairman. Col. Mana nevertheless swore Mato into
office on 6 April, and the handing over ceremony was fixed for 8 April at the local
government headquarters.

The indigenes swore not to allow him assume office. Tension was just
palpable in the air. On 8th April 1994 Berom ethnic group thronged to the venue to
prevent the handing over taking place (Bagudu 2003:88). They succeeded, Col. Mana
backed away from Mato’s appointment, ordering the DPM to continue running Jos-
north until further notice. This in turn infuriated the Jasawa. In the following days
Jasawa butchers slaughtered animals on the high way near the Jos abattoir, saying
these and other acts of protest would continue until Mato was installed. On 11th April
the Jasawa held a meeting near the central mosque, calling for people to come out en masse for a demonstration the next day.

The following day Jasawa Youths took to the streets... this later finally degenerated into chaos and violence in the city of Jos, leading to the destruction of property and the death of four persons. Parts of the Jos ultra-modern market, the Gada Biyu market, and an Islamic school and mosque along Rukuba road were destroyed. (Philip, 2009).

Suberu (2001) maintains that if there was any single overriding logic to the 1991 local government reorganizations, it is that they were largely the result of concerted manipulation of the distribution and configuration of the new locality to favour… the (Babangida) administration’s key members, advisers, supporters or lobbyists (2001:107). He further stressed that “the creation of Jos-north local government was done to favour the Hausa community in Jos”. The Plateau indigenes certainly lobbied hard for it. The Plateau indigenes protested vociferously, but to no effect. (Suberu, 2009).

This heightened the indigenship, citizenship and settler contestation in the area. The recurrent problem constituted by the indigene/settler syndrome in Jos, mostly between the Hausa/Fulani self styled Jasawa and traditional natives of Jos town (the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere) constitute a major factor for the Jos crises.

4.4.3 Economic Factor

The crises on the Jos-north of Plateau state is first and foremost a struggle over land. Majority of the Beroms are Christians tied to the land as peasant farmers or workers in the Civil Service, while the mainly Muslims are Hausa dry-season farmers and cattler rearing Fulani, with the Igbo, Urhobo, Yoruba and Hausa dominating the business life of the Jos-north (the metropolis). Some indigenes particularly from the
southern senatorial district are also cattle herders. The land thus remains an important emotive issue to a region that is predominantly inhabited by peasant farmers (frustrated over lack of fertilizers) and cattle herders who usually are mutually conflict prone. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) brought about the retirement and retrenchment of many public servants, semi or low educated petty company workers and military personnel (most who actively participated in the civil war) occasioned their return to the farmlands thereby exerting great pressure on land resources. (Umar, 2001:3), thus:

Suddenly, land which used to be available to those who used or needed it became a prized possession. Both the Hausa/Fulani and Beroms alike began to rationalize their inability to acquire and possess land to the presence of the other group, thereby undermining the imperative of their coexistence and the basis of consensus and confidence building (2001:1). Invariably, these factors probably account for the preponderence of land disputes as an index in the perennial communal conflict profile of Jos-north and Plateau state, at large.

In view of the above it can be inferred that land is central to survival, hence conflict very often occur over access to pastoral and arable land. Differences in ethnic nationality and religion between Plateau ethnic groups and the Hausa-Fulani only serve to compound these economic problems. With regards to economy, it is evident that a strong economic factor concerns the domination of commerce by Hausa speaking people. And this certainly has implications on the spread of Hausa in Jos. (Ahmed, 2005).

Analyzing the views of Hausa/Fulani by Philip, (2004), they have brought manufacture and trade business of many kinds to Jos, and increased its prosperity. They pay taxes for years, they wish not to go anywhere else and in many cases no where else to go. They own a great deal of property there. To them, their exclusion
from a share of governance and the benefits of indigenship of Jos is not only unfair to them as a matter of equity (2009:10).

Beroms on the other hand, are of the desire that the Hausa Fulani recognize them by accepting the fact that they, the Beroms, own the land, and as such, they are landlords that deserve to be and should be respected. An extension of this need is the exclusive preserve to own and preside over traditional authority in the area under considerations. Simply put, the Beroms have a fundamental need for recognition and respect (Best, 2004:47).

4.4.4 Socio-Cultural Factor

The Jos-north local government area is heterogeneous community consisting several ethnic groups and among which include Beroms, Hausa/Fulani, Anaguta, Jarawa, Igbos, Yorubas, Urhobo and others. After the creation of Jos-north local government in 1991, the majority of Berom and Anaguta had their population reduced, as some moved to the Southern Jos local government. The Hausa-Fulani were predominantly Muslims while the Berom were predominantly Christians. As a result of this religious affinity the Anaguta took after the Berom brothers, which automatically grouped them together against the Hausa during the crises. So also, the Hausa and Fulani did in solidarity. These cultural and religious differences determine the alliance in all crises and incidents as far back as 1947.

It had been noted by the several commissions of inquiry that social integration of the diverse communities within the area of Jos-north was lacking. Because of the long standing hostility associated with who owns land or those who came first, the indigenous communities felt that the Hausa/Fulani are marginalizing them economically. And vis-à-vis Hausa-Fulani felt that they are being excluded from governance and rulership.
Furthermore, in analyzing the social dimension of the crisis, Umar, (2001) posits that despite many years of existence, Hausa/Fulani Muslim failed to integrated fully into the Jos Plateau society. The community being Muslim does not tolerate marriage between their daughters and Christian but they do marry Christian girls. Most Jos Plateau Christian communities detest such mode of social integration. This has given birth to what Christians refer to a “Hausa-Fulani inferior culture” to belittling and arrogance since they look down with open contempt and lack of respect up on their host community, using such intemperate language and stereotypes as arna, infidels, Sarkin arna, the chief of infidels, Kafirai (Kafir) to describe them. They exhibit total disregard for the culture, religion and traditional institutions of their host communities. This is a fundamental reason that has given birth to deep seated bitterness, with far reaching social consequences, that has continued to fan conflict on the Jos-north local government and Plateau state at large. This has severely breached the laws of communal harmony and interaction (Umar, 2001:4).

Secondly, the source of tension as observed by Umar (2001), in the Jos settler/indigene relationship also stems from the Hausa-Fulani claim over the ownership of Jos, the chieftaincy stool and other tenuous claims to political offices. Further maintain that, this is what has pitted Muslim Hausa-Fulani against such Christians as the Berom, Afizere and the Anaguta on the one hand and other settlers like the Yoruba, Urhobo, and Igbo on the other (2001:5).

In a linguistic sense, Ahmad (2005) observes that, still in a socio-cultural perspective Hausa as a second language in Jos had an edge over other minor languages. This is because Hausa language and culture have influenced the earlier inhabitants of Plateau. The extent of this influence has led to language shift, which
may endanger the local languages leading to their death or extinction. The factor responsible for the shift among others is the social factor.

He further observed that, as an urban area, different people with diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds migrated to Jos and this led to the concentration of population in the city. With such situation, the need for a lingua franca arose. Obviously Hausa becomes the language of the majority with most of the population shifting to it for inter-group or inter-ethnic contact.

Citing Zango (Hausa settlement in a non-Hausa country) Ahmad (2005) adds that, Hausa speakers in Jos live mainly as a group in city centre (for instance, Unguwar Naraguta in Jos). Although the settlements were not typical Hausa quarters, they stick to their cultural tradition. This gave them a greater chance of retaining their language and culture. On the contrary, speakers of minor languages of Plateau state are scattered all over Jos and Bukuru. Thus, they are easily assimilated into Hausa language and culture. Speakers of these smaller languages of the Plateau state are scattered all over the city as a result of which their language and cultural values are disintegrating. The smaller the number of speakers of a language, the stronger would be the threat to their language (cf. Mohammed, 1999).

Judging from the above, if one could clearly analyze, it violates the citizen’s rights and leads to conflict or crisis. Even if the government is tyrannical or dictatorial and the fact that in our contemporary society civil unrest could be complicated by the guise of religion to satisfy certain economic and social motive is pathetic indeed.

4.4.5 Religious Factor

Since the outbreak of crises in Jos-north in 1991, different versions have been given about its causes. A fairly large number of the people who spoke about the
nature and source of the riots attributed it to religious factor. There was a general feeling among the public that the religious undertone to the crisis was nurtured by the state. It has been believed, particularly among the Christian side that the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida was largely responsible for the un-conducive atmosphere of religious intolerance in the Jos-north local government area. Hence the creation of Jos-north local government along religious interest to favour the Hausa-Fulani community (Suberu 2001:107).

Tied to the above is the way news spread about the crisis: that it was between Muslims and Christians that Muslims were being killed by Christians in Jos. This generated negative reactions by Muslims in Wase, Yalwan, Shendam and Gamai areas, all in Plateau state.

The participation of religious bodies like the Jama’atu Nasril Islam and the Christian Association of Nigeria in the conflict was also another factor. For instance, while the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) identified itself with Hausa/Fulani and criticized the demand of the Berom as one that would install Christian rulership over the Muslims, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) identified with the Berom being a predominant Christian community. After the conflict, these religious groups were seen distributing relief materials only to their religious followers who were affected by the conflict (Ahmad, 2005).

In addition to the above, the escalation of the conflict and introduction of religion into the conflict by desperate individuals and groups have both inevitably led to religion becoming an identity and means of demarcation during the later stages of the conflict. In particular, at the point the crisis spread to beyond the Zone (Jos north), and when the religious Associations began to enlist external emotional and material support as mentioned earlier, religion became a crucial dividing line for the
religious groups as parties to the conflict. It is this division that gives the conflict the semblance of religion. What is clear from all the evidence is that even though religion was used to prosecute the crisis, this crisis was hardly about religion.

Most commentators and observers point to the destruction of places of worship and the religious pattern of attacks and killings, the use of religious slogans, etc. to conclude that the crisis was religious. However, more needs to be done to reach the conclusion that the conflict is not religious. Nevertheless, religion is only an instrument for the prosecution of the conflict in Jos-north. Sadly, not many, including religious persons can see beyond the narrow angle of religion (Philip, 2009).

4.5 THE SEPTEMBER 2001 CONFLICT

4.5.1 Background To The Crisis

The background to the 2001 Jos-north local government crisis had been set up from the previous issues discussed. The immediate cause of the conflict, like the previous ones, began with the appointment of a Hausa/Fulani candidate, Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), a federal government programme, in Jos-north local government (Best, 2004:60). The appointment sparked protest and rejection from the Berom ethnic groups on the one hand, and jubilation from the Hausa/Fulani on the other hand. Like they did in 1994, the Beroms made press releases challenging the appointment of a person they considered a “non-indigene”. The group, mostly youths called on the government to reverse the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar in the interest of peace. Best (2004) opines that the same candidate had been Education Secretary in Jos-north local government from 1991 to 1993, and had contested the chairmanship of the local government. The candidate had been declared winner, was sworn in, but
was later removed by an Election Petition Tribunal. The Berom remained vehement that he was a non-indigene.

Moreover, other physical acts were embarked upon by this “Concerned Youths” of Plateau state to stop Mal. Mukhtar from assuming office. Persons believed to be Berom youths vandalized his office. It was reported by the Jasawa Development Association on the 20th August, 2001 that human faeces were used to smear the office. The provocation from the above material has become the justification for the Hausa/Fulani response documented below. The Hausa/Fulani blame the indigenes for setting the background to violence with this provocation (2001:61).

The Hausa community, through the Jasawa Development Association, reported these events to the Governor of Plateau state in a letter dated August 20, 2001. Copies were made to Nigeria President, Vice President, leaders of the National Assembly and key security agencies in Nigeria. However, the appeal to the governor to stop the group and warned that should government fail to check their activities in good time “… the peace, unity and tranquility of this area cannot be guaranteed”. (Ibid).

The reaction of the Jasawa Development Association was informed by earlier frustrations, as catalogued in the letter. Reference was made to the nullification of the appointment of Alhaji Aminu as local government chairman in 1994, and the rejection of the appointment of Mallam Ado Muhammed as Education Secretary to Jos-North in 1996. Also mentioned was that Alhaji Sani Mudi, Hausa, won the party primaries for chairmanship office in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 1998, but was relegated to the position of Deputy Chairman by the party hierarchy. Others are the refusal to grant indigene certificates to Hausa/Fulani people in Jos-north local

Furthermore, a week after the letter of the Jasawa Association was sent to the governor, particularly on August 28th 2001, a group of Berom Youths from Plateau state addressed a letter to Plateau state government entitled “Enough is Enough”. The youth group not only protested the propaganda of the Hausa/Fulani youth, but also gave the Governor and the security operatives 48 hours within which to call the Jasawa to order, failing which, in their words, “… we will SURELY call them to order”. On 31st August, 2001, the Plateau state Youths Council addressed a press conference on the same issue (Otite, 1990).

Many indigenes that blamed the Hausa-Fulani for masterminding the 2001 crisis point to this letter, as well as the hand bills distributed, as chief evidence. While this report cannot apportion blame or determine which group ignited the conflict, it is necessary to point out that the letter was indicative of rising tension in the city, and did provide an early warning signal for anybody that cared to listen. Put within context, the letter was reaction to an action by another group, and was appropriately channeled. While the Jasawa Association may be accused of threatening to disrupt peace if their grievances were not addressed, it should be noted too that the “Concern Plateau State Youths”, had similarly given an ultimatum to the government to reverse the appointment of Mallam Mukhtar.

While this exchange went on, there were no visible and convincing steps taken by the authorities to ensure that law and order was maintained. The issuers of these subversive hand bills were neither apprehended nor called to dialogue. The failure of conflict prevention was very evident at this stage. According to Human Right Watch, 2001), quoted a resident of Jos saying that “The Police Commissioner kept saying
everything was under control while the whole town was on fire”. However, it did not occur to anybody that the violence would spread that rapidly, and cover such a wide area. There had been rumour that it was to take place a week earlier than September 7, 2001, but it rained heavily and unstoppably that day. Thus, there was wide spread belief that the violence was planned well in advance, and such belief can be found on both ends of the conflicts divided. Even if there was some planning in advance it began, assumed a life of its own; and that the planners, if any no, longer had control over its spread, and could not stop it even if they wanted to (Human Right Watch, 2001).

According to Best (2004), the September 7, 2001 crisis found a vent in an event at a private mosque located in a part of Jos called Congo-Russia. This area is known for its relative poverty, slums and for housing some of the worst locally brewed alcoholic joints in Jos. The residents of Congo-Russia are mostly non-Muslims. The mosque where the incident occurred is located at the border between the non-Muslim population of Congo-Russia on the other hand, and two Muslim strongholds on the other. One is on Bauchi Road, just across the stream from Congo-Russia, and the other at Angwan Rogo and Angwan Buzaye, immediately north-west of Congo-Russia. Angwan Rogo especially has a high degree of Muslim population. It also had a small non-Muslim population, all of which was expelled during the crisis.

Thus, mosque had been an irritant to non-Muslims in Congo-Russia, the local alcoholic reputation of Congo-Russia was also an irritant to the Muslim inhabitants of the area. The mosque was converted to host Friday Juma’at prayers and naturally did attract large congregations from outside the immediate neighbourhood, against the wishes, and to irritation of non-Muslims neighbours.
The implication of the Friday Juma’at prayers for the immediate community is that the road leading to Congo-Russia from Bauchi road, and into Bauchi road, and this is the only access road, gets’ blocked during such prayers. Even though the actual prayer itself is short, it last only twenty minutes at most, preparations begin from 1:00pm and could end at 2:15pm. The non Muslim could not tolerate such inconvenience, and the Muslim could not understand the basis for the non-tolerance by non-Muslims.

The problem between the authorities of the mosque and the non-Muslim community in Congo-Russia had been running away back from 1994 to 1996. Recall that was a year of confrontation between the Hausa/Fulani and indigenes, taking a religious divide. The community had complained about the blocking of the access road into the out of the community on Friday afternoons, to the Police. According to Best (2004:66) that:

...The Divisional Police Officer of Nasarawa Gwong went in company of one of us to communicate your directives disallowing the mounting of road blocks there by preventing the resident in the community to gain access to their respective homes. Alhaji Tijani (Mosque proprietor) has vowed not to comply and has threatened that hell will let loose and there will be chaos and bloodshed if any body tries to stop the mounting of road blocks during their Juma’at Muslim worship. The community is not afraid of any bloodshed as declared by Alhaji Tijani, but they do not want to take the law into their hands. (Muazam, 2002).

However, the proprietor of the Congo-Russia Mosque, Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi denied any knowledge of having threatened the elders who authorized the above petition or any negative encounter between him and elders. Be that as it may, it was little surprising against the earlier background that the tension continued to build in the community. The relationship between the mosque authorities and the Congo-Russia community continued to deteriorate. Things came to a head on September 7,
2001 when non-Muslim girl was said to have insisted on passing through a congregation of Muslim worshipers outside the mosque at prayer time. She was said to have been asked to wait until after the prayers, or select an alternative route, but she refused. Some report have it that she was allowed to pass, then she came back a second time within a short interval, suggesting an intention to cause provocation. A quarrel broke out between the girl and Muslim paramilitary at the mosque, and the girl was allegedly rough handled. Within minutes, reports got to the non-Muslim community and a fight ensued between the Congo-Russia community and the Muslim community (Best; 2004:67).

Given this narration, it has remained unclear as to who threw the first stone that ignited the violence. What is not in doubt, however, is that the incident provided a necessary vent for indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani. The adverse impact of the crisis during its earliest hours was experienced at the vicinity of Congo-Russia mosque. The mosque was eventually destroyed at some point, and the location lies fallow up to now. Homes belonging to both Christians and Muslims as well as business premises did not escape the devastation. By the evening of Friday September 7, 2001 much of Angwan Rogo and Congo-Russia had constituted the front in the conflict news of people who were killed or displaced from these areas soon spread to other parts of the city causing the conflict to spread beyond controllable proportions (Best, 2004:68).

Furthermore, police presence and response to conflict, where available, was epileptic and deplorable. Some alleged that the police high command was partial, and did provide security to a few places on one side of the conflict. News of this perceived partiality also contributed to escalating the conflict (Best, 2004). The second and third days of the conflict, Saturday 8, September and Sunday 9, September witnessed the fiercest fighting. Passions had gone high, and news of what happened
on Friday, some of it exaggerated, went out. According to Mapal, (2000) bodies of the dead, specifically those who lived in the surrounding villages were also conveyed to their respective villages for burial. These developments account for the further escalation of the conflicts and subsequent destruction of property and loss of lives. However, the dismal performance of the police became even evident in their having failed to curb the violence on the first day and then the second and third days. This created an opening for ethnic and religious militias and hurriedly assembled gangs to wreak havoc on the populace in certain parts of the conflict area. Those not directly affected by the violence were affected in less direct ways, such as Panic, anxiety, or loss of friends and family (Mapal, 2000).

However, the Plateau state Governor returned from his overseas trip and made a brief broadcast to the citizens of Plateau state. He assured them that everything was under control, and called on the people to return to their normal businesses. The people had barely begun to return to their normal schedules when violence broke out again on Wednesday September 11, 2001, coinciding with the attacks on the USA by terrorists. Attacks that were limited to the Dilimi-Gangare area of the town, one of the strongholds of Hausa/Fulani, turned out to be perhaps the most violent. There was heavy human and material casualty. This dampened the morale of the populace and eroded their confidence in the crisis management capacity of the government. Luckily, the September 11 crisis was immediately brought under control but not before it wreaked havoc on the populace. (Best, 2004).

4.6 THE ETO BABA PDP WARD CONGRESS 2002 CONFLICT

4.6.1 The Background Of The Crisis

The Jos crisis of May 2002 occurred as a result of a Ward Congress of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Jos which was to be held at the Ward...
Headquarters Eto Baba Ward, an Anaguta stronghold, to elect Ward Officials for the party. It actually looked like an insignificant political event that turned into another blood bath, in Jos. This opened up the fierce contests for the control of the Jos-north local government by the two groups after the 2001 crisis. Determined to influence and win positions at the congress, the Hausa/Fulani brought in a large number of their supporters in open trucks, estimated at close to sixty thousand persons. The Anaguta pointed out that these supporters were imported from outside the ward, and perhaps from outside Jos, to intimidate and attack them. (Best 2004:76).

Consequently, this huge influx of people immediately created panic among the indigenes. Within a short time, the Party Congress exploded into violence, where Hausa/Fulani were pitted against the indigenes and others. A free-for-all-fight led to the killing, maiming and wounding of people at the event. The crisis soon escalated into the city area and persons fleeing from the venue of the Party Congress attacked, maimed and burned houses as they passed. Illegal road blocks were mounted by Zelot youths who killed people from the wrong faith (Best, 2004:76). The saving grace was the quick intervention of the joint security patrol. Even though the security came too late to save some lives and property, it was quicker than the previous records. Thus bringing the carnage to an end on the first day. Unfortunately, the crisis further deepened mistrust and suspicion along the religious and ethnic divide. Residential patterns were further adjusted to conform to religious divide. Some of Muslim residents in locations like Angwan Rukuba soon moved out from the area. (Best, 2004:77).

The 2002 crisis however, produced political, economic, social, religious and psychological impacts. The economic impact came by way of the destruction to property and business. Even though no empirical figure has yet been put to the
economic impact of the conflict, as there has been no independent assessment of the impact of the conflict. However, whatever may be contained in the Nikki Tobi Report in this direction is yet to be made public (Best, 2004:7). Suffice it to say, however, that the conflict led to the unprecedented large scale destruction of private and public property in the town. Normal business was disrupted for at least two weeks in the first instance, and for longer periods in the future.

Perhaps the greatest economic impact came with the destruction of the ultra modern market in the centre of Jos. Neither the state government nor the Traders Association have been able to replace this market, or to find a convenient alternative. For months, the traders in Jos constituted nuisance to the Key business area and roads of the city. According to Richard, (1979) it has been suggested that investors have found it difficult to come to Jos because of perceived insecurity.

The political impact of the crisis is not new. As earlier discussed, the politics of the local government has been polarized and heated for a long time. There has been a further division of the political elite. As a result of the conflict, the slightest political events in Jos, such as the PDP Ward Congress, generates violent confrontations along religious and political lines, as was the case in 2002. The local government has remained under two unelected leadership for long, a development that irritates political groups and aspirants that would love to see elections conducted into positions in the council.

There is also the psychological impact to the conflict. This manifests by way of the imparting of a culture of mutual fear and suspicion among the groups. Thus, certain areas have been ethnically cleansed of some ethnic and religious groups. For instance the Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rimi and Bauchi Road areas are nearly devoid of any non-Muslim populations. On the other hand, there are hardly Muslim in
Angwan Rukuba, Jenta Adamu, Eto Baba and Hwolshe. Furthermore, the perceptions of many residents of Jos have been distorted, and social stereotypes are deepened. Inspite of the messages of peace and the activities of government and NGOs, people have been reluctant to return to certain residential areas perceived to be unsafe. For instance, non-Muslim students of the university of Jos will hardly accept accommodation in Angwan Rogo, inspite of its proximity to the university of Jos. They have refused to be persuaded by appeals from members of the Angwan Rogo community to return to the area.

The violence and atrocities that accompanied the conflict, and its prolongation after January 2002, were unprecedented and violence continued to occur sporadically inspite of security measures taken. Night raids, mostly suspected to have been carried out as reprisal attacks by both parties all deepened a crisis of insecurity that loomed over Jos north local government area, and Plateau state at large. For a long time, lives were lost across the length and breadth of the most affected local government area in the conflict.

Religion has relevance in the definition of identities in Jos-north. This is because of the role it played in the conflict. Religion was not causal to the conflict, but did serve the function of mobilization, identity and ideology in the execution of the conflict. Religion cheaply and easily appealed to the popular emotions of parties to the conflict. Thus, the present demarcation of residential areas in Jos is more toward religious than ethnic lines. (Robert, 1971).

4.7 THE 2008 JOS CONFLICT

The changes made in the independent Electoral Commission by the Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution was state independent Electoral Commissions (SIEs). Formerly elections to all offices, federal, state and local had been conducted by national bodies,
most lately, in the 1999 elections, by the Independent National Electoral Commission, (INEC). After the 1999 the job of staging local government elections was constitutionally devolved to SIECs appointed by the governors and funded by the state governments in 2001 and 2002 all states including Plateau enacted local government electoral laws spelling out the details. Local government elections were to have been held all over the country in 2002, but no one was ready.

Finally in 2004 most states held them, but not Plateau, which was then in crisis. In Plateau local government elections were only again actually accomplished in 2008. Between 2002 and 2008 the local government area in Plateau were administered by caretaker chairman appointed by the governors. In Jos North, Dariye appointed Dr. Danladi Atu, an Afizere man, who served from 2002 – 2006. In 2006 Dariye was impeached by the Plateau State House of Assembly and replaced by chief Michael Botmang, his Berom Deputy Governor. Powerful Beroms had imposed Botmang on Dariye in 2003 in exchange for their support against Jang. When Botmang took over the governorship he replaced him with a Berom man, Professor B.T. Bingel a history professor at the university of Jos. Then in 2007 Botmang want governor Jang replaced professor Bingel as Jos North caretaker chairman with a different Berom, a woman named Ngo Lydia Lodam. It began to seem that there would be a reign of Beroms in Jos North, at least for the time being:- until the next local government election at least, when the question on who should rule could be tested at the polls. This is what the local government election finally held in November 2008 were decided (Philiph, 2009:27).

According to Philiph (2009), the Jasawa requested Jang with regards to the Jos-North local government election; and said let a Muslim be the PDP chairmanship candidate. They are the majority in Jos-North. They maintained that Berom never
even had a councilor in Jos-North before; they do not have any ward in Jos north (Even now, when a Berom is chairman, there is no Berom – councilor) Jang said no. they further insists, so what about Deputy Chairman? No. the Muslims went for a third time; that at least they should be given the post of secretary of the local Government. Jang said no. that he (Jang) can do without the Muslims (Philip, 2009:27).

The fact that Jang was governor, from a ruling party in the Plateau PDP, and a Berom in the same vein claimed Jos North for the Beroms and in all, Jang is from Du. It did not come as a surprise then that the PDP nominee for Chairman of Jos North ended up being a Berom from Du. His name Timothy Gynag Buba. He is a younger brother of Jacob Gyang Buba, immediate past controller – general of the Nigeria Customs Service. And a long – time supporter of Jang; in April 2009 Buba the Elder became the new Gbong Gwom when the old one died. But Du is in Jos South local Government, not Jos – North. With his indigene certificate from there, Buba the younger had even held office in Jos south. But now he contested for Chairman of Jos-north –in arguable violation of the very indigeneship rules, Jang has been so insistent on enforcing. Buba is widely understood to have been imposed on the Jos-North PDP by Jang in an undemocratic nomination process objected to not only by the party’s Jasawa but by its Anagutas and Afizere as well. The Anagutas were pacified by the choice of an Anaguta, a Christian, as Buba’s running mate. Rebuffed by Jang and PDP, the Jarawa turned again to the ANPP, which nominated Aminu Yusuf Baba, one of their own, as its Jos-North Chairmanship candidate. Buba’s running mate was an Afizere – Christian. In this race the Afizere sided with Jasawa against the Beroms and the Anagutas, together with whatever other supporters either side could recruit. Thus
the stage was set for the Jos-North election, to be enacted as showdown between Jang and Jasawa (Philip, 2009:28).

Furthermore, the election was supposed to be held in January 2008, but the Plateau State Independent Electoral – Commission (PLASIEC) appointed by Jang was not ready. The election was finally set for 15 March 2008. But by mid-afternoon of that day it had to be called off with no outcome anywhere in the state. However, the chairman of the Plateau state independent electoral commission, PLASIEC, Mr. Jefferson Majei announced the cancelation of the Polls citing Thuggery and hijack of electoral materials as reasons behind the cancellation... the cancellation polls, which were supposed to start at 8.am and end at 3 p.m local government election could not start until late in the day. As at 3 p.m. election materials were still been shared at police stations where they were kept for security reasons (Philip, 2009:20).

After the botched March elections Jang sacked his PLASIEC and appointed a new one in October, the elections were reset for Thursday, 27th November and it actually held, for most part smoothly and peacefully all over the state. But the tallying of votes were badly used in Jos North. Because PDP was declared the winner of the chairmanships in all seventeen local governments in the state.

It is in view of such polarization along religion that the Christians worked and prayed for victory, with the following statements:

That this time the Christians (except evidently the Afizere) manage to unite against the Hausas. The pastors were preaching in the churches that everyone should go out to vote, that they must not vote for any Muslim, the Muslims are infidels and they must not have them ruling over us. They want to Islamise the place. Don’t vote for any unbeliever. We have voted for them before, they have disappointed us. Everybody should pray, get out to vote, etc. there was a heavy turnout among the Christians this time. The Hausas always have taken voting serious, this is time for Christians to do the same (Philip, 2009:30).
Muslims too worked and prayed for victory as follows:

*If you are in PDP or vote for PDP – you are a pagan. Some would say: if you vote PDP who is not a Muslim you are a pagan (Philip, 2009).*

In this regard, members of the Hausa/Fulani Community were being sensitized in mosque to vote for Muslim ANPP chairmanship candidate and threatened to vigorously resist any attempt at manipulation by the ruling party in the state (ibid).

The Jasawa on their part maintained that they would “vigorously resist any attempt at manipulation by the ruling party”. In fact they have a slogan: “Akasa a raka kuma a tsare”, meaning “Cast your vote, escort it and guard it”. As the polls closed and votes began to be counted, they followed the ballot boxes and result sheets from the polling places and wards to the central collation centre to make sure no hanky panky went on there. In fact partisans of both sides were doing the same.

Furthermore, results came in to the collation centre from fifteen of the twenty wards, and were successfully collated by 3 a.m. with those according to Jasawa, ANPP was ahead in the Chairmanship election by more than 30,000 votes. So the Jasawa thought they had won. PDP supporters feared the same. With chanting of PDP must win! PDP must win!” from Jasawa came back: “Baza mu Yarda ba”. “We won’t agree!”. As the result from the missing wards were waited, the situation became tensed. At some point police came. The people inside the collation centre were told to leave: “Your safety cannot be guaranteed”. Outside, the people began throwing stones. Fighting started. People – Jasawa polling agents, a policeman – have been killed at the collation centre. The police finally succeeded in dispersing the crowd. Some angry youths went out into the town, talking on cell phones. Before long the looting and burning and killing started. Already by mid – morning on Friday, 28th November, the crisis was general and part of the city were in flames.
During the 2008 Jos – North crisis, Human Rights Watch documented, 118 cases of arbitrary killing by the security forces that took place between 7 am and 1 pm on November 29 alone. The majority of the killings documented by Human Rights Watch were committed by the Nigerian Police. In 15 separate incidents of arbitrary killings by the police, at least 74 men and boys, all but two of them Muslims were killed. The vast majority of killings were perpetrated by the anti-riot mobile police force, commonly referred to as the mobile police or MOPOL. Human Rights Watch also documented eight incidents involving the arbitrary killing of 59 men by the military. Believing that the actual number of the arbitrary killings by security forces may be substantially higher than the figures mentioned (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

Many Jasawa on their part, were convinced that the crisis was part of “a deliberate ethnic cleansing agenda by the state government to exterminate specific tribes and creed in Jos – North (i.e. the Hausas, the Muslim), using politics as an apparatus” (Philiph, 2009:33).

The issue now is who won the election? According to Philip (2009) the total vote from the five missing wards have never been announced. What was announced on Friday, 28th November, as the conflict raged, was that the PDP candidates had won all seventeen local government chairmanships in Plateau state, including Jos – North. Only total numbers of votes were given, not break downs by wards. This announcement of course only intensified the violence in Jos North. Some semblance of order was finally restored on Sunday the 30th. The original plan had been to swear in all the new local government Chairmen on the Monday, 1 December, but this was wisely postponed to give every one time to calm down. The swearing in of the chairmen finally took place on 21 January 2009. In Jos-North, local government council, in the first week of February, with Timothy Gynag Buba in the chair, only
twelve of the twenty – councilors were sworn in: The other eight, mostly Jasawa, mostly ANPP from the predominantly Muslim wards, said the election had been sham and they would not participate. Since the council’s quorum is two thirds of all members, or fourteen, it was unable to function. Since then, however, five of the eight counsellors have relented and taken their seats, with only the councilors from Abba Na Shehu, Ibrahim Katsina and Naraguta “A” wards still adamant in late July 2009; but presumably the council and chairman are moving ahead with their agenda without them (Achor, 2009).

4.8 THE 2010 JOS CONFLICT

The report of Daily Trust of Saturday, January 23, 2010 states that nobody could have predicted that the crisis will erupt again. The Dutse Uku at Nasarawa Area in Jos North local government where the crisis started, were the adverse victims. This is as a result of a common misunderstanding among neighbours, that caused the mayhem.

It was also confirmed that the casualty figure numbered over 300 dead including women and children with more than 700 injured while more than 21,000 persons have been displaced with less than 800 structures raised to the ground. As the dust began to settle on Wednesday evening when the state government announced the relaxation of the 24 hour curfew of Jos/Bukuru metropolis, it was clear that the four day crisis was one that Plateau recorded high sectarian crisis both interms of the spread of violence and depth of resentment between the two sides of the divide. (Daily Trust, 23 January, 2010: 1-3).
4.9 REMOTE CAUSES

4.9.1 Rebuilding of A House

The first version had it that it was as the result of a football match between a Christian-dominated and Muslim dominated sides which later the youths could not agree on the mode of officiating. Later, people heard that violence erupted when a certain Muslim, Malam Kabiru Mohammed whose house was damaged during the November 2008 crisis had mobilized men and material to go and rebuild his house when a man of Jarawa extraction accosted him and his group, telling them that they won’t be allowed to rebuild and that they cannot come back to the area, as the area had become an exclusive Christian area (Daily Trust, 2010).

Furthermore, it was the protest that greeted the bid to stop the Muslim from rebuilding his house that was said to have gone bloody that Sunday morning as both men at the centre of the storm were said to have mobilized supporters to their sides based on religious divides to enforce their positions.

The third version has it that Malam Kabiru in rebuilding his house, took advantage of the absence of his erstwhile Christian neighbor and extended the structure of his house to the present of the adjoining plot, and when he agreed to shift and maintain his original plot he insisted that the land belonged to him.

Similarly, Daily Trust could not identify the Jarawa man, even Mallam Kabiru does not know his name. Mallam Kabiru further confirmed that he had gone to the site of his property at the Nasarawa Gwong areas with labourers and building materials that Sunday Morning to repair his house which had been destroyed in the 2008 crisis when some people led by the unidentified Jarawa man tried to stop him and that was when a hot exchange began between them which later turned bloody. Mallam Kabiru
denied ever trying to encroach on another land, saying that was not possible since it is not a fresh plot.

But the Plateau State Police commissioner then, Gregory Yalong, condemned the earlier versions relayed by the media as the cause of the crisis. He blamed the crisis on a group of Muslim youths who he claimed launched an attacked on Christian worshippers at the St. Michaels Catholic church, Jos at Nasarawa Gwong. He emphasized that it was the attack launched by the group of Muslims youths on Christian worshippers that later turned into a fight which led to the crisis, adding that the police had been able to arrest 35 persons that afternoon saying five out of 35 were arrested in full military uniforms (Daily Trust, 2008).

4.9.2 Immediate Cause

By Sunday evening there was relative calm albeit being accompanied by mutual suspicion and tension as residents of Jos and Bukuru were not sure what would happen next. But early Monday morning, the fears of residents that the matter had not been settled was confirmed when areas like Dogon Karfe, Abattoir, Dogon Dutse, Rikkos, Anglo Jos, in Jos North Local Government, Bukuru and Kuru in Jos South then Bisichi and other villages in Barkin Ladi Local Governments caught fire.

In view of the above, nobody is sure what added fuel to the Sunday fire leading to the escalation of violence up to the areas where crises were not experienced in 2007, but Daily Trust confirmed that many say there have been deep-seated sentiments harboured by each side even prior to the crisis which only found ventilation immediately the news of fresh hostility was confirmed.

Daily Trust further confirmed that Ahmed Garba, secretary of the Youth Wing of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam JNI stated that it was the statement by the commissioner of police that escalated the crisis. However, Shamaki of the League of Human Rights
said that the statement by the police commissioner was apt since the police had identified and named the aggressors.

The then chief of Army staff, Lt. General Abdulrahman Dambazau, who visited Jos at the height of the crisis, said the cause of the crisis could not be ascertained immediately and further stated that “nobody can really come out to tell exactly the cause”. The imposition of 24 hour curfew by the Plateau State government helped in containing the crisis as the restriction of movement, coupled with the presence of military check points at almost every point in Jos and Bukuru prevented those who had the intension of continuing with the violence..

Consequently, what was happening at Jos, had spread to remote villages and because there were no curfews and little military presence, the carnage was extended to remote areas. After the crisis, the state commissioner of information Gregory Yenlong, by Wednesday evening, announced the relaxation of the 24-hour curfew imposed on the state. By Thursday morning many residents decided to flee Jos.

Majority of the Christian population, however, were seen relocating from areas considered to be predominantly Muslim to areas with larger Christian population, while many who are indigenes of the state left for their various local governments. An atmosphere of mutual suspicion pervaded as different text messages were being sent to people about how certain group, were planning to launch attack on members of other groups.

It has been observed that if not for the non-availability of commercial vehicles and motorcycles, the exodus from Jos would have been on an epic scale, as people were forced back to their homes after standing for hour on the streets, unable to find vehicles. (Daily Trust January 23, 2010 vol. 12 No. 68, pp.1-3).
Governor Aliyu Babangida maintained that:

*State governors should be held accountable for any breakdown of order in their states because some of them do not read the security reports that are regularly sent to their desks. He further maintained that governors should ensure they read security reports to enable them act proactively to fore stall communal crisis (Daily Trust Jan 23, 2010).*

The above, if carefully analyzed portrays that the inability of the Plateau State government to use the security reports led to crisis. Given the fact in our society civil unrest could be complicated by the guise of religion to satisfy certain economic and social interest as earlier mentioned is pathetic indeed.

### 4.10 CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDIGENE/SETTLER DICHOTOMY

The indigene/settler problems resulting from a continuous emphasis on the notion of indigeneity particularly in the distribution of essential state resources is of great consequence to Nigeria especially as it affects integration and development in the study area. Therefore the crisis is majorly political.

To begin with, building a nation or what has been described otherwise national integration cannot follow from developments that give a central place to the dichotomy of indigene/settler as has been made clear in the all of these do not in any way facilitate economic development.

Further more, such display of violence is usually accompanied by extraordinary humanitarian tragedy following the displacement of people in the absence of a mechanism for early warning signals, decisive response from the state among others.

All these elements have been found in Kaduna crisis in 2000, the recent crisis in Jos 2001, 2004, 2008/9 and 2010, the Kafanchan crisis in 1987, Ife/Modakeke,
crisis, Tiv/Jukun Wukari crisis to mention just few in the analysis above. Reference to indigeneity with its concomitant ethnic and/or particularistic communal claim to territory cannot make for the transfer of loyalty from primordial political objective to national political objects and the development of national political culture which national integration entails. One cannot immediately see for instance a Hausa man in Plateau state can believe that he is a co-national of a Berom in view of the indigene/settler dichotomy that has pitched the two communities against each other.

Secondly, dichotomizing between an indigene and a settler with its natural propensity to degrade into conflict and invariably crisis is a cog in the wheel of economic development. This is because when such erupt hundreds and thousands of human lives lost, such individuals constitute the human resource that be deployed for productive purposes. Closely following the above is the property usually valued in billions that is usually destroyed. Businesses are grounded foreign and even local investors are scared from contemplating investment in these areas.
Map of Plateau State showing Jos North Local Government Area
CHAPTER FIVE
SETTLER/INDIGENE CONTESTATION IN JOS NORTH LGA: DATA
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the demographic distribution based on gender and the ethnic background of the parties in conflict in a tabular form.

5.2 DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

Table 5.2 has shown that, the male category in this study has the frequency of 366 with valid and cumulative percentage of 79.2 respectively. While the female had 96 frequency representing 20.8%. This is in the total number of 462 questionnaire returned. It should be noted that this category generally cut across all the ethnic groups in the study area. They also include the civil servants, students, farmers, academics, business, married and single. And mostly have a stake in decision-making. This sex distribution is captured in Table 5.2.

Table 5.1: Gender Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.1 shows that the study population is made up of 79.2% male and 20.8% female. The dominance of male population in the sample is not a reflection of the distribution between the sexes. It is however a reflection of vocational differences which tends to restrict most females to sedentary life in home. It can also be observed
that the difference between the sexes is alarming. This shows how patriarchal or rather pluralist the study area is. Considering the ongoing conflict, this is statistically represented in Table 5.1.

**Table 5.2: Distribution Of Respondents by Tribe Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berom Arizere</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaguta</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarawa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, May 2010

Table 5.2 clearly depicts that most of the respondents in the study area were Hausa-Fulani, with a frequency of 212 representing 45.9% of respondents. This is followed by the Berom with 95 frequency representing 20.5% of the respondents. Also indicated in the Table, 37 (8.0%) were Anagutas, while 28 (6.1%) of the respondents were Jarawa, others constitute 27 representing 5.8% of the respondents, 13.6% did not make any response to the question. This is statistically captured in table 5.3 above.

Above table clearly shows that the highly populated group in the conflicting area of 437,217 (in Jos – North) where Hausa Fulani. Yet they were marginalized on the basis of political offices and civil service.
Table 5.3: Distribution Of Respondents by Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey 2010

The religious distribution of respondent as shown in Table 5.3 indicates that majority of the respondents with a frequency of 291 or 63.0 were Muslim. Also indicated in Table 5.3 is that, 166 respondents representing 35.9 were Christians. While about 4% of the respondents assumed the status of traditionalists, 0.6% of the respondents did not make any response to the above question. However, 20% represent other religious and those who did not associate themselves with the above options.

Looking from this table the population of Muslim outweigh the Christians in the study area. However, the indigene-settler dichotomy has placed the Muslims who were most Hausa-Fulanis at disadvantage. This has clearly captured in the table above.
Table 5.4: Marital Status Of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey, 2010

The marital status of respondents as shown in Table 5.4 indicates that majority of the respondents with frequency 309 or 66.9% were single. By implication, those that are single could be affected by the economic factors, responsible for not being married. Also indicated in Table 5.5 is that 120 persons representing 26.0% of the respondents were married. 6.3 represents divorcees while 2% stands for widows, 0.6% of the respondents had no response to the above question. The above is statistically captured or represented in Table 5.4.

Due to the pluralist nature of the study area, the table depicts that young men who are mostly single constitute the largest population. By implication the crisis has engulfed with them with most of their life partners, which adversely affected the population, and the future generation which would have been productive to the study area.
Table 5.5: Distribution of Respondents by Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business persons</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The occupational distribution of the respondents also revealed that 66.0% being the majority of the sampled population were students, whereas 29.0% were civil servants, 0.9% of the respondents did not make any response to the above question. Similarly, Table 5.5 indicates that 3.9% of the respondents are involved in business while 2% are farmers.

By implication, the above occupation distribution of respondents in the area shows that the majority of the people though yet to graduate from the university, shall storm the labour market given a low level of industries in the area constituting 3.9%. Consequently, the work force is dominated by a particular ethnic rendering large number of people into self sponsored occupation for the purpose of sustaining their living. This implies that the Nigerian state and Jos-North local government in particular has not been able to exploit her resources appropriately due to incessant crises. More importantly, the land will be abandoned which would have been utilized for farming and industrialization due to crises in the study area. Table 5.5 represents a statistical representation of the explanation above.
Table 5.6: Local Government of Origin Of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Govt</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jos-North</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


About 417 respondents, representing 90.3 hailed from Jos-North local government area, while others with 39 frequency representing 8.4% assumed to be residents in the study area, while 6 respondents, representing 1.3% did not respond to the question. This shows that majority of the respondents have their origin from Jos North as represented in the above Table.

The implication is that those without indigene certificate were termed as settlers. Which in a way precipitated the crisis to be an ongoing issue.

Table 5.7: State of Origin of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of Origin</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The valid respondent of 389 frequency representing 84.2% were people of Plateau state, in Jos – North local government. This indicates that majority of the respondents have Jos as their state of origin as shown in the Table above. This is an
attestation that the views of the respondents are views of those affected by the conflicts and not people outside Plateau state.

Looking at the percentage of those that hailed from Plateau and Just-North in particular; this in itself breeds exclusion on the basis of appointment.

5.3 ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Table 5.8: Was the Jos-North Crisis a Contest for Political Power?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.9 reveals that 275 (59.5%) agreed that the indigene/settler contestation in the study area was majorly for political power. Also indicated in the above Table that 175, representing 37.9% disagreed with the assertion that the central factor is for political power, 12 respondents representing 2.6% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that majority believed that crisis is as a result of contest for political power as represented in Table 5.8.

However, the Table also depicts that struggle over power had degenerated the conflict in the study area so alarming. Which agrees with our proposition in the earlier chapter.
Table 5.9: Was the religious differences the central factor that led to the Jos-north conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The views of most respondents as presented in table 5.10 shows that 68.2% have subscribed to the fact that, religious difference was the central factor that led to the contestation between settler/indigenes in the study area. Nevertheless, 30.5% of the respondents did not subscribe to such view, 12 respondents representing 2.6% did not respond to the above question. This is an indications that the central factor that led to Jos crisis is religious difference as represented in Table 5.9.

Given the fact that religion in the study area was a catalyst for mobilization of support and sympathy has been so central in perpetrating the tempo of the conflict. Particularly when seeing the various religious association distributing the relief materials to the victim of the conflicts. For example Jamatul Nasir Islam (JNI) and Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) is separately distributing the relief material to the victims of the conflict from their respective region. This also increased tension in the study area.
Table 5.10: Is Ethnicity A Major Factor In Determining The Dichotomy Between Settler/Indigene In Jos-North Local Government Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most respondents were of the view that ethnicity stand as the major factor in determining the dichotomy between settler and indigene in the study area. This represents 62.3% as indicated in Table 5.10. It is also revealed in the Table that, 152 frequency representing 32.9% did not subscribe to the views above, 22 respondents representing 4.8% did not respond to the above question. The effect is that ethnicity will lead to bitter relations between and among the ethnic groups in the study area.

The issue of ethnicity became relevant to the conflict because of the pluralist nature of the people in the study area. This however make the major ethnic group to identify themselves with their various ethnic when it comes to political affiliations and other opportunities. Which in a way increased the degree of the conflict in the study area.

Table 5.11: Has the state government shown any serious concern in the crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most respondents held the views that the Plateau state government is apathetic or rather unserious on handling the crisis. This is clearly indicated in Table 5.11.

The frequency of 339 (73.4%) was the respondents view. While 120 frequency representing 26.0% did not subscribe to the views above, 3 respondents representing 0.6% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that the least attention given to the crisis by the Plateau state government the more likely the possibility of heightening the level of the crisis. The above views is statistically presented in table 5.11.

Moreover, the inability of the Plateau State Government to accord equal opportunity to all the major ethnic groups in the study area makes people feel that the state government has least interest in bringing a lasting solution to the conflict.

Table 5.12: Has the conflict among some ethnic groups in Jos-north local government, particularly on the issue of Bongon Jos, is another factor that led to conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident that most respondents in Table 5.12 had the view that the contestation among the ethnic groups in the study area, has nothing to do with the Bongon Jos traditional position. The frequency 230 representing 49.8% attested to that. Also indicated in Table 5.12, 42.0%, responded that the conflict between Berom and Hausa-Fulani is connected to the issue of Bongon Jos, 38 respondents
representing 8.2% did not respond to the above question. That is, each ethnic group is claiming the ownership of the traditional rulership in Jos-North local government.

In addition to the above, it is clear that the issue who owned the rulership in the study area has been presented in various perspective in the earlier chapter. The Hausa – Fulani emphasized that they were in Jos since 1902, with about eleven (11) rulers. Birom on the other hand challenged the claim that the former has no staff office. This in itself degenerated the conflict of indigene-settler in the study area.

Table 5.13: Has Ethnicity Been Used Or Manipulated By The Elites To Divide The People Along Religion In Jos – North Local Government Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.13 reveals that the frequency 381 (82.5%) respondents were of the view that ethnicity has been used as a medium by the elites to perpetrate the crisis, where religion was equally used as a kind of mobilization to derived sympathy. Also indicated in Table 5.13, 71 frequency of respondents representing 15.4%, did not subscribe to the view that ethnicity has been manipulated by the elites to cause the crisis, 10 respondents representing 2.1% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that a large number of people were ignorantly involved in the crisis because of the negative information received from the political elites, which later divided people along religion. The above views are presented in table 5.13. This has also justified our proposition and theoretical frame work. That elites are largely responsible for the ongoing conflict in the study area. Since the majority of the masses
are apathetic and does not takes part in decision making consigning the plight of the people in the study area.

**Table 5.14: Was Government Passive On The Dichotomy Between Indigenes And Settler?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Majority of respondents in Table 5.14 are of the view that, the dichotomy leading to settler/indigene contestations was due to the passive actions of the Plateau state government. Also indicated in the Table above, 56.9% subscribed to this view, while 15.4% respondents did not subscribe to the views, 22 respondents representing 4.8% did not respond to the above question. The implication of the passive act of the Plateau state government, makes people to lost confidence in the government. The above views are presented in Table 5.14.

The Table also indicates that since most of the people that constitute the government hailed from one of these conflicting ethnic group. Which in a way offered them more advantage to remain passive on any action to be taking in averting/combating the conflict.
Table 5.15: Has the Creation of Jos North Local Government Area Reduced the Level of Conflicts?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident that most respondents with frequency 232 representing 50.2% are of the view that the sub-division of the old Jos local government has changed its political equation. Consequently, the 207 frequency of respondent (44.8%) did not subscribe to the view that the sub-division of the old Jos local government has changed the political equation, 23 respondents representing 5.0% did not respond to the above question. This is statistically represented in table 5.15.

This also implies that the creation of the Jos-North from its old nomenclature in 1991, has changed the political landscape of the study area. This can be seen from the struggle over power to occupy the local government portfolio, and the chairmanship of the NAPEP. Each of the conflicting parties are struggling to get advantage of any position created. Which in a way led to indigene/settler conflict in the study area.
Table 5.16: Has Nigerian Constitution Since 1979 Compounded the Unfortunate Dichotomy Between Indigenes/Settlers In Jos – North Local Government Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.16 reveals that the frequency of 246 (53.2%) held the view that the 1979 constitution did in any way compounded the recent dichotomy of settler/indigenes in the study area. Also indicated in Table 5.16 only 175 frequency of respondents representing 37.9% have subscribed to the views that the dichotomy between the settler and indigenes was compounded by the said constitution, 41 respondents representing 8.9% did not respond to the above question. Invariably, the 1979 constitution have not defined the position of who is an indigene, particularly with regards to federal character. This is statistically presented in Table 5.16.

Tied to the above table, the conflict in the study area was on-going due to the fact that the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) did not clearly define who is an indigene. But emphasized on the issue of citizenship, conflict also became serious in the study area due to complication caused by the federal character.
Table 5.17: Was The Expansion Of Sharia Laws In Twelve Northern States Of Nigeria A Remote Cause Of Jos – North Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most respondents in Table 5.17 did not agree with the view that the Sharia legal system take-off in the twelve northern states was the remote cause of the Jos-North crisis. Accordingly, the frequency of 360 (77.9%) held the views above, while only 19.7% with 91 frequency subscribes to the view that the expansion of the Shariah was the remote cause of the crisis, 11 respondents representing 2.4% did not respond to the above question. This implies that religion might not be the central factor that precipitated the crisis, given the wide gap between the frequency of respondents in terms of those who agreed and those who did not.

In addition to percentage captured in the table above, one of the conflicting parties claimed that since Plateau state and Jos in particular had never been in the control of Danfodios Jihad, there is no point Sharia legal system can be introduced in the study area as applicable elsewhere in the Northern Nigeria e.g. Zamfara etc.
Table 5.18: Has The Contestation Over Economic And Political Space Constitute One Of the Immediate Causes Of Conflict In Jos – North Local Government Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Majority of respondents with frequency 322 representing 69.7% are of the view that both economic and political space constitute an immediate cause of the crisis. While 127 (27.5%) did not subscribe to the fact that the said factors were the cause, 13 respondents representing 2.8% did not respond to the above question. By implication, there are those that dominate the commerce and politics of the study area respectively. The struggle by each, to have a control of the political economy of the local government heightened the crisis. This is statistically represented in Table 5.18. This is true that the Hausa-Fulani claimed since they dominate the commerce in the study area since 1902, and on that. And as a result the Hausas the heart of Jos, to the environs since they have the capital to buy the Beroms land. Which politics has conscientize the Beroms to create demarcation between indigene and settler in the study area.
Table 5.19: Was The Alleged War Between The Indigene And Settlers Been Over-Exaggerated By The Press?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.19 reveals that most respondents had the view that the alleged war between the indigene and settlers was not over exaggerated by the press. This is supported by frequency of 317 representing 68.6% respondents. While only 132 frequency (28.6%) subscribe to the views that, the alleged conflict was highly exaggerated, that the study area had lost the future generation that will occupy the labour force, 13 respondents representing 2.8% did not respond to the above question. And heighten the level of hatred between and among the various ethnic groups in the study area. More importantly, the socio-economic and political development of the state is adversely affected. This is statistically presented in Table 5.19.

Furthermore, it is evident that both the conflicting parties as well as the media organizations viewed the indigene/settler crises in Jos as a war or rather a genocide. This became necessary when the crisis did not favour one or the other. For example, while the crisis in Dogo Nahauwa was seen as genocide by the Berom, but it didn’t go the same with the Hausa-Fulani.
Table 5.20: Was Economic Factor The Genesis Of The Crisis That Broke Out At Jos – North Local Government Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.21 reveals that the frequency of 266 representing 57.6% of the respondents did not subscribe to the view that the genesis of the crisis in the Jos-North local government, has an economic inclination. Also, indicated in Table 5.20 the frequency of 184 (39.8%) held the view that economic factor is central to the recent crisis in Jos – North local government area, 12 respondents representing 2.6% did not respond to the above question. This implies that economic factor was not the genesis for the crisis. This is statistically represented in table 5.20.

However, economy though was not the major factor but relevant to the dichotomy between the conflicting parties in the study area. This is evident as some respondents who claimed indigeneship of the area were not comfortable with the economy in the land of the Hausa-Fulanis. Which the Hausa-Fulani on the other hand felt aggrieved for been excluded in the scheme of affairs. This keep the crisis on-going.
Table 5.21: Do you think the Re-Definition Of The Residency Rights A Solution To The Crisis In Jos-North?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Frequency 267 representing 57.1% were of the view that the re-definition of the residency rights and its enshrinement in the Nigerian constitution will resolve the recurrent crisis in Jos – North local government area. While the frequency of 167 (36.1%) respondents did not subscribe to the view above. This implies that the respondents with frequency 267 (57.1%) out weight the views of the respondents with 36.1%, 28 respondents representing 6.1% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that the re-definition of residency rights will go a long way in addressing the conflict in Jos-North. This is statistically presented in Table 5.21.

Looking at the table above, we can deduce that since the issue in Nigeria settler conflict in the study has continued to change the dynamic of the conflict. It is on this note that the large number of respondents opined that the residency right will addressed the issue of indigene/settler rift.
Table 5.22: Was The Inadequacy Of Security Personnel Responsible For The Escalation Of The Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most respondents are of the view the inadequate of security personnel was responsible for the escalation of the crisis. The views above represent 68.8% while the frequency of 138 respondents representing 29.9% did not subscribe to the view above, 6 respondents representing 1.3% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that people took laws into their hands due to insufficient security personnel. Life and properties will be adversely affected, and the displacement of people as refugees. This is statistically presented in Table 5.22.

Judging from the responses above we can deduce that the acute shortage of the security personnel to quench the incessant crisis in the study area has been a problem. This lapses has really affected the socio-economic and political stability of the study area. As a result, the plateau state government resorted to the creation of a vigilante, known as ‘Operation Rainbow”. The implication is that only the other ethnic group were included such as the Berom, Afizare, Anaguta. But the Hausa-Fulani were not considered in the formation of the vigilante group. This viewed the conflict abatement to be onesided.
Table 5.23: Was The Religious Leaders Party to The Conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey, 2010

Table 5.23 indicates that the frequency of 233 (50.4%) respondents held the view that the religious leaders were not party to the recurrent crisis in Jos – North local government area. It also indicates frequency of 218 respondents, representing 47.2% have subscribed to the view that the religious leaders were party to the conflict, 11 respondents representing 2.4% did not respond to the above question. However, the differences between the respondents above is just fifteen (15) which implies that to some extent, religious leaders were slightly party to the conflict. This is statistically presented in the table above.

Since the indigene/settler conflict in the study has the religious undertone, as propagated in some quarters. The religious leaders through their sermons incited the followers to attached religion to the conflict which most people through parochial sight viewed the conflict from religious perspective.
Table 5.24: Did You Suffer Any Form Of Maltreatment In The Hands Of Law Enforcement Agents During The Jos-North Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.24 revealed that the frequency of 269 (58.2%) respondents did not suffer any maltreatment from the law enforcement agents, during the Jos – North violence. However, the frequency of 176 representing 38.1 respondents have adversely suffered maltreatment of the law enforcement agents during the crisis, 17 respondents representing 3.7% did not respond to the above question. This shows the difference of 93 of the respondents above. The implication is that majority of the respondents were maltreated by the law enforcement agents. This is statistically presented in table 5.24.

Because of the nature of the conflict, some respondents vehemently complained of being molested by the security agents, particularly during the state of emergency. This has seriously affected psyche of the people in the study area. Not even that, people had to some extent lost confidence in the security personnel in charge of protecting the life and property of the people in the study area.
Table 5.25: Is The Restructuring Of Jos –North Master Plan a solution to the Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most respondents did not subscribe to the views that the restructuring of Jos-North master plan will serve as a solution to the crisis. These respondents represents 47.0% while 45.7% subscribed to the view, 34 respondents representing 7.4% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that sudden restructuring of the local government master plan will in no small measure escalate the propensity of the crisis, as no compensation might be given to the affected persons. This implications was also captured in the opinion of the stakeholders interviewed in the study area. This is statistically presented in table 5.25.

Considering the nature of the conflict, the presidential advisory commission headed by late Solomon Lar and the Ajibola panel of inquiry respectively, have parochially recommended for the restructuring of the Jos master plan. Which had negative effect on the inhabitant of the study area. The refusal by some ethnic group made the conflict unresolved. Another implication is that the failure of the Plateau state government co compensate those that the restructuring of the Jos-north master affected has no compensation. This also kept the crisis on-going.
Table 5.26: Give A Brief Account Of Your Understanding Of The Jos – North Crisis Of Settler/Indigene Contestation Since 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani and Berom are struggling for political power</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa man was appointed as NAPEP National co-ordinator</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to ethnic rivalry it needs constitutional solution</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to settler or indigene belief</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Frequency 300 (64.9%) has a majority view that the struggle for power between the Hausa-Fulani and Berom was a factor leading to indigene/settler contestation in Jos – North local government, since 1991. While the frequency 55 (11.9%) were of the view that ethnicity was the cause of the crisis, it however needs constitutional solution. Equally in Table 5.26, frequency 35 (7.9%) respondents maintained that the indigene settler belief has widen the propensity of the crisis. Also indicated in Table 4.26 that, the appointment of a Hausa man as NAPEP National co-ordinator, generated a reaction by the Berom ethnic group, led to the crisis. This is also shown in the frequency 27 (5.8%). While others with frequency 21 (5.8%) did not subscribe to the opinions above, 17 respondents representing 3.7% did not respond. This is statistically presented in table 5.26.

This table, clearly show that the indigene/settler conflicts was as a result of the struggle for political power ethnic rivalry and the lacuna in the constitution to clearly define who is an indigene? These issues put together had compounded the conflict in the study area.
Table 5.27: What Were The Major Problems Encountered By The People In Jos-North In 2001, After The Conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss of lives and properties</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement of people and refugees</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of trust between Hausa Berom and other tribes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious intolerance</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most respondents as indicated in Table 5.28 frequency 228 representing 49.4 held the views that quite a number of people lost their lives and properties while frequency 57 (12.3%) maintains that the crisis displaced people to various places. 6.1% opines that after the crisis, there were bitter relations between Hausa, Berom and other tribes in the study area. Table 5.27 also indicates that about 14.3% of frequency 66 were of the view that, religious intolerance has become the order of the day after the crisis, 5 respondents representing 1.0% did not respond to the above question. It is in view of the above that most stakeholders interviewed agreed that the consequence of the crisis was loss of lives and properties, and the displacement of people as refugees. While others with 78 frequency (16.9%) did not subscribe to the opinion above.

Given the fact that the percentages of the respondent captured their views on the conflict in the study area. However, the loss of lives and properties refugees, lack of trust between the conflicting parties, as well as the religious intolerance is seen as the basis of the conflict, in the study area.
Table 5.28: Suggest Ways To Guard Against Future Occurrence Of Crisis In Jos – North Local Government Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punishment of those involved in the crisis</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of both parties</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious and ethnic leaders meet regularly</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect of the rights of indigene and settlers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide adequate security</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be religious tolerance</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint both settlers and indigene to positions</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (other tribes)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.29 reveals that most respondents were of the view that to guard against the future occurrence of crisis in the Jos-North local government area, punishment of the perpetrators of the crisis should be given more premium. This views is clearly shown in frequency 188 representing 40.7% while frequency 58 (12.6%) of respondents maintained that orientation of the conflicting parties, will also serve as a veritable tool in averting the future occurrence of the crisis. However, 47 (10.2%) of the respondents opined that religions and ethnic leaders should be meeting regularly. This is to bring cordial relations among themselves.

Also indicated in Table 5.28 about 51 frequency (11.0%) of respondents are of the views that the rights of both indigenes and settlers be accorded to each. This is to enhance fairness and good governance. Frequency 40 (8.7%) opined that the provision of adequate security will in no small measure guard against the future occurrence of crisis in the Jos – North local government area. It was also suggested by respondents with frequency 37 representing 8.0%, that religious tolerance will also avert the future occurrence of the crisis in Jos – North local government area.
Moreover, frequency 24 (5.2%) of respondents suggests that equal opportunity should be given to both settler and indigenes, in terms of civil service employment and political positions. While others, as indicated in Table 5.28 did not subscribe to the views above. Frequency 11 (92.4%) has clearly attested to that, 6 respondents representing 1.2% did not respond to the above question. This is also statistically presented in table 5.28. The above opinion was suggested by all the stakeholders interviewed in the study area.

Judging from table above it can be deduced that punishment of the culprits of the conflict among other things will guard against the future occurrence of the crisis. This is in addition to the effective political will of the government and the people’s support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly encouraging</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally discouraging</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It has been revealed in Table 5.30 of frequency 255 (55.2%) that the feelings of most respondents about the role of Plateau state government in managing the crisis was totally discouraging while respondents of frequency 77 (16.7%) are of the view that the role of Plateau state government in managing the crisis is highly encouraging. Also indicated in Table 5.29 the frequency of 69 representing 14.9% maintained that
the role of the Plateau state government in managing the crisis in Jos – North local government was encouraging. However, the frequency 53 (11.5%) of respondents opined that their feelings about the role of the Plateau state government in managing the Jos-North local government crisis, was discouraging, 8 respondents representing 1.7% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that majority of the respondents do not think the state government is doing enough to manage the crisis in Jos-North. This is statistically presented in table 5.29.

As clearly shown in the table, the indigene/settler conflict has made people to feel totally discourage on the role of the Plateau state government. This is due to its passiveness in finding the lasting solution to the conflict.

**Table 5.30: Was Ethnicity A Factor/Relevant To The Crisis In Jos-North Local Government Area Of Plateau State?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very relevant</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly relevant</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not relevant</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most respondents in Table 5.30 subscribed to the view that ethnicity was very relevant to the recurrent crisis in the Jos-North local government area. This is clearly captured by frequency 209 representing (45.2%) of the respondents. Similarly, 159 frequency of respondents representing (34.4%) viewed that ethnicity is relevant or a factor to the recurrent crisis in Jos – North local government area. Also indicated in
Table 4.30 that frequency of 59 respondents, representing (12.8%) fairly relevant to the crisis. Consequently, frequency of 34 respondents (7.4%), did not subscribe to the view above, 1 respondents representing 0.2% did not respond to the above question. Which implies that, ethnicity contributed to the crisis in the Jos – North local government area. The implication is that ethnicity creates a bitter relations between and among the various ethnic groups in the study area. This is statistically presented in table 5.30.

It is also evident that due to the pluralist nature of the study area, the struggle for power among the major ethnic group became enormous. Thus the ethnicity became very relevant to the crisis.

Table 5.31: Was Economic Condition Relevant In Fueling The Crisis Of Citizenship In Jos – North Local Government Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very relevant</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly relevant</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not relevant</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident in Table 5.31 that frequency of 160 representing 34.6% of the respondents were of the view that the economic condition is very relevant in fueling the crisis of citizenship in Jos – North local government area. Also indicates in the same Table, frequency 142 (30.7%) opined that the economic condition is relevant to the crisis of citizenship in the study area. While frequency of 75 (15.0%) are of the views that the economic condition is fairly relevant to the crisis, and 85 respondents,
representing (18.5%) did not subscribe to the views above, 2 respondents representing 0.4% did not respond to the above question.

The implication is that economic power is not spread, other than being dominated in the hands of very few. While the majority are wallowing in abject penury. In other words some ethnic group in the study area are highly enterprising but not in the corridor of power. While others are least economically enterprising but have control in governance. This is statistically presented in table 5.31.

Furthermore, since economic power is control by few at the institutional level, the larger population wallowed in poverty and unemployed due to uneven distribution of income. This is in a way fuel the crisis.

**Table 5.32: Was the non-implementation of the various Commissions of enquiry reports, a factor to the crisis in Jos – North local government area?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most respondents in Table 5.32 with frequency 350 representing 75.8% are of the view that the non implementation of the various Commissions of inquiry reports is a factor to the crisis in Jos – North local government area, while 99 frequency of respondents representing 21.4% did not subscribe to the views above, 13 respondents representing 2.8% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that the perpetrators of the crisis were not punished or rather brought to book to serve as deterrence to others. This is statistically presented in table 5.32.
Looking at the Table above we can deduce that the resources, effort and time used in setting up the commissions of inquires was in vein. Since their recommendations on the issue of punishing the culprits of the crisis was given a palliative measures, by the governments. This increased the tempo of the crisis, and people lost confidence in the government.

Table 5.33: What Do You Think Are The Obstacles To Peace And Development In Jos – North Local Government Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity and politics</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment and illiteracy</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad governance</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief that some people are settlers and others indigenes</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.34 reveals that 95 frequency representing 20.6% of the respondents have a majority views that insecurity was the central obstacles to peace and development in Jos – North local government area. Also indicated in the same Table, with frequency 89 (19.3%) are of the view that unemployment and illiteracy was the obstacles to peace in the study area. 86 frequency of respondent representing 18.6% opined that ethnicity and politics has been obstacles to peace and development in Jos – North local government area. About 56 frequency representing 12.1% of the
respondents subscribe to the views that poverty was the obstacles to development in the study area.

Moreover 54 frequency of respondents representing 11.7% held the view that the belief that some ethnic groups were indigenes while others settler, contributes in no small measure as obstacles to peace and development in the study area. Other respondents which constitute frequency of 40 (8.7%) did not subscribe to the views above. The implications is that the prevalence of ethnicity and politics, unemployment and illiteracy, bad governance, poverty, and to crown it all believing that some ethnics are permanently indigenes while others settlers, retard development in all ramifications. This is statistically presented in table 5.34 above.

Based on the Table above it can be deduced that the crisis in the study area was so alarming and keep on – going due the bitter relationship between and among the different ethnic group in the study area, compared to the period before the conflict.

Table 5.34: Was The Relationship Between And Among Different Ethnic Groups In Jos – North Compared To What It Was Before The Crisis Cordial?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly deteriorated</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deteriorated</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly cordial</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordial</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The majority view of the respondents, with frequency 201 representing 43.5% maintained that the relationship between and among different ethnic groups in Jos –
North local government compared to what it were before the crisis, has highly deteriorated. Also indicates in Table 5.34, about 158 frequency of respondents (34.2%) opined that the relationship deteriorated, while the frequency of 50 representing 10.8% held the views that the relationship between and among different ethnic groups in the study area was fairly cordial, before the crisis. However, the frequency of 41 respondents (8.9%) were of the view that the relationship between the different ethnic groups before the crisis in the study area was cordial, 12 respondents representing 2.6% did not respond to the above question. This is statistically presented in Table 5.34 above.

The table also depicts that to avert the future recurrences of the crisis in the study area religious leaders should guard their utterances, accountability and fairness, adequate security, gainful employment as well civic education, and the legal process of channeling grievances. Least of these keep the crisis on-going.

Table 5.35: Suggest the best way to sustainable peace in Jos – North local government area in particular and Plateau state at large. Express your opinion in brief.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders should preach one Nigeria</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability and fairness by political leaders</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate security</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate punishment to perpetrators to the crisis</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and education to be provided</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (other tribes)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most respondents in Table 5.35 revealed that, for a sustainable peace in the study area, gainful employment and education must be provided. This is captured in frequency 114 representing 24.7% of the respondents. Similarly, frequency 113 representing 24.5% of the respondents held the views that, for a sustainable peace to reign in the Jos-North local government area, adequate security must be provided. Also indicates in Table 5.35 the frequency of 42 (9.1%) were of the view that, adequate punishment to the perpetrators of the crisis should be done to serve as deterrence for others. The frequency of 69 of the respondents representing 14.9% held the views that religious leaders should preach one peace. About 24 frequency of respondents representing 5.2%, opined that, accountability and fairness by political leaders will enhance sustainable peace in the study area. While others with frequency 100 (21.6%) did not subscribe to the views above. This is statistically presented in 5.35 above.

Looking at the Table clearly, the conflict in the study area was characterized by the struggle for political power. This is to addressed the conflict. On that we can deduce that rotation of the political posts among the major ethnic group in conflict will reduce the magnitude of the indigene/settler dichotomy in the study area.

Table 5.36: Will the rotation of political leadership in Jos-North among major ethnic groups enhance peace and sustainable development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.36 revealed that most respondents with frequency 396, representing 85.7% were of the view that, the rotation of political leadership of the Jos-North among major ethnic groups will enhance peace and sustainable development in the study area. Also indicated in the same Table, the frequency of 39 representing 8.4% of the respondents did not subscribe to the view above, 27 respondents representing 5.8% did not respond to the above question. The implication is that with the heterogeneous nature of Plateau people, and Jos – North in particular, if a single tribe or ethnic group continues to have control in the leadership of the study area, crisis will continue to flourish for lack of fairness. This is statistically presented in table 5.36 above.

5.4 DISCUSSION ON MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The thrust of this work was to examine the crisis of citizenship in Nigeria, with particular attention to settler/indigene conflict in Jos – North local government, Plateau state. This was done by evaluating the views of the respondents in the study area and the causes of the crisis. The study examined the implications of the crisis in Plateau state, and on national development at large.

The major findings of this research as indicated in the data analysis from 5.8 and 5.9 shows that the crisis in Jos – North is largely political clothed or hidden under the cover of religion. This could be seen in the high level of respondents who were of the views that politics is the major factor as depicted in Table 5.8 accounting for 59.5%. More so, 68.3% of the respondents opined that religious difference was the central that led to the crisis in Table 5.9. A greater number of the respondents constituted 62.3% in Table 5.10, opined that ethnicity was a major factor in determining the dichotomy between indigenes and settlers in the study area. The
findings discussed above therefore, validate one of the research assumptions for this study that, the indigene/settler contestation in the study was largely political.

The findings also agreed to the fact that government in the study area did not show any serious concern to avert the crisis. This is clearly depicted in Table 5.11, with 73.4% of the respondents. Indicated in Table 5.12 majority of the respondents did not subscribe to the views that the contestation among some ethnic groups on the issue of Bongon Jos was a factor that led to the crisis. This is affirmed with 230 (49.8) respondents. 381 representing 82.5% were of the views that ethnicity was manipulated by the elites to divide people along religion in the study area.

Table 5.14 reveals that 263 (56.3%) opines that government was passive on the dichotomy between indigene and settlers. While 232 (50.2%) affirmed that the subdivision of the old Jos north local government has changed the local political equations. Table 5.16 also revealed that 246 (53.2%) of the respondent did not subscribe to the view that 1979 Constitution was a factor that have compounded the dichotomy between indigenes/settlers in the study area.

Table 5.17 equally reveals that 360 representing 77.9% did not agree that the expansion of Sharia laws in the twelve northern states of Nigeria was not a remote cause of the crisis. Majority of the respondents in Table 5.17, with frequency 322 (69.7%) affirmed that the contestation over economic and political space constitute one of the immediate cause of conflict in the study area. However, Table 5.19 shows that the frequency 317 (68.6%) of the respondents did not subscribe to the views that the alleged war between the indigenes/settlers been over-exaggerated by the press.

Table 5.20 also reveals that 266 representing 57.6% did not agree that economic factor was the genesis of the crisis. While Table 4.16 with frequency 267 (57.8%) were of the views that re-definition of the “residency rights” and its
incorporation in the Constitution is a possibility of an end to the crisis in the study area. Majority of the respondents, with frequency 318 (68.8%) in Table 5.17 opined that the inadequacy of security personnel is responsible for the escalation of the crisis.

Table 5.23 reveals that 233 representing 50.4% did not agree with the views that religion or rather religious leaders are party to the conflict. Moreover, 269 (58.2%) maintained that, they did not suffer any form of maltreatment in the hands of law enforcement agents, in the study area. In terms of religious factor, the findings discussed above therefore, validate one of the research assumptions for this study that, religion was used as a tool for mobilization or rather a subtle catalyst to the crisis.

The findings of this research unfold the fact, that the restructuring of Jos-master plan a solution to the crisis. This is captured in Table 5.25 for example shows that 47.0% were of the view that, the restructuring of Jos-master plan was not a solution to the crisis, in the study area. While 45.7% subscribed to the view that the structuring of Jos-master plan was a solution to the crisis.

Majority of the respondents in Table 5.26, with frequency 293 (63.4%) were of the view that the struggle for political power, between Hausa and Berom forms the basis for the crisis since 1991. The finding discussed above therefore, validate one of the research assumptions for this study that the crisis of indigene/settler in the study area was largely political.

Also captured in Table 5.27 that, majority of the respondents were of the view that the problems encountered after the crisis was loss of lives and properties. Frequency 228 (49.4%) has attested to that, while 57 (12.3%) maintains that the crisis caused displacement of people as refugees. Table 4.28 reveals that 188 (40.7%) were of the views that punishment on the perpetrators of the crisis was a way to guard against future occurrence of crisis in the study area. Table 5.29 also affirms majority
of the respondents with frequency 308 (66.7%) were highly discouraged about the role of the Plateau state government in managing the crisis. By implication the actions of the Plateau state government will escalate the crisis. However, Table 5.30 reveals that frequency 209 (45.2%) of the respondents opined that ethnicity was very relevant to the crisis in the study area. The findings discussed above therefore validate one of the research assumptions for this study that the problems of cultural identity led to the indigene/settler contestation in the study area. Table 5.31 also indicates 160 representing 34.6% of the respondents were of the view that the economic condition was very relevant in fueling the crisis of citizenship in the study area.

Furthermore, 350 (75.8%) of the respondents which constitute the majority were of the view that the non-implementation of the reports of various Commissions of enquiry was a factor to the crisis in the study area. The implication is that the reports of the various Commissions will be an exercise in futility for not punishing or bringing the perpetrators of the crisis to book by the government.

Table 5.33 show that 95 (20.6%) of the respondents were of the view that the obstacle to peace and development in the study area was insecurity. While Table 5.34 reveals that 201 (43%) of the respondents, were of the view that the relation between and among different ethnic groups in the study area, compared to what it were before the crisis, has highly deteriorated. Similarly, 113 (24.5%) which constitute majority, of the respondents in table 5.35 were of the views that the best way to sustainable peace in the study area is adequate security.

It was also captured in Table 5.36 that majority of the respondents with frequency 396 (85.7%) were of the view that the rotation of political leadership of the study area among the major ethnic groups, will enhance peace and sustainable development.
According to one of the respondent who was the former Deputy Governor of Plateau State, and a Gubernatorial candidate (Mrs) Polin Talin during the interview noted that, the problem of indigene/settler dichotomy in Jos – North local Government is purely conflicts on land ownership. She further reiterated that the struggle for political power between the major ethnic group (Hausa and Berom) ash compounded the conflict. Some interviewees identified the recurring conflict in the study area with religion. This become possible, when the news of the conflicts spread beyond the study area (Field Survey, 2010).

As part of the findings of this work the indigene /settlers contestation is rooted on the basis of individual and group interest instead of issue based. This is because at the center of the contestation elites manipulate individuals and groups instead of developmental issues. In this sense, elite are more particular about who is an indigene or who is a settler but do not discuss about issues like basic amenities of the communities or the study area such as unemployment, education, health and the likes. All these are silent in the contestation.

On the whole, the findings of the research proved that, the indigene / settler conflict in Jos North Local Government Area has political undertones, with religious and ethnic coloration. The failure in the part of the Plateau State Government to curb the problem once and for all keep the conflict ongoing.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SUMMARY

The study, the Crisis of Citizenship in Nigeria, with particular attention to indigene / settler conflict in Jos – North Local Government Area of Plateau State has been undertaken in the whole study area. This represent the sample from the state (Plateau) and operationally define our conception of the Jos – North Local Government. The introductory chapter summarizes the critical background to the study form the imperialist colonial origin of the Nigerian state. It also examines the problem of the study – the challenge of the puzzle explaining how and why land and blood ties have become platforms of identity conflicts in Nigeria’s plural society. It focused on the contemporary crisis of violent conflicts between “indigene and settlers” in various part of the country. This is a conflict that is defined by claims to territorial possession and cast troubling shadows on the theoretical discourse on the subject as well. It looks at the critical objectives of the study and its significance in the quest for knowledge.

The study is divided into five chapter the first introduces and states the problem of the research as well as sets the major objectives. It notes the plurality of Nigeria a cross political, sectional demographic religious, ethnic and other division (Otite, 2005, Alubo, 2006, Dunmoye, 1998). From the historical background of Nigeria, we observe several violent eruptions communal, religious but most importantly, ethnic in nature. The theoretical problem seems to be that the theoretical discourse on indigene/ settler conflicts is yet to fully resonate with the social reality on the ground. How do we account for a phenomenon that seems like the HIV virus,
to mutate without any apparent logical principle that could give us some insight into how to explain it?

The second research question seek to find how land ownership/use together with power is responsible for the causes and escalation of indigene/settler conflict? The third research question wants to find out what is responsible for the present malignancy of indigene/settler conflict in the Jos – North Local Government Area as well as the gulf between available knowledge and the problem. These research questions therefore motivate us to set our research objectives in the following ways:

i. To explain through primary data, national root cause of indigene/settler conflict in the Jos – North Local Government Area, Plateau State.

ii. To examine the problems surrounding the concept of indigene/settler conflict and seek better understanding of their meaning.

iii. To examine the ideological platforms and purposes and the role of politics in indigene/settler conflict.

iv. To explore the gaps in available research knowledge and seek explanation for the persistence of indigene/settler conflict in Jos – North Local Government Area, Plateau State.

v. To examine the relationship between land rights, kinship ideology, politics and how these cause and escalate indigene/settler conflict in the study area.

Having set out objectives to guide us to undertake the study, we frame our methodology with which to collect data to test the inference of our variables thus:

i. Land and power are key motivation sources of indigene/settler conflict in the Jos North Local Government Area.

ii. Political elite are key players in the indigene/settler conflict in the study area.
iii. Religion is used as catalysts to mobilize support of the people in the study area. More especially the so called indigenes.

The study preceded to define the scope and limitation. These are defined as covering the conflict area in the Jos – North Local Government involving settlers and indigenes. This includes conflicts within the study area. The potential challenges of the study area then spelt out as well as the area of coverage which is explained in greater detail in the methodology. We then proceeded to explain the significance and justification of the study. To start with, the study is significant in seeking to document a much neglected aspect of Nigerian history. While observing a disproportionate effort to document negative colonial imprint on Nigeria’s economy, society and so on, we see nothing in the area of her inter-ethnic relations which also suffered no less (Akinwunmi ed 2006, Odey ed 2007). It provides a critical link between the theoretical concepts seeking to explain the indigene / settler phenomenon and studies seeking knowledge on this area.

The study is also significant in examining the situational and mutative character of identifying conflict which is yet to be fully accounted for in the theoretical discourse so far. The subject matter is also significant for its dangerous dimension of raw naked violence in the ethnic cleansing methods that indigene / settler conflict entails. The study is also significant for examining the constitutional ambiguity that seems to give tacit support for perception that motivates indigene / settler platforms. This is to be seen in section 147:3 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In Nigeria at the moment citizenship is challenged by kinship ties (Dunmoye, 2005).

It is also significant for the study to take a closer look at the issue of struggle for political power. The sheer persistence and volatility of indigene / settler conflict
should command our attention in an area that is heterogeneous, or plurally most diverse.

The study undertakes a review of related literature in the second chapter it also anchors it here with a theoretical frame of analysis. It attempts a better understanding of the meaning and origin of the concept in Nigeria. The roots of the concept goes much further in the colonial past but has acquired more urgency and relevance in recent times. According to Hembe, Alli, ed 2005:101) it is a coined word to define native of a particular area as compared with other Nigerians resident there settler is an identity platform based on lineal descent and on ethnicity. It is used in recent times to discriminate against other Nigerians (World Organization Against Torture, 2002:133, Egwu, 2002, Alubo, 2003). Those who are settler in an area are therefore considered to be non-indigenes (Mamdani 2000, Williams, 2003:101, Ewa 2002:77) scholars who have written on this trace it to ones ancestry and lineage. Mere birth does not qualify one to be an indigene (Alubo, 2003:56) scholars have also documented how these definitions have played out in practice discriminating against other in contest over opportunities (Ekeh and Osaghae, 1998). Scholars have also noted the constitutional support in this ‘nativisation’ of citizenship. These are found in section 25 a,b,c, (the grandparents clauses) it is also found in Section 14(3) in the Federal Character Principles. They have also noted its ambiguity in failing to address the residency rights of citizens outside their areas of origin section 15(3)b of the constitution. These sections also give support for the character principles, Federal quota and inconsistency (Alubo 2003, Dunmoye, Kukah 2006, Egwu, 2003). What is also noted is the literature in the area is where Egwu (2002) indentifies five critical points raised in the elaboration of ethnicity in the works of Cohen (1989), Nnoli (1978; 1989), Otite (1990) and Osaghe (1992). He first point that ethnicity exists in a
polity in which there is variety of ethnic grounds (Pluralism). Second, it is characterized by exclusiveness, the common consciousness of being one in relation to others. Third, it is a tool of competition for individuals and grounds for scarce public good such as contracts, employment, political appointments, scholarships, access to land as well as opportunities for creating trade and commerce. Fourth, it is primarily a political phenomenon, which has much to do with the allocation of values. In fact, it is a state – linked category rather than an archaic survival mechanism of the African people with other cleavages as class and religion. This also forms the deliberate act of a state to maintain the statuesque which consequently may lead to settler / indigene conflict. Also the resonance of settler/ indigene conflict with religion in several case studies in Wase (Plateau State), Nasarawa – toto (Nasarawa state), Zangon – Kataf (Kaduna State), and Bauchi.

The review literature also examines settler/indigene conflict from a framework of ethnic conflict. Noting that the phenomenon is defined by ethnic configuration has been traced to the colonial period (Nnoli, 1978). We ended the review with the Elite theory which hinges on the manipulation of the economic and political power by few, due to an conscious mind of the masses as chapter. Which breeds the indigene / settler conflict.

The third chapter is exclusively devoted to methodology. It elaborates the research design, the characteristic of the study population, the sample and sampling techniques, the sources and instruments of data collection, the validity of instruments of data collection, the method of data analysis and the limitations of the methodology. The research is a field study of Jos-North Local Government of Plateau state. It employs both quantititative and qualitative method of data collection and analysis. The methodological objectives of collecting data is from:
i. The material roots of indigene / settler ideology on the basis of and ownership

users

ii. The ideological platform of indigene / settler conflict – conception of citizens, indigene, settler, migration, tradition.

The study utilizes such qualitative research techniques as interviews with some stakeholders.

The researcher used instrument of a designed questionnaire to collect date in the study area along the five major ethnic groups in the conflict, we also used research assistants to help in administering the questionnaires to the respondents in the study area.

6.2 CONCLUSION

The researcher investigated the crisis of citizenship with particular attention to indigene/settler conflict in Jos-north Local Government Area, Plateau State. It was very clear from the findings established that, the Jos north local government under review is cycled with crisis rooted on the basis of land owner resulted to indigene/settler dichotomy. The above notwithstanding is a passive role of the Plateau State government that allowed the elite to politicize the citizenship on the basis of indigene/settler. This actually affects the socio-economic and political development of the study area.

Nevertheless, it could be noticed that ethnicity, politics, religion has been a serious problem that led to the crisis of citizenship rooted on the basis of indigene/settler. Other problems include the bad governance, inadequate security and lack of implementing the recommendations of the reports of the various Commission/Committee of Inquiry in the study area. The now turn to provide
alternative framework or recommendations that can help to avert the future recurrence of the crisis in the study area and other parts of Nigeria.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Having considered the findings from the research, the following measures are recommended to avert the future recurrence of the conflict.

1. Religious tolerance and accommodation: In order to stem indigene/settler Conflict in Jos-North Local Government Area – Plateau State, there is a need for the residents to be tolerant and accommodating of their different others. This can be made possible by consistent public awareness campaigns by political, community and religious leaders. In this regard, there is need for education of the citizenry through this awareness. Religious leaders should be wary of what they preach to their followers – in order to nurture the spirit of oneness in their faithful notwithstanding their religious differences. Political and community leaders should act in such a manner as to enhance harmony among the people by guided utterances.

2. Economic empowerment of citizens: As rightly observed by the findings of this work, most of the indigene/settler conflicts in Jos-North have roots in the impoverished state of the populace. Therefore, one way to end these conflicts is to empower the people not only in the study, but nationally too. To do this job opportunities for the unemployed who usually turn into ready tools to be used during conflict situations. Government can also empower the citizens by embarking on skill-building or acquisition programmes which will enhance self-reliance. This endeavour by government should actualize and transcend the present national programme “Subsidy re-investment and employment programme (Sure-P), as well as the National Poverty Eradication Programme
(NAPEP) in the study area which is still limited. To further consolidate the empowerment scheme, conscious effort should be made by government to improve on available infrastructure and provide new ones in order to cope with the ever increasing challenges to government in terms of building a responsive government and provision of social services in the face of increasing population.

3. Provision of Adequate Security in the security personnel with appropriate training that can be drafted on (time when ever any indigene/settler) conflict erupts anywhere in the state. They should have adequate and modern security facilities (i.e. communication gadgets, vehicles, arms and ammunition etc) that would enhance the effectiveness of their operations. Most importantly strict laws and regulations should be enacted and should be applied to latter so that culprits are made to face the punishment they deserve.

4. Strengthening the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIRECT): It has become apparent that despite the existence of this body it has not be deferred the occurrences of indigene/settler conflicts. Thus, the council should strengthen society, but by expanding its scope of operation to include indigene/settler matter as well. In doing this, the council should place emphasis on not just resolving conflicts but should endeavour towards building bridges across religious and ethnic divides by deepening national values in the citizenry through social programmes encouraging inter-marriages and educating the populace on the need to be tolerant of one another devoid of indigene/settler dichotomy. By so doing, this will dampen the spirit of division amongst Nigerians and foster oneness that is sin aqua non to nation building.

5. Political Re-orientation of the Entire-national citizenry
This re-orientation is necessary against the back drop of the kind of political structure and behavior and social values which Nigerian have been socialized over many decades. In these, there is in equality among the people, discrimination on the basis of indigeneship/settlership of states, religion, ethnic group, class and so on.

All Nigerians should be treated as equals anywhere in the country. The thinking that will make every Nigerian to feel a sense of citizenship of the country and as such display the needed patriotic behavior is require to enhance national cohesion. This demands a reshaping of our educational policy, revamping of our nation-building institution and Jos-North in particular such as the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), National Institute for Policy and Strategic studies (NIPSS), Political Parties, national Associations and the emergence of a patriotic national leadership.

6. Government should take seriously the reports of commissions of inquiry arising from indigene/settler conflict with a view of implementing them. More especially compensating and resettlement of victims of the conflict.

7. The curriculum at the primary and secondary school levels should incorporate subjects that can promote inter-ethnic and religious harmony and remove stereotypes and prejudices.

8. The basis of citizenship should be derived from residency so that the settler would be a citizen who should be free to reside anywhere without fear, freely, own properties and even contest election in area.

9. Cultural and sports competition should be strengthened. They can serve as a media of integration.
10. We join Adesoji and Alao views in recommending that there is the need to build a national citizenship through a reform of the Nigerian constitution particularly chapter III, section 25-32 of the 1999 constitution as (amended) that deal with the issue of citizenship. In doing this the recommendation of the political Bureau (1987) which suggested of “Residency right” and incorporation into the constitution should be given priority.

It is therefore, the hope of the researcher that, all hands must be on deck to whole heartedly implement these recommendations and embarked on good governance in the study area. These if well adhered to, will greatly help in curtailing the future recurrence of the conflict in Nigeria and Jos-North in particular.
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APPENDIX A

1.1 THE REPORT OF AJIBOLA PANEL OF INQUIRY ON JOS NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRISIS

1.2 INTRODUCTION

The commission of inquiry led by former Attorney General of the Federation Prince Bola Ajibola was set up by the Plateau state Government to investigate the Jos crisis of November 2008.

The panel however said in its 339 page report that “despite the coincidence of time, the local government election of 2008 was not the immediate cause of the unrest but the feeling that the Hausa-Fulani had lost the election and had by that taken lost access to one of the major opportunities for economic domination and advancement amongst their people, which pushed them to violence”. (Daily Trust, February 15, 2010).

1.3 RECOMMENDATION

The commission recommended that major Hausa/Fulani settlements in Jos should be acquired by the Plateau state government. The settlements which the commission suggested should be acquired by the state government include Gangare, Yanjinka, Rikkos, Cattle Market (Yan Shanu), Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rimi, Angwan Dalyop, Katako, parts of Ali Kazaure and Dilimi. The Prince advised the state government to create a modern city out of the settlements after the acquisition by constructing urban access roads through these settlements and opening up the slums with the provision of roads, housing estates, clinics and modern schools.

The commission further recommended that the police be made to investigate the activities of some prominent persons in the state, including former Deputy Senate President Ibrahim Mantu, Alhaji Saleh Hassan, Sheikh Yahaya Jengre as well as former Minister of State for Information and Communications Alhaji Dasuki Ibrahim Nakande.

The commission recommended that Nakande and House of Representatives members representing Jos North/Bassa Federal Constituency Malam Samaila investigated by the police, saying their utterances before and after the crisis were capable of igniting more crises in the future.

Ajibola commission also said it was not satisfied by the explanations of former President Ibrahim Babangida that he did not create Jos North local government to favour a particular group. The commission found out that the former President created Jos North local government in 1991 to favour the Hausa/Fulani community that demanded for the local government in the form in which it was created.

The Prince Bola Ajibola commission however absolved Plateau state governor Jonah Jang of any complicity in the 2008 crisis. It said “there was no evidence to substantiate the allegation that the statement gave a shoot-on-sight order” during the crisis after which security agents were alleged to have killed so many residents.

However, the report advised the state government to readily take on security advice “as in the recent instance, when the scheduling of the elections for Thursday was advised against because it would mean that the results would be announced on Friday a Muslim worship day, with possible religion-inflamed consequences”.

The commission in its final report also recommended that the state government reacquires the university of Jos land and hand over same to the university authority to fence and develop for it use. It said “over time some persons have acquired some parcels or portions of the university of Jos land by tribal sentiments,
wrong issuance of Right of Occupancy and other titles including numerous illegal sales and purchases with the active cooperation of the Federal Government”.

The commission also recommended that the Plateau state government should after investigating individual culprits, set up a reconciliation commission for the purpose of allowing adversaries meet and to reconcile their differences. It said “those among them that come out and embrace the peace process should be granted amnesty from criminal prosecution” while the state government should investigate those who do not embrace the reconciliation commission.

The commission also recommended that the state government required the university of Jos land and hand over same to the university authority to fence and develop for its use. It said “over time some persons have acquired some parcels or portions of the university of Jos land by tribal sentiments, wrong issuance of Right of Occupancy and other titles including numerous illegal sales and purchases with the active cooperation of the federal government”.

The commission also recommended that the present Jos North local government be redelineated into three sustainable local governments with an equitable representative number of wards within each local government, while “the state government should be due consideration to all ethnic groupings in appointment, nominations and promotions within the state”.

In addition, it recommended that the state government should promote inclusion and participation through a ‘state character’ principle similar to the federal character policy of the federal government “as this would take into consideration” citizen’s right in any party of Nigeria that they may find themselves. “This means that all persons who are bonafide citizens should have equal right, opportunities and access and not to deny those designated as non indigenes of an area the access to some of the most important avenues of socio-economic mobility be it government jobs, academic scholarships, university admission or fees”.

The commission said it received claims of property destroyed totaling more than N43 billion while 4,815 structures as well as 167 cars were claimed to have been damaged during the unrest. It is also said actual number of persons who lost their lives in the 2008 Jos unrest stands at 312 as it could not verify claims by Human Right Watch that the Muslim Community recorded 632 deaths. The commission however agreed that the Muslim Community “suffered massive casualties”. (Daily Trust February 15, 2010, pp. 1 and 5 vol. 23 No.66).

Based on the above report, it would be recalled that the Hausa/Fulani Muslim Community had boycotted the activities of the Prince Bola Ajibola Commission into the November 2008 Jos crisis. “It said that Governor Jonah Jang who set up the commission was an interested party in the crisis and cannot be expected to set up an impartial commission of inquiry. (Daily Trust February, 15, 2010).

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON JOS CRISES (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) MAY, 2010

1.01 INTRODUCTION

Arising from the crisis, which engulfed Jos and environs from January 17th to 19th, 2010, the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation Republic of Nigeria, His Excellency, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, GCFR, convened a consultative forum of stakeholders from Plateau state to consider the situation. The meeting was held at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, on Monday 1st February, 2010. At the end of the meeting, a fifteen (15) member presidential Advisory Committee,
which was subsequently raised to twenty-eight (28) to reflect additional stakeholders, constituted.

1.02 TERM OF REFERENCE
The committee was given the following terms of reference to consider within a 2-week time frame, which was later extended due to emerging circumstances:

1. To recommend practical solutions to the recurring problems leading to the crisis;
2. To recommend peace-building measures and practical steps that traditional rulers, the media, religious leaders, ethnic associations, civil society and other stakeholders in Plateau state shall each take in order to avert the recurrence of a similar crisis;
3. To classify and recommend the roles that the federal, Plateau state and local governments shall play in implementing the solutions to be recommended in (i) above; and
4. To make any other recommendations, to the Federal and Plateau state governments on any other relevant issue critical to averting the recurrence of similar crisis in Plateau state and ensure lasting Peace, harmony, solidarity and stability in the state.

1.03 METHODOLOGY
In order to effectively address its terms of reference and make appropriate recommendations, the committee adopted several initiatives including regular plenary sessions; syndicate sessions, submissions made by individual members; study of available white papers and reports of previous commissions of inquiry set up at different times by the Federal and Plateau state governments for guidance and as resource materials; interactive discussions with political traditional leaders and resource persons across the country. In the same vein, the committee also adopted palliatives such as press releases, inspection visits to scenes of crises as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, where victims of the crisis were condoled and urged them to remain calm, assuring them of the commitment of the Federal Government to find lasting peace in Plateau state.

2.00 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2.01 MATTERS RELATING TO LONG-STANDING COMMUNAL SUSPICION AND DISPUTE OVER OWNERSHIP / LAND MATTERS IN JOS.

2.011 FINDINGS
The committee found that the controversy over the ownership of Jos was the main cause of the crises. The committee observed that previous reports ascribed ownership of Jos to the native tribes of Afizere, Anaguta, and Berom but Hausa communities challenged it in court.

2.012 RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee recommended that Government should set up a forum for continuous consultation and dialogue in order to promote accommodation, mutual respect and right of citizens as well as allay fears.
Furthermore, host communities should accommodate other citizens by way of respecting their citizenship rights while such resident citizens should respect the customs and traditions of their hosts.

2.02 INDIGENESHIP

The Federal Government and the National Assembly should expedite action to give practical effect to constitutional provision regarding citizenship rights and indigeneship. Pending constitutional amendment, the extant policy approved by the Plateau state government should be enforced.

2.03 CREATION OF DISTRICT/VILLAGE HEADS ADMINISTRATION IN JOS-NORTH

2.031 FINDINGS

The committee was availed with the administrative challenges related to the traditional institutions that arose following the creation of Jos-North local government.

The committee found that Jos-North local government was the only local government in the state with one district.

2.032 RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee recommends as follows:

i. That the state Government should strengthen the community and traditional institutions in Jos-North local government;

ii. That the state government should refer to previous reports that it deemed helpful on the creation of Chiefdoms, district and village areas in the state which are: Yahaya Kanam Commission of Inquiry (1976), Report of John Samci (1997), Yahaya Gwende (2002), Da Barnabas Dusu upgrading/creation of Chiefdoms / district / village areas in Plateau state.

iii. That interested communities should take advantages of the state government circular on the creation of new/additional chiefdoms, districts and village areas and apply accordingly.

2.04 CREATION OF JOS-NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

2.041 FINDINGS

The committee found that Jos-North was created by the then Military Administration in furtherance of its policy that every local government that had two federal constituencies be split into two local governments. This brought about creation of Jos-North and Jos South local governments.

2.042 RECOMMENDATIONS

The creation of Jos-North local government be revisited by the Federal government in consultation with the relevant stakeholders and communities to create additional local government(s) and electoral wards taking into cognizance the tradition, geographical contiguity and affinity of the areas.

2.05 ELECTORAL MALPRACTICES

2.051 FINDINGS

The committee found that lack of neutrality and transparency on the part of the state independent electoral commissions and the use of the power incumbency to rig
elections were a national phenomenon. It further observed that the quest to win elections at all costs by politicians and resort to election violence contributed to the crisis.

2.052 RECOMMENDATIONS

Politicians must ensure that votes count in all elections, address election complaints through legal means as against resorting to violence while the independent national electoral commission (INEC) should be empowered to conduct all elections at federal state and local government levels. Also, the use of modern information technology should be introduced in conducting all elections.

2.06 COMMUNITY INSENSITIVITY
2.061 FINDINGS

The committee found that politics of Jos-North local government area had been characterized by community insensitivity and acrimony.

2.062 RECOMMENDATIONS

Zoning and rotational arrangement should be introduced in order to prevent politics of acrimony.

2.07 IMPOSITION OF CANDIDATES AND POLITICS OF EXCLUSION
2.071 FINDINGS

The committee found that political parties often compromised their constitutions in the emergence of candidates for elections.

2.072 RECOMMENDATIONS

Political parties should strengthen their internal democracy in order to address tendencies of imposition of candidates and politics of exclusion.

2.08 RELIGIONS DIMENSION TO THE CRISIS
2.081 FINDINGS

The committee found that religion was not the main cause of January 17th, 2010 crisis but it was rather exploited by some individuals and groups to gain political popularity and support. It also discovered that religious preachers incite hate and violence.

2.082 RECOMMENDATION

Religion should not be use as a political campaign tool by religious and political leaders. There is the need to organize and promote inter-religious education and establish religious code in order to regulate religious activities and practices.

2.09 ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE CRISIS
2.090 YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
2.091 FINDINGS

The committee found that majority of the participants in all the crises in the state were youth and that if they were employed they will not be available to be hired for pittance by mischief makers. It also found that the crises resulted in destruction of lives and economic ventures, markets, shops and houses.
2.92 RECOMMENDATIONS

The state government should construct satellite markets and undertake the reconstruction of the burnt Jos main market as a way of boosting economic activities for youth. Establishment of vocational training and skills acquisition centres across the state to train and empower all youth without any discrimination. Also recommended is the establishment of recreational / sport centres to enable youth acquire sporting skills.

2.0100 ABSENCE OF PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

2.010 FINDINGS

The committee found that the state government was the major source of employment and that the presence of private sector in economy of the state was very minimal.

2.0102 RECOMMENDATIONS

The federal government should come to the aid of the state by utilizing part of the intervention found available to Mr. President to bail it out of its present predicament while the state should introduce attractive incentives for private sector participation in the economy.

2.0110 LAND DEGRADATION ARISING FROM MINING ACTIVITIES

2.0111 FINDINGS

The committee found that as a result of years of mining activities, a large portion of land in the state was degraded and rendered unsuitable for other economic activities.

2.0112 RECOMMENDATIONS

The state government should approach the federal government to seek for special assistance from the ecological fund to rehabilitate and reclaim the areas destroyed due to mining activities of yester-years.

2.120 NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF PAST REPORTS AND WHITE PAPERS

2.0121 FINDINGS

The committee found that the recommendations of the previous reports on past crises in the state had not been implemented.

2.0122 RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee recommends that once approved by government, report on the crises should not only be released immediately to the public, but that they should be processed and implemented. A committee of government and stakeholders should be put in place to examine recommendations contained in past reports with a view to determining their relevance, especially in the interest of promoting peace process.
2.130 FARMER-GRAZER CONFLICT
2.0131 FINDINGS
The committee found that conflict between herdsmen and farmers has been traditionally attributed to encroachment on farm land by grazers on the one hand and encroachment on grazing reserves by farmers on the other.

2.0132 RECOMMENDATIONS
Grazing reserves should be established in areas that are vulnerable to farmers / grazers conflicts especially Barkin-Ladi, Bassa, Jos-South and Riyom local government areas of Plateau state as contained in the approved government white paper on the Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry Report of 2001.

In the same vein, grazers and farmers must rededicate themselves to work towards promoting mutual understanding and peaceful co-existence in mediating over any crisis situation within their groups. In addition, joint consultative and peace committees should be constituted at ward, village and district levels for dispute settlement among farmers and grazers.

2.0140 RESETTLEMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLAYED HERDS MEN
2.0141 FINDINGS
The committee found that as a result of crisis, many Fulani herdsmen were displaced while some of them relocated from their settlements.

2.0142 RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to encourage speedy reconciliation and end the spate of attacks and counter attacks being witnessed in vulnerable areas, the federal and state government’s should ensure that all internally displaced persons, especially the Fulani herdsmen, are assisted to return to resettle in their places of abode without any hindrance to reprocess their property.

2.015 MEDIA
2.0151 FINDINGS
The committee found that some media outfits engaged in destructive journalism through biased and subjective reportage of the crises.

2.0152 RECOMMENDATIONS
The mass-media should engage in intensive research and be more objective in their coverage and reportage. In addition, the Nigerian press council should maintain professional ethical standards and practices.

2.016 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
2.0161 FINDINGS
The committee found that the non-implementation of past reports of judicial commissions of inquiries is a factor in recurrence of the crises. The committee observed that while not discountenancing the implementation of past reports, adopting the option of Truth and Reconciliation commission may further enhance the peace process.
2.0162 RECOMMENDATIONS
The establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission which will provide an avenue to reinforce the peace process in Plateau state is recommendation.

2.017 DIALOGUE
2.0171 FINDINGS
The committee observed with concern the emerging trend of a culture of violence in Jos and Bukuru metropolis.

2.172 RECOMMENDATIONS
Cultural dialogue is what residents should imbibe and resolve never again to resort to violence as a means of resolving their differences and disputes.

2.018 RE-LANDSCAPING AND RE-DESIGNING OF JOS METROPOLIS
2.0181 FINDINGS
The committee noted with concern, the deplorable state of slum settlement in Jos metropolis, which provide conducive atmosphere for crime and violence to thrive, where by constituting insecurity.

2.0182 RECOMMENDATIONS
The federal government should assist the state with a special intervention fund to undertake and implement the new Jos Master Plan particularly as it affects compensation for properties that may be affected in the process. However, this should be done with proper consultation with relevant stakeholders to allay any fears.

2.019 EMERGENCY RELIEF FUND FOR LOSS OF PROPERTY AND MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD
2.0191 FINDINGS
The committee found that various forms of loses were incurred by victims of the crises including human lives and properties such as residential accommodation, business outfits, cattle and other assets worth billions of Naira which is far beyond the capacity of the Plateau state government to shoulder alone.

2.0192 RECOMMENDATIONS
The federal, state and local governments should set up a special intervention fund to cater for the immediate needs of the victims.

3.00 IMPLEMENTATION
3.01 STRATEGY
In order to facilitate early implementation of this report, there is need to put in place, a machinery to monitor the implementation of the approved recommendations, particularly those relating to immediate measures needed to contain the incessant crises.

3.02 Accordingly, the committee strongly recommended that a Joint Implementation Monitoring Committee should be constituted. The committee should comprise representatives of federal, state and local governments as well as the relevant
stakeholders in Jos Metropolis. Doing so will instill confidence and carry along all affected in the implementation process. (Daily Trust September 1, 2010 Vol.25 No.7).

Based on the above recommendations submitted by both the Presidential Advisory committee and Ajibola Commission of Inquiries, we were made to understand that the issue of punishment on the culprits or the perpetrators of the crises is very silent which if care is not taken might degenerate another conflict leading to crisis. However the victims of the crisis and the properties destroyed have not been compensated. This will in no small measure make the victims to vest confidence on the government, if properly addressed. And failure to address the issues as stake, keep the crisis on going.
APPENDIX B
UNSTRUCTURED ORAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DATA COLLECTION

1. There is general assertion in different quarters that the indigene / settler problem in Jos-North local government is religiously inclined? How true and to what extent is this in the case of the Jos-North Local Government.
2. To what extent can you say that the crisis of citizenship in Nigeria, with particular case to indigene / settler contestation in the Jos-North is an elite manipulation?
3. What do you think are the problems confronting the Jos-North local government with regards to the crisis of indigene settler?
4. Plateau state has several ethnic groups. But the recent cycle of crises seem to be involving a particular ethnic group, the Berom against the Hausa and Fulani, notably on the issue of settlers. What can you say in that regard?
5. What do you think has being the impact of the crisis on the citizen of Jos-North Local Government?
6. Are the masses in Jos-North Local Government actively involved in the formulation and implementation of project that are meant to serve their interest?
7. What inputs are made available to the victims of the crisis with regards to compensation, unemployment and poverty as part of the efforts of the government to reduce unemployment rate?
8. To what extent can you say that the crisis of citizenship with particular case to indigene / settler dichotomy has an ethnic and religious factor? How is it that these concepts became relevant to the crisis to what extent.
9. Can you say that the structuring of the Jos-North town planning is a way to resolve the problem of the contestation on land by the major ethnic groups?
10. In your own view, what do you think will be the lasting solution to the crisis in the Jos-North local government, with regards to indigene / settler issue?
### APPENDIX C
THE NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES, NAME, SEX, POSITION / STATUS, DAYS OF INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/NO</th>
<th>NAME OF INTERVIEWEE</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>POSITION / STATUS</th>
<th>DAYS</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Shedrack Best Gaya</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Secretary to the Plateau State Government.</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>2nd July 2012</td>
<td>4.30-5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Barr. Dalong</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Lecturer Univeristy of Jos (Faculty of Law)</td>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>July 5th 2012</td>
<td>8.30 am – 9.00 am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mal. Sale Hassan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Business Man</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>8th July 2012</td>
<td>9.00am – 11.00am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Alh. Ibrahim Dasuki – Nakande</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Member of the presidential advisory committee on Jos Crisis</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>6th July 2012</td>
<td>4.00 pm – 5.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Chief Joshua Dariye</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Former Executive Governor of Plateau state</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>14th July 2012</td>
<td>12.00 pm – 1.00 pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Gregory Yolong</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Former commissioner of information, Plateau State Government</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>July 28th 2012</td>
<td>9.00 am – 10.00am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Moses Ignacious Kaigama</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>CAN Chairman Plateau State</td>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>July 31st 2012</td>
<td>10.00am – 11.30 am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Mal. Balarabe Daud</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Chief Imam Jos central Mosque</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>July 27th 2012</td>
<td>12.00pm – 1.00 pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Sheik Sani Yahaya Jengre</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Head of Izala Tul Bid’a Wa’i qamatusunnah (JIBWIS).</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>21st July 2012</td>
<td>4.30 pm – 5.30pm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D
STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE

Please mark the appropriate box with an X i.e. ( X ).
When the question requires open expression of your opinion, please be brief.

1. Sex: (a) Male ( ) (b) Female ( )

2. Religion: (a) Islam ( ) (b) Christianity ( ) (c) Others ( )

3. Tribe: a. Hausa ( ) b. Fulani ( ) c. Berom ( ) d. Anaguta( ) e. Afizere( )

4. Marital Status: (a) Single ( ) (b) Married ( ) (c) Divorce ( )
(d) Widowed ( )

5. Occupation: (a) Civil Servant ( ) (b) Business Person ( )
(c) Student ( ) (d) Farmer ( )

6. Local Government Area of Origin:______________________________

7. State of Origin:__________________________

8. The Jos-North Crisis was a Contest for Political Power?
   (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

9. was Religious differences the central factor that led to the Jos-North Crisis?
   (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

10. Is Ethnicity a Major Factor in Determining the Dichotomy between
    Settler/Indigene in Jos-North L.G.A.
    (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

11. Has the State government shown any serious concern in the crises?
    (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

12. Has contestation among some ethnic groups in Jos-North local government
    particularly on the issue of Bongon Jos, another factor that led to conflict.
    (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )
13. Has ethnicity been used or manipulated by the elites to divide the people along religion in Jos-North local government area.
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

14. Was the government passive on the dichotomy between indigene and settlers?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

15. Has the sub-division of the old Jos local government area changed the local political equations.
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

16. Was Nigerian constitutions since 1979 have compounded the unfortunate dichotomy between indigenes / settlers in Jos-North Local Government Area?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

17. Was the expansion of Shariah laws in twelve Northern states of Nigeria a remote cause to Jos-North crisis.
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

18. Has the contestations over economic and political space constitute one of the immediate causes of conflicts in Jos-North Local Government Area?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

19. Was the alleged genocide war between the indigene and settlers been over-exaggerated by the press?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

21. Was Economic factor the genesis of the crisis that broke out at the Jos-North local government area?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

22. Has the re-definition of the “Residency rights a solution to the crisis in Jos North?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

23. Was the inadequacy of security personnel responsible for the escalation of the crisis?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

24. Was the religious leaders party to the conflict?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

25. Did you suffer any form of maltreatment in the hands of law enforcement agents during the Jos-North crisis?
   (a) Yes (    ) (b) No (    )

26. Has the restructuring of Jos-Master plan a panacea to the crisis?
(a) Yes (   ) (b) No (   )

27. Give a brief account of your understanding of the Jos-North crisis of settler/indigene contestation since 1991:____________________
                                               ______________________________________________________
                                               ______________________________________________________

28. What were the major problems encountered by the people in Jos-North in 2001, after the conflict?______________________________
                                               ____________________________________________________________
                                               ____________________________________________________________

29. Suggest ways to guard against future occurrence of crisis in the Jos north Local Government area?
   (a) _____________________________________________________________
   (b) _____________________________________________________________
   (c) _____________________________________________________________
   (d) _____________________________________________________________

30. What are your feelings about the role of the Plateau state government in managing the crisis in Jos-North Local Government Area?
   (a) Highly encouraging (   )
   (b) Encouraging (   )
   (c) Discouraging (   )
   (d) Totally discouraging (   )

31. Was ethnicity a factor /relevant to the crisis in Jos – North Local Government Area of Plateau State?
   (a) Very relevant (   )
   (b) Relevant (   )
   (c) Fairly relevant (   )
   (d) Not relevant (   )

32. Was the economic condition relevant in fueling the crisis of citizenship in Jos-North Local Government Area?
   (a) Very relevant (   )
   (b) Relevant (   )
   (c) Fairly relevant (   )
   (d) Not relevant (   )
33. Was the non-implementation of the various commission of enquiries reports a factor in the crisis in Jos – North Local Government area?
   a. Yes [    ] b. No [    ]

34. What do you think are the obstacles to peace and development in Jos – North Local Government Area?
   (a) _____________________________________________________________
   (b) _____________________________________________________________
   (c) _____________________________________________________________
   (d) _____________________________________________________________

35. Was the relationship between and among different ethnic groups in Jos-north compare to what it was before the crisis cordial?
   (a) Highly deteriorated (    )
   (b) Deteriorated (    )
   (c) Fairly cordial (    )
   (d) Cordial (    )

36. Suggest the best way to sustainable peace in Jos-North local government area in particular and Plateau state at large? Express your opinion in brief.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

37. Will the rotation of political leadership of Jos –North among the major ethnic groups enhance peace and sustainable development? Express your opinion.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________