UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS IN AFRICA:
A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA CAMEROON BORDER CRISIS

BY

ALFRED OLATUNDE
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DECLARATION

I, Alfred Olatunde hereby declare that this project work was carried out by me and it has not been presented anywhere. Authors whose works were referred to in this thesis are duly acknowledged.

[Signature]

Alfred Olatunde  B.Sc, PGDE
CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this project work is an original work undertaken by Alfred Olatunde as approved by the Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. It is therefore a partial fulfillment for the award of Masters Degree in International Affairs and Diplomacy (MIAD).

Mr Alfred Olatunde, BSc, PGDE

Sign

Date

Dr. P. I. Izah

Sign

Date

Project Supervisor

Head, Department of Political Science

Sign

Date

Dean, Postgraduate School

Sign

Date
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my lovely family.
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ALFRED OLATUNDE
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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) has been actively involved in conflict resolutions in the world since its inception in 1945. The United Nations (UN) was established to promote international peace and security after the second world war.

The purposes of the UN are three to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion (Article i.) Under the UN charter, provisions are made for the intervention on hostilities between belligerents. The essence of these provisions is that they are to be complied with by all the members of the United Nations to ensure international peace and security.

As the preamble to the UN charter states: WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,
and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods that armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.(pp.49)

The contents of the preamble to the Charter is unequivocally explicit in the sense that UN desires a situation whereby succeeding generations would be protected from catastrophe and scourge of war. This is to postulate that the charter never contemplates resort to war in case of international law and non-international disputes.

The path of peace is what essentially the charter promotes and encourages belligerents to settle dispute within the known international and diplomatic procedures in order to save humanity from the brink of a very serious humanitarian disaster which repercussion and consequences would detrimentally depend the drift which humanity is already inflicted with.
The charter of the United Nations envisages peaceful co-existence between states and promotes diplomacy rather than armed conflict. It is noteworthy to observe that the intention of the UN charter is essentially on peace and peaceful means of settlement of international dispute. The absolute necessity of maintaining international integration by means of peaceful resolution of conflicts should form the fundamental concern of all states and organs. The greatest challenge facing humanity today is the threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Beginning from the late 1950’s through the 1960’s conflicts have dominated world politics, a greater majority of it are from African states. To contain this growing conflict therefore, the UN has expanded its scope of operations and this has to a large extent help in preventing the escalation of such conflicts into full scale wars. The UN has done this through one of its main organs – The International Court of Justice (ICJ) The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It was established by the charter of the UN, signed on 26 June 1945 as San Francisco, in pursuance of one of the primary purposes of the UN: “to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of inter national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” The Nigeria – Cameroon border conflict over the Bakassi peninsula is a notable example. The court operates under a statute which forms part of the charter,
well as under its arm Rules. It began work in 1946, when it replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) which had been established in 1920 under the auspices of the League of Nations. The seat of the Court is in the Peace Palace at the Hague (Netherlands).

The Bakassi crisis dates back to the early part of this century, when Britain and Germany fought over ownership of the territory. This was however resolved in 1915, by a treaty which made the peninsula part of the Western Cameroon. This position was reversed by the General Convention of 1958 on international boundaries. It made the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon at Rio Rive and thus fixed Bakassi part of Nigeria territory.

(Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties Art.2, Para. 1)

The Nigeria civil war however gave the Camerounians a chance to regain the territory. Nigerians, on their own part, as a strategy to win Biafra sought to enforce a blockade in the Gulf of Guinea to prevent the rebels from bringing in their supplies. The then Camerounian leader Ahmadu Ahidjo asked for the peninsula in return for the country’s co-operation in cutting off the Biafra. Nigerian’s Head of State at the time accepted the condition and at a meeting in Yaounde in April 1973
sealed the part with both leaders affixing their signatories to a new map which puts
the boundary of the Cross River estuary.

But the pact was reportedly rejected by the then Supreme Military
Council, this was in spite of the fact that another meeting between Ahidjo
and Gowon at Maroua in 1975 ceded the territory to Cameroun. Since the
repeal of this treaty. Both minor and major crises have become a
common thin in the area.

(Maroua Declaration of June 1, 1975)

Various efforts of solving the present dispute including the Organization
of African Unity (O.A.U) resolution or 1963 have since proved abortive,
even the earlier Geneva agreement of 1958 only succeeded in
compounding the issue as it reviewed the boundary from the Anglo-
German treaty of 1913.

(Ibid. 129)
However, at independence, the conflict has lingered to the extent of deteriorating to shooting wars between the two neighbouring countries, leading to the UN interventions.

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

This work seeks to assess the role of UN in the resolution of the Nigeria Cameroun crisis over the Bakassi peninsula. To this end, the following research questions are posed for answers;

1. What are the fundamental causes of the conflict
2. What are the effects of the conflict on the relations of both states?
3. What is the effort of the UN in the resolution of the conflict?
4. What future for the two states in the resolution of the conflict?

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW

Owing to imprecise and arbitrary method of demarcating land borders signifying their spheres of influence, the Colonial Powers have, at independence, left many unresolved issues and opportunities for border conflicts if not sorted our amicably.
Although there have been series of borer problems between Nigeria and Cameroun, there is the compelling urge to examine the reasons which actually torched off an escalating sequence of war frenzy between the two countries. (Nigeria/Cameroun dispute over Bakassi: Legal, political and Diplomatic background, Auwalu H. Yadudu, Weekly Trust Newspaper, 20th March 2000, P.3).

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF NIGERIA AND CAMEROON
The two countries presently referred to as Nigeria and Cameroun evolved or are a product of colonialism, but became independent nations in 1960 and 1962 respectively. While Nigeria gained her independence from Britain (Anglophone), Cameroun gained hers from French (Francophone). The two countries border each other with Cameroun to the East of Nigeria.

ORIGIN OF THE NIGERIAN – CAMEROON CONFLICT OVER THE BAKASSI PENINSULA
In the late nineteenth century, the European powers, mainly Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Spain, carved out and appropriated chunks of African
territory in what was later characterized as the scramble for Africa, turning in to their possessions. They did so by conquest and treaty.

In the year 1884, the reigning Queen of England made a treaty with the rules of the then Calabar province, the agreement signed by King Eyo Honesty II on behalf of the native indigene and the British consul for the Bight of Benin and Biafra acting for the Queen recognized the entire Bakassi Peninsula as part of the Obong of Calabar's territory. The area covered the Bight of benin and Biafra up to Ubenekang and Idombi.

(Jumare M.M, 1994)

The terms of the treaty including British protection for the Obong and the territory against external aggression. In return, Britain was granted an extensive trading concession and rights over the administration of justice and taxation on behalf of the Obong.

(Jumare M.M, 1994)

Later in 1885, Britain again was to enter into another treaty with Germany, although this was in contravention of the 1884 treaty, the latest agreement effectively made Idombi renamed Barmusso by the Cameroun part of the German territory. The
treaty was described as a product of ‘German influence and might in the continental Europe of the 19th century’. The step was soon to become obvious as the first part of instalmental cession by Britain of the old Calabar territory. Although there was a swift protest from the Obong, the parties of the province never knew what hit at them until the 1913 Anglo-German treaty through which Britain attempted to turn over the whole area covered by the 1885 treaty to Germany. The people of the area protested and the king of Calabar made frantic representations to the colonial office in London. The protest was rested on the argument that, old Calabar was not a conquered territory but only brought under the British protection freely by treat. The argument was however ignored and not long after that, World War 1 broke out.

(Aluko Onifade (ed) (1977)

On the eve of the grant of political independence to both Nigeria and Cameroun, there was agitation on the part of the people on this territory for either total independence on a choice to merge with Nigeria on what was known then as GRENCH Camerouns. Following a plebiscite conduced by the UN, Northern Cameroun chose to join and become part of Nigeria while their Southern counterparts preferred to join the French cameroun.

(Ibid: 130)
In the process of acquiring the territory, both Germany and Britain entered into many treaties demarcating their spheres of influence and in the process of determining what would later become the International boundary between the successor African States: Nigeria and Cameroun. Needless to say, these treaties largely ignored long standing, if not immemorial, historical and cultural or political facts which were obtained on ground. It was in this context that, by what Nigeria considers as an illegal and ungratified treaty, Britain purported to fix Nigeria's border with Cameroun at River Akwayafe, thereby placing the dispute Bakassi territory in the Cameroun. However, thee were a couple of earlier treaties which had firmly fixed the border to be Rio Del Rye River, thereby squarely placing the territory in Nigeria territory. More importantly, the fact of history, political and linguistic affinities and ties, administration and physical occupation have indisputably placed Bakassi in Nigerian territory. After the 1956 General conference, the colonial powers met to discuss the boundaries of their colonies and consequently in 1961, a plebiscite in the Southern region of Nigeria ceded the Southern part of to the Federal Republic of Cameroun. Virtually, the first serious contest for the peninsula was during the Nigerian civil war. During that time, the government of Ahmadu Ahidjo in Cameroun was sympathetic to the cause of one Nigeria, he was apparently offended over the encampments of the Nigeria 3rd mailmen command led by the enviable dynamic and courageous Brigadier
Benjamin Adekunle at Abana on the peninsula, that was how Cameroun first laid claims to the disputed Bakassi Peninsula which as a matter of fact coincided with the discovering of oil deposits in the peninsula

(Akinyemi, A.B (1974)

Cameroun’s present claim is also hinged on the agreement signed by the two countries’ Heads of State in 1975. This agreement termed the Maroua declaration was sequel to a three day meeting in May 1975 between former Cameroun leader Ahmadu Ahidjo and his Nigeria counterpart, General, Yakubu Gowon in the border town of Maroua. The agreement as it were, actually shifted the boundary from the point earlier adopted by the countries in 1971, in favour of Cameroun.


At the conclusion of the meeting, the two leaders agreed to a new boundary. To the Camerounians, the treaty was an extension of the sovereignty over a group of villages in the border of the two countries. But the Nigerian side did not recognize the Maroua declaration. The argument was that the Maroua treaty was never rectified by the countries’ highest ruling body before the Gowon regime was overthrown. The treaty was in fact repudiated by the succeeding administration of late General Murtala Mohammed
RECENT TRENDS IN THE CONFLICT

The Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict has been on for a very long time without as much as witnessing any particular response from successive governments in Nigeria. In May 1980, a Camroonian patrol boat opened fire on a Nigerian site, the incidence torched off an escalating sequence of war frenzy followed by reluctance of the Camroonian authorities to offer an apology for the incidence and to promise reparations and compensation for the dead and injured within a fortnight as openly demanded by Lagos, the two countries were brought to the bank of war.

(Gbenga A. (1994) African Concord, PP.15

Nigerian newspapers sectionalized the crisis and the urge to go to war filtered deep with every such effort. Students of the Universities of Lagos and Ibadan responded by storming the premises of the Camroonian Embassy at Lagos. Most important to them was the favour of war, this demonstration brought about a degree of seriousness and sub-regional instability. Meanwhile, the armies of both countries mobilized in readiness on opposite sides of their common frontiers. Soldiers who were on leave were recalled, those who were about to proceed on leave had their leaves cancelled. The prospects of war between the two countries were as real as never before since their political independence in 1960.

(Gbenga A. (1994)
It is of interest of note that the organisation of African (O.A.U) responded to the dangerous clouds of war gathering over two of its members. At first, there was indifference on the part of the O.A.U later it became involved in trying to pacify the mutual hostility inclinations. This was however after President Shehu Shagari had dramatized his shock at the sadistic tendencies of O.A.U. The organisation became interested in resolving the border crisis only after Shagari reconsidered at the Lagos Airport his planned trip to a summit at Nairobi, Kenya. His decision against the summit gave more signs of sensitivity to the O.A.U. The official reason for President Shagari's reconsideration of the schedule trip was awarded as due to the feature of the summit agenda to include the border crisis.


In May 1981, some Camerounians Gendarmes ambushed and killed five Nigerian soldiers at Ikang, a border town adjoining Cross River State, the incident raised more protest by Nigerians and some years after this aggression, the rampaging Gendarmes forcefully occupied some Nigerian villages, hoisted their flags. Collected taxes and generally terrorized the villagers.

More recently in May 1991, some Camerounian Gendarmes abducted six Nigerians from Mbo Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State; detained and tortured them for about two weeks before the Nigerian government intervened, forcing the Gendarmes to release the Nigerians.

(Sami, S; 1984)

Over the years, the continuous and outrageous economic sabotage by neighbouring States against Nigeria has been alarming. Yet aware of this, successive Nigerian governments seem helpless and perpetually in want of how to respond. A five year old girl was innocently short in the leg while sleeping in her thatched roofed hut, her leg was amputated subsequently. An attack also took place on the 17th February 2002, as five of the Gendarmes were sighted in a patrol boat at Atabong, there was exchange of fire and more casualties were recorded.


A very recent pathetic case is that of Mrs Emeuyi, a four month old pregnant woman who is saddled with the responsibility of taking care of four young children because he husband was detained in a camp at Biya, Cameroun since February 6th 2002. Mrs Emeuyi said she received a message from he husband informing her of
how he got arrested by the Camerounian Gendarmes while fishing close to the Camerounian boundary at Bonke.

(Sami; S 1984)

Many other Nigerian fishermen have been arrested by the Gendarmes while fishing and those who are not too lucky got killed for example Bassey Etim Okon. One lucky fisherman who kept thanking God for saving him during detention period at Kumba prison recounts how he was arrested while fishing within the Nigerian waters. He said after fishing, he and his mates decided to drive in their canoes to the land to smoke their fish. They were attacked by Gendarmes who seized all their property, beat them mercilessly and killed his brother accomplices. He was thrown into Kumba prison where he along with other Nigerian was called salves.

(The Vanguard, Dec. 2003 PP. 15)

All in all, Nigerian military spokesmen have admitted that goods worth millions of naira have been lost by Nigeria to Cameroun Gendarmes on the Peninsula in recent years. Innocent lives lost are beyond imagination, over 500,000 Nigerians have been misplaced due to feeling or loss of their homes in Akwa Ibom and Cross River States.

(The Vanguard, Oct, 2003, pp. 16 – 17)
ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT

The Nigeria's fear of foreign involvement in the Nigeria-Cameroun border dispute over Bakassi Peninsula was compounded by the placement of French might behind Cameroun, who was the colonizers of Camroon and three other Franco-phone countries encircling Nigeria. This fear was heightened by the arrival of French troops and paratroopers with two pama attack helicopters in Cameroun on February 27th 1994.

(Agbakoba O, 1984)

As a result of this, this research project also seeks to evaluate on the question: Can Nigeria count on the neutrality of other Francophone neighbouring countries if confronted by French backed Camerounian forces?

As Nigeria's consistent policy on good neighbourlines between its five immediate neighbours has been that of disharmony and distrust. A case of support needed of its neighbours was shattered in the Nigerian civil war of 1967, as some of its neighbours actually gave their support to the Biafran rebels.

(Alikali, A. 1996)
Nigerian does not doubt this French partial involvement in the conflict, as there is a possible that if a compromise is not reached, in the outbreak of war, thee could be simultaneous attack from its Francophone neighbours like Chad, Niger Republic and Benin Republic. However, French has denied that deployment had nothing to do with the unfolding dispute between Nigerian and Cameroun. As the authorities in Paris claim that is troops in Cameroun were on routine military manoeuvres though later admitted that the deployment was ‘at the request of the government of Cameroun’. Nigeria on its part had tried to come to a reasonable term that the French would not act awkwardly as there are French interests in about 172 companies operating in Nigeria.

1. 4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES/JUSTIFICATION

The aim of this project is to examine what the UN as a body has been able to achieve regarding the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroun. The way and manner in which this case will go will enhance the confidence of other nations in UN and particularly its organ the ICJ. This settlement will therefore be a reference point for Similar cases/situation an intention of this sort will enhance peace and recently and the UN must have lived up to its obligations peace and recently in very paramount hence the project.
The project will therefore be able to proper solutions to this lingering problem between the two nation states defending in the settlement.

1. 5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The most suitable theoretical framework to be used in this analysis is the systems theory. We know that we construct theories for two reasons;

First, we hope they will simplify reality so that we might understand it in order to control it or adapt to it.

Secondly, once we have developed such an understanding, they (theories can guide us in testing its accuracy. Theories do this by providing logical basis for expectations about the world which can be compared with reality by proper research technique. We however know that theories are simply intellectual tools. In fact they are sets of logically related tools which represent what we think happens in the real world (Macheim and Rich 1981:17).

Thus conceptually, a system refers to an autonomous unit that is capable of adaptive behaviour and within this autonomous unit. There exists complex element involved in interaction between each of the elements and the environment.
Classic statement of system theory exists in Ross Ashbys design and other writers such as Moton, A. Kaplan have extensively written on this theory. The system theory in terms of International Relations is therefore on that takes the International Political System as a single system with the states as the component units, with each involving a dynamic interaction, at the same time pursing its own interest.

No actor in the international political system can remain isolated as each unit develops a network for defence and interdependence. The features of the system theory can be identified in terms of the structures. There is the feature of inputs which refers to the demand and support made by actors in the international political system.

There are also the feature outputs which refer to the conversion of demand and support into policy decisions. We also have the conversion which refers to the structures and institutions that are instrumental in covering demands into policies.

There is also the feedback, the feedback refers to the reaction of states to policy decisions reached and the environment refers to the factors which affect the functioning of the system. The more the report between the input and the output,
functioning via the feedback mechanism, the more stable the system is. A malfunction or failure of any of the structures in a political system to reach a compromise within a system can lead to breakdown or a halt in its future development. Resistance of a system in its capacity to continue the production of authoritative outputs will thereupon depend in keeping a conversion process operating.

The Nigerian-Cameroun conflicts over the Bakassi Peninsula is a typical example of a situation where all the structures in the system played one role or the other. The UN resolution of the crisis represent inputs into the system, the parties agreement to reframe from going to war represents the output. As a result of this resolution, will there be peace in the area? This will be the feedback. Thus the system theory can be used as the most suitable theoretical framework for this analysis.

1. 6 ASSUMPTIONS

For the purpose of this work the following have be hypothesized for authenticity or otherwise that:

1. The UN has made tremendous efforts in the resolution of the Bakassi conflict
2. The involvement of the UN in the conflict has been timely
3. The UN has achieved little or nothing in the resolution of the conflict.
1. 7 **SCOPE AND LIMITATION**

The Bakassi Peninsula conflicts. The period of study is from 1994 to date. However, the period before this time will also be taken into consideration to enable us have a better comprehension of the crisis.

There has been many conflict settled by the UN but our interest is only on the Bakassi Peninsula problem between Nigeria and Cameroun.

This study identifies some limitations, which prelude the collection of data and hence its analysis. Basically, available data are not free from bias, the complexity behind this is that it does not lead to facilitated saving time and energy.

Other limitations are financial constraints, lack of classified details, inability to move certain documents which are restricted and not to be taken away.

1.8 **METHODOLOGY**

Secondary sources of information will be used. This will include Books, Journals, conference papers, newspapers etc.

This is essentially a secondary method of data collection.

In using this method of data collection, precautions would taken because professor Bowley (1970) states that “secondary data should not be accepted at their
Classic statement of system theory exists in Ross Ashbys deign and other writers face value” in other words, sufficient precautions should be taken in using them. Thus, for this method to be used accurately the following are noted;

1. Test of suitable to see whether the secondary data are suitable for the purpose for which they are compiled.

2. Test of Adequacy to find out whether the data are adequate for which they are gathered.

3. Test of reliability to know whether the data are reliable or not.

1.9 **ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY**

This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is a general introduction encompasses the statement of the research problems, aims and objectives or the justification for the study, propositions, scope and limitations, methodology and the theoretical framework.

Chapter two is the historical evolution of Nigeria and Cameroun, origin of the Nigeria-Cameroun conflict, recent trends in the crisis. The recent trend is the conflict and how much involvement there has been in the conflict by foreign countries and international organisations.
Chapter three looks at the UN mechanism for the resolution of conflicts, the international court of Justice and how it has settled previous disputes among states;

Chapter four views the success and failures and further prospects of the conflict while chapter five encompasses the summary conclusion and recommendation.
CHAPTER TWO

THE UNITED NATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Once a dispute has been brought to the attention of the UN, the nature of the action taken by the UN is determined by a variety of considerations, including the functions and powers of the organ, its operating procedures and the attitudes of its members.

If such dispute is submitted to the International Court of Justice, the court, establishes a jurisdiction which will give a judgement that will be binding on the parties and which will be the final determination of the case.

2.2 UNITED NATIONS MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

International crises and crisis management have always been given a high degree of attention in International Relations research. However, today there are more reasons why this should be an object of very careful research. There is a common ground for
looking more closely at the pre-conditions and principles necessary for keeping existing conflicts on the lowest level of possible violence. To proffer non-violent behaviour to the actual use of force has acquired a kind of nominative significance.

The United Nations has been charged with vast responsibilities for the maintenance of International peace and security. According to Article 1 of its Charter, it is expected to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suspension of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by lawful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace. The procedures available for the discharge of these obligations are laid down in the charter, particularly in Articles 33-51. The Chief responsibility rests with the security council, but the General Assembly plays an increasingly significant role.

The UN also has great responsibilities in dealing with what are called 'security problems'. These relate not to one State's charges of aggression or other misconduct against another State but to the UN's obligation to promote conditions of general security so that breaches of the peace by any state will become less likely, and so that effective sanctions can be involved if breaches do occur.
The most difficult task of United Nations has been the adjustment of political disputes. In evaluating its work in this filed, certain broad considerations should be borne in mind; these include:

1. The charter imposes primary responsibility on the Security Council but that under certain conditions the General Assembly may take a hand.

2. The security is bound to no specific procedure; it is authorized to use any or all of several indirect ways of reaching a settlement or it may devise ways of its own. Its preference is to induce the disputing parties to settle their differences by direct negotiation.

3. The distinction between political disputes and legal disputes should be kept in mind, but it should not be over emphasized.

Generally speaking, political disputes go to the Security Council/or the General Assembly and legal disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The record of the United Nations in dealing with the large number of political disputes brought before it has been valued. While no spectacular successes have been scored, the UN has contributed directly or indirectly, to the settlement of several controversies which otherwise would have become serious threats to world peace. For centuries states have sought to preserve or increase their political
influence and economic power: they have fought for land, energy resources access to the sea, control over cities. It is not surprising that the disputes considered by the court most frequently relate to territorial and maritime issues.

The decolonization of African, in particular, has given rise to a large number of case before the court, since the new states attach great importance to their boundaries. I will summarize some of the disputes that have been tackled by the UN as follows:

1. Iran: This was the first dispute taken to the UN on January 19, 1946.

   The dispute was between the Soviet Union and Iran. The dispute was settled entirely by direct negotiation on the urging of the Security Council.

2. Palestine: Around the historic land of Palestine; a centre of international rivalry had evolved intermittently since the beginning of human history. Some of the hardest problems to confront the UN. The rival claims of the Jews and Arabs have created a dilemma of infinite complexity (The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1947 Dept. of State Pub 3024, International Organisation and Conference Series III, February 1948, PP 42,44.) In this instance, the dispute did not originate as a complaint. It involved a reversal of United States policy, concurrencement action by the Security Council and the Assembly, and two special sessions of the Assembly.
UN mediation helped to produce a cease fire which lasted for a while which has now broken out again to violence, suicide bombings and loss of killing of soldiers and civilians including women and children.

3. The Congo: The Congo had hardly become independent, on June 30, 1960, before it seemed on the verge of disintegration. The UN undertook its most massive operation, both in peacekeeping and in nation building assistance. Undoubtedly, it helped the Congo to survive in the first difficult years of independence. But the cost to the UN was very great, including an insupportable financial burden, the death of Security General of the UN Dag Hammarslejold, bitter differences among UN members and other stresses which jeopardized the future of the organization. (The UN: Political and security issues pp 327, 328, 332 & 334

The Court has not only contributed to the development of a body of legal principles governing the acquisition and delimitation of territory; it has also resolved in the process a large number of disputes between States. For example, the Court decided in 1962 that the Temple of Preah Vihear, a Khmer place of pilgrimage and worship which had been under control of Thailand since 1954, was actually on Cambodian territory and that, consequently, Thailand must withdraw its police and military forces and return any objects removed from the ruins. Thailand complied with the Court's judgement.
In 1986, in the case concerning the **Frontier Dispute** between Burkina Faso and Mali, the frontier line determined by a special Chamber formed by the Court was fully accepted by the parties.

In 1992, another Chamber formed by the Court ended a **Land, Island and Maritime Frontier** of 90 years’ standing between El Salvador and Honduras. In 1969, underlying tensions linked to the dispute were so strong that a football match between the two countries in the World Cup led to a short but bloody “football war” More recently, the Court resolved a **Territorial Dispute** between Libya and Chad concerning the so-called Aouzou Strip, an area of 125,000 square kilometres situated in the Sahara desert over which the two States had been in recurrent armed conflict for years. In 1994, the Court ruled in favour of Chad and, a few months later, all Libyan troops occupying the territory withdrew under the supervision of observers dispatched by the UN Security Council.

In December 1999, the court also settled a sensitive frontier dispute between Botswana and Namibia over a 3.5 km island located in the Chobe River. It ruled that Kasikaili/Sedudu Island belonged to Botswana, and Namibia announced that it would abide by the decision.

*(The International Court of Justice Publications, May, 2000, pp 49.50)*
While one must admit that the UN has failed to 'settle' definitely, a dispute brought before it, this is not to say that it has not relieved tensions in many crucial situations.

It should be mentioned that in defence of the UN's record of limited success in dealing with political disputes.

1. Few international disputes are really 'settled', but they may be compromised, postponed or otherwise prevented from leading to serious international crises and with the passage of time may loose much of their explosive character. The UN can play and has played a useful role in reducing disputes that might have otherwise led to international.

2. The UN encourages parties to a dispute to 'seek a solution by negotiation enquiry, meditation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice'. (Article 33 of the UN Charter). In other words, the role of the UN is an intermediary one, and only when all other procedures for peaceful settlement have been exhausted is the Security Council requested to invoke the more stringent provisions of the charter.
Both members and non-members may bring disputes and situations likely to lead to international frictions or give rise to a dispute to the attention of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN.

However, there is no obligation to submit any particular dispute or situation to any particular organ of the UN.

1. Why then do states especially members make the choices they do?

2. Why do they bring some matters to the attention of the UN while others which are equally resistant to solution by the parties by means of their own choice remain unsettled and unsubmitted.

3. Why do they submit some to the Security Council, some to the General Assembly and others to the court?

It is clear that the decision to submit it is political and that any state or group of states which decides to bring a matter before a UN organ does so because it hopes to gain some advantage for itself.

In the covenant of the League of Nations and again in the provision of the UN charter, aggression is clearly precluded as an unacceptable and animal act. The use of war as a political instrument is generally illegitimate, although this tendency has not found expression in legal norms, it nevertheless does reflect reality.
Would public opinion as well as domestic public opinion make government aware that the use of force is becoming ever more costly irrespective of the merits and demerits, justice or injustice of the cause concerned. Again this fosters and strengthens an interest on how to pursue political goals and how to settle conflicts by methods short of war, these procedures are known as crisis management.

The growing relative importance of crises management compared with other violent tactics and strategies of conflict behaviour gives a strong impulse to the growing demand for more and better knowledge on International Crises and Crisis management.

As part of the UN mechanism for resolving conflict, where a diplomatic mode of settlement fails, as in the Nigeria-Cameroun border dispute, the UN opts for a judicial mode of settlement, as can be seen in the resolution of the Nigeria-Cameroun dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

The charter system of peaceful settlement and adjustment consists of duties placed upon members and organs and procedures which are intended to aid members in performing their duties and serving the general purpose of the organization. The charter states that the first purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security and to that end bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and International Law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to breach of peace.

The charter places on its members certain duties. They shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered. According to Article 37, paragraph 1 of the Charter, if they fail to settle their disputes by these means, the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of International peace and security, shall first of all seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice. If a dispute is submitted to the International Court of Justice, whether by specific agreement or in accordance with previous
acceptance of the court’s compulsory jurisdiction, member states that are parties undertake to comply with the decision of the court.

It will not be out of place to describe, very briefly how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) works. It is the judicial organ of the UN with a membership of about 15 judges, appointed to reflect and represent the diverse legal traditions of the world; these judges serve for a fixed term. It is presided over by a President and arrives at its decisions by a majority vote. Any nation which has filed a script or has been dragged before the ICJ is entitled to appoint what is termed a judge Advocate to, for want of a better term ‘hold its briefs and is entitled to participate in all the deliberations of the ICJ. He can come from amongst outside the 15 judges who from its chambers.

Submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, unlike in the case of national courts, is not compulsory. A member state to the UN may voluntarily submit to the ICJ’s jurisdiction with or without any conditions. Parties who have not submitted may, by their mutual consent, request the ICJ to determine an issue they have agreed to bring to it.
In the respect of this dispute, Nigeria has, as far back as 1960, submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ with certain conditions whereas the Cameroun submitted herself just a few days to filing the suit and purposely for it. Since the outcome of the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun will impinge favourably or adversely to the interest of any of their neighbours. Equitoral Guinea sought and obtained the permission to intervene in the suit to protect its vested interests.

Technically speaking, the ICJ lacks the police powers and enforcement mechanism which are available to ordinary courts of law, although the Security Council may authorize the use of force or other coercive measures to enforce its orders especially where coercive measures to enforce its especially where non-compliance may pose a threat to world or regional peace. Libya is known to have honoured the ICJ ruling over the Aouzou strip which she had to relinquish to Chad after 'illegally' occupying it for some time.

Nevertheless, member State possessed with might that is the super power such as USA are known to have disregarded or brushed aside at least one ICJ order. At the end of the day, it is a combination of diplomacy and the use of threat or military might, rather than legal coercion that saves issues.
CHAPTER THREE

3.1 THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BAKASSI DISPUTE

‘One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential’ (Judgement, ICJ) Reports 1974 pg 473, para 49).

The doctrine of good faith in international law has further developed considerably. There is the Friendly Relations Declaration of the General Assembly of 1970 (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV),) which enjoins states to fulfill in good faith obligations assumed by them in accordance with the charter. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 also provides that ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. The charter of the United Nations in paragraph 2 of its Article 2 requires that members shall fulfill in good faith their obligations under the charter.
3.2 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE

BAKASSI DISPUTE

As Nigeria was busy and in good faith discussing its border problems with her neighbours, the management of the common resources of Lake Chad within the framework of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and exercising restraint in the face of increasing harassment of its citizens in these area, Cameroun filed its application on the 29th of March 1994 and further amended its claims on the 6th of June of the same year.

On 29 March 1994 Cameroun filed an Application instituting proceedings against Nigeria concerning a dispute described as “relat/ing/ essentially to the question of sovereignty over the bakassi Peninsula”. Cameroun further stated in its Application that the “delimitation/ of the maritime boundary between the two States/ has remained a partial one and /that/, despite many attempts to complete it, the two parties have been unable to do so.” Consequently, it requested the Court, “/In order to void further incidents between the two countries…… to determine the course of the maritime boundary between the two States beyond the line fixed in 1975”.

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It is Nigeria’s argument that Cameroun’s application to the court as a surprise and was perhaps filed in a clandestine manner. Nigeria further alleges the absence of good faith on the part of Cameroun. Cameroun denies all these accusations and states that Nigeria was informed about Cameroun’s intention to bring the action before the court.

(Dissenting Opinion of Jude Ajibola, ICJ Judgment of Bakassi Peninsula 7th October 2002).

The argument is that Cameroun, in lodging its application on 29th March 1994, acted prematurely and so failed to satisfy the requirement of reciprocity as a condition to be met before the jurisdiction of the court can be involved against Nigeria’ (CR98/1, pp29).

Cameroun lodged its optional clause declaration of 3rf March 1994 and filed as application 3rd weeks thereafter (i.e on the 29th March), whereas Nigeria had accepted the court’s jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the statute as far back as 14th August within the time limit.
The tussle between Nigeria and Cameroun over the ownership of the oil rich Bakassi Peninsula has dominated local and international headlines for quite a long time.

The journey to settle the matter amicably began of 24th March, 1994 when Cameroun went to the ICJ and filed an application instituting proceedings against Nigeria over the Peninsula. It specifically relied on the Maroua declaration.

In a bid to consolidate its suit, Cameroun filed an additional application on 6th June 1994 to extend the case to a further dispute with Nigeria over "a part of the territory of Cameroun", which it claimed is also being occupied by Nigeria.

On 6th June 1994 Cameroun filed an Additional Application "for the purpose of extending the subject of the dispute" to a further dispute described as "relating essentially to the question of sovereignty over a part of the territory of Cameroun in the area of Lake Chad". Cameroun also requested the Court, "to specify definitively" the frontier between the two States from Lake Chad to the sea, and asked it to join the two Applications and "to examine the whole in a single case".

By an order of 16th June 1994, the ICJ in an unprecedented speed noted that Nigeria had no objection to the additional application being treated as an amendment to the
initial one even as the court fixed 16th March, 1995 as the time limit for the filing of
the statement of claims and 18th December, 1995 as he deadline for filing of
counter-claims by Nigeria.

(Summary of the Judgement of 10th October 2000, (Pp.4)

On 13th December 1995, Nigeria filed some preliminary objections to the
jurisdiction of the case and to the admissibility of the claims of Cameroun. Nigeria
argued among other things that for at least 24 years, both countries had accepted a
duty to settle all boundary issues through the existing bilateral machinery. On the
same day, Cameroun requested the court to institute 'provisional measures' after
serious armed confrontation occurred between the two countries in the disputed
Peninsula.

ICJ held sittings between 5th and 8th of March 1996 and on the 15th of March 1996,
it ordered that 'both parties should ensure that no action of any kind, and
particularly, no action by their armed forces is taken which might prejudice the
rights of he other in respect of whatever judgment the court may render in the case,
which might aggravate or extend the dispute before it'.

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On 11th June 1995, the court delivered a judgment and rejected seven of the preliminary objections given by Nigeria and stated that the eight objections would have to be entertained during the proceedings on the merits of the matter.

Specifically, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction in the case and found Cameroun’s claim admissible. Nigeria therefore requested for an interpretation of the ruling, which in separate proceedings, was declared admissible by a 25th March 1999 judgment.

However, Nigeria recorded its first legal victory on 30th June 1999 when the court announced that the counter claims were admissible and as such formed part of the proceedings. It therefore asked Cameroun to hand in a reply and fixed 4th April 2000 and 4th January 2001 as deadlines for those pleadings.

On 20th June 1996, a new twist was introduced into the case when Equatorial Guinea filed an application to intervene in the proceedings to protect its legal rights and interest in the Gulf of Guinea so that they may remain unaffected as the court addressed the maritime boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun. The court fixed 16th August 1999 as time limit for both parties to file their observations regarding Equatorial Guinea’s application. The contending parties complied within
the time limits. The court upheld the application of Equatorial Guinea on 21st October 1999 and asked Nigeria and Cameroun to file written observation on the statements on 14th April 2001. It also fixed resumption of oral evidence by both for 18th February to 21st March 2002 while the ruling was slated for July.

Diplomatic negotiations may have informed the shift of judgment date to October. Nigeria has also engaged in bilateral negotiations on boundary matters with Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome which have resulted in the successful delimitation of their maritime boundaries and the establishment of joint commission for the mutual utilization of resources.

Regrettably, Cameroun has chosen to combine diplomacy with unprovoked use of or the threat of the use of force in dealing with Nigeria over the border matters. To reassert its claim over the Bakassi and area in the Lake Chad, it has invaded on more than one occasion these territories.

(Summary of the Judgement of 10th October 2000,) (pp.10)

In the face of all the harassment from Cameroun, Nigeria preferred the diplomatic option. On the eve of Cameroun’s filing the suit in 1994, Nigeria was busy attending meetings convened by President Eyadema of Togo with the Camerounians in Kara in Togo with a view to finding a diplomatic solution.
Similarly, Nigeria welcomed the UN goodwill mission to Bakassi in 1996 and extended every co-operation to it. Cameroun’s attitude to all these moves was that it no longer trusted Nigeria’s good faith in negotiating issues bilaterally or multilaterally, it preferred a definite settlement of the issues by the ICJ.

3.3 SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

‘Sovereignty over the Peninsula lies with Cameroun;’ these were the words of Gulbert Guillame of France, the President of the ICJ in a ruling at the Peace Palace in the Hague on the 10th of October, 2002

Nigerian representative on the ICJ also has this to say:

Judge Ajibola however disagrees with the decision of the Court, which declares that the territorial sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula belongs to Cameroun. In his own opinion, the Court’s acceptance of Cameroun’s title claim based on the 1913 Anglo-Cerman Agreement can be faulted, because its Articles XVIII-XXII upon which Cameroun bases its claim are null and void, and those Articles are severable from the Agreement. He goes further to state that the Court failed in its judgement to consider the effect of Nigeria’s argument based on historical consolidation and effectivies. In his opinion, the evidential value of the Treaty of 10th September 1884, between the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and Great Britain is clearly in
favour of Nigeria’s case. It is a clear indication that at all relevant times before Nigeria’s independence, the territorial sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula truly belonged to the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and that the Treaty was a treaty of protection, which did not transfer any territorial sovereignty to great Britain. Great Britain could not therefore transfer any territorial rights to Germany or to Cameroun, after its independence. (Summary of the ICJ of 10th October, 2002 P 40) This ended the long drawn legal, political and often times physical struggle for the absolute control over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula.

President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria went to France on the invitation of France President, Jacques Chirac to confer with his Camerounian counterpart, Paul Biya and United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan. It was a meeting called to make Nigeria and Cameroun respect whatever might be the decision of the World Court on the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula. Both leaders agreed to among other things, ‘rebuild confidence by eventually demilitarizing the Peninsula with the possibility of dispatching international observes to monitor the troops pull out’.

The judgement delivered by the ICJ has put Nigeria into a tight corner with 2 options left: Diplomatic intervention by the African Union and physical engagement, that is war. Because the first option never worked under the then
Organization of African Unity (OAU), there is little reason to believe that it might work now.

The area of failure by the UN, like in all African countries in which it engages in peaceful resolutions of conflict, little of nothing has been done for example Somalia and Rwanda as most are tribal sentiments which basically in my view requires the parties involved to negotiate for a lasting solution, as the UN cannot actually harmonise these conflicting areas.

On the Nigeria – Cameroun conflict, failure could be noticed as the UN did not give room for the principles of negotiation to be exhausted before accepting the judicial move of settlement, the UN made no effort to encourage the ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiation, as it promptly gave room for Cameroun’s resort to the judicial resolution of the dispute.

3.4 FUTURE PROSPECTS

The Bakassi Peninsula, a territory which belonged to Nigeria prior to the ICJ ruling of October 10, 2002, a judgment which was in favour of Cameroun advising Nigeria to relinquish its ownership of the Peninsula which it owned for decades and therefore giving it to cameroon is still a very controversial issue.
The next point of call for Nigeria is not the Court again, but the Security Council. By article 94 of the UN charter, each member of the organization undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party. However, like any other court, the ICJ cannot enforce its own judgment. This responsibility is given to the Security Council.

However, the terms of the Security Councils responsibility in this regard are carefully worded, so as to give the Council a further power to judge the rationality, fairness, correctness and justice of the judgment before taking a decision whether to enforce the judgment or refuse to enforce it as given.
4.1 THE ROLE OF ICJ AND THE NIGERIA-CAMEROUN CONFLICT

"I would not venture to assert that the court (ICJ) is the most important organ of the United Nations: but I think I may say that in any case there is none more important. Perhaps the General Assembly is more numerous, perhaps the security council is more spectacular ..... your work will perhaps be less in view, but I am convinced that it is of quite exceptional impotence" (Pan) Henri spaak, President of the first session of the UN General Assembly Inaugural sitting of the court , 1946).

The sources of law that the court applies are defined by article 38 of its statute.

- International conventions and treaties
- International custom
- The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
- Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.

Moreover, if the parties agree, the court can decide a case \textit{ex aequo et bono} i.e. without limiting itself to existing rules of international over the Nigerian-Cameroun crisis, the ICJ has ruled in from of Cameroun and this ruling has not give down well with Nigeria.
Thus, today, the court is no longer seen solely as the last resort in the process of the settlement of disputes. States may have recourse to the court while simultaneously employing other methods of dispute resolution, appreciating that such action may complement the work of security council and the General assembly as well as bilateral negotiations.

In this combined process of dispute resolution, judicial recourse has helped the parties to a disputes to clarify their position. Parties re promoted to scale down their sometimes overstated political pretensions and transform them into factual and legal claims. As in the case of Cameroun – Nigeria Boarder crisis decision by the ICJ, it has provided the parties with legal conclusions which they may use as a basis for further negotiations and settlement of the disputes. This is the aim behind the formation of the Cameroun – Nigeria mixed commission (see Appendix) so far, the crisis is far been solved the UN intervention.

As the case stand as of now, it will be good for Nigeria to vigorously follow the various reconciliation means available at settle the dispute. The probable means of reconciliation recommended will include; authentic and contextextual reconciliation.
From the previous discussion, it is imperative to proffer some recommendations which could be useful in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the Nigeria – Cameroun border dispute over the Bakkasi Peninsula.

It will be suggested however that if a compromise is to be reached on the Nigeria-Cameroun conflict, certain concessions have to be adopted.

4. 2 SUMMARY

This study was set up to bring to light the findings on what led to the lingering conflicts of the border crisis between Nigeria and cameroun on the Bakassi Peninsula.

The finding on the conflict situation has led to some tentative suggestions and recommendations that are proffered to assist policy makers in finding solutions.

Although Cameroun believes that the Bakassi Peninsula is part of its territory as a result of the last treaty signed during the Nigerian Civil War of 1967. Nigeria traced the origin of ownership of the Peninsula to the days of her colonial rule in
1884 when the Queen of England made the entire peninsula part of the Obong of Calabar's territory.

The Anglo-German treaty in which Britain turned over the whole area covered by the 1885 treaty to Germany used as document in favour of Cameroun by the ruling of the ICJ.

The efforts made by UN under the ICJ in the resolution of the conflict have however been commendable. The failures and successes attained by the UN in view of its future prospects will likely be a reference point for readers of this work.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

It is now history and incontestable that Cameroun dragged Nigeria to the ICJ at Hague. Under the ICJ statute, Nigeria had no other option than to respond to whatever allegation Cameroun might have leveled against her.

Often in courts of law, most cases are won not on the fact but on the use of technicalities by expert technicians in civil procedure. That is the time the lawyer exploits all loopholes and the slightest weakness in the case of the opponent. Nigeria’s approach to the Bakassi case was a bad one. It was wrong as it was procedurally defective.

Certain Articles of the statute of ICJ permit the raising of issues relating to jurisdictional matters. It is commonly agreed how that some of the judges that determined the Bakassi case and adjudged Cameroun as the rightful owners were biased. Cameroun being an appendage of France with interest in Bakassi will command more sympathy from the World body than Nigeria if only on the grounds of International politics. France’s economic interest in Bakassi, relationship with Cameroun, Germany and Switzerland are more than enough grounds that would
have warranted Nigeria exploiting the provisions of the ICJ statute that deals with preliminary objections on jurisdictions.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The pecuniary interest of France over Bakassi oil filed makes it imperative for Nigeria to reject the judgment and seek succour in the Security Council or appeal for the compassion of the general Assembly of the UN.

Under our municipal laws, jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time even on appeal up to the Supreme Court. The rules of natural justice and Articles 24 & 36 of the statute of the ICJ makes it mandatory that judges who are biased or who have interest for or otherwise in a matter should not sit Nigeria’s team to the ICJ on the ruling of the Bakassi peninsula should have done this and prevented the court from adjudicating on the matter instead of waiting until judgment was given against them before raising the issue.

The following steps can be taken to reverse the wrong judgment of the ICJ ceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroun:

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1. The failure to visit the locus in quo (that is the Bakassi Peninsula) by the ICJ before deciding the case is fatal. Physical inspection which would have given the world body certain indisputable facts is fatal.

2. Inspection placed on the treaties signed by the colonial masters was wrong, especially one on Protectorates which was completely misplaced. The settled principle of law is that you do not give what you do not have. The history of the Bakassi people, cultural heritage, and affiliation with their Kith and Kin in Nigeria which has been for centuries should have persuaded the judges of the ICJ if all these facts had been taken into consideration.

3. Britain's stand and its sympathy for France/Cameroun though it is more for economic interests as opposed to Nigeria - he former colony speaks a lot of its sincerity and integrity in this matter. This issue has best exposed Britain as predators that were out only for economic gains.

4. Nigerian submissions were not considered at all. Public Policy and the rules of private International Law of Nigeria were not adequately considered.

The Bakassi Peninsula is not a matter that Nigeria can afford to gamble with any longer. It is not medicine after death but a matter of survival – a matter of necessity. The lives and future of some Nigerians or a portion of land over which Nigeria has exercised ownership from time immemorial and over which UN Charter Nigeria has exercised sovereignty are at stake. Cameroun must not be allowed to take over
Bakassi Peninsula whatever guise. The decision is ‘unprecedented in world history’ (Prince Bola Ajibola, SAN), the judgment was handed down without due regard to the population, interest of the people, facts on ground and other relevant issues.

The UN has not given up their efforts in seeing to the end of the border crisis. To this end, The Cameroun – Nigeria mixed Commission was established in Nov. 2002 in Geneva in the presence of the Secretary – General of UN. This mixed commission has up till now held eight meetings these meetings are alternated i.e one in Abuja Nigeria and the next in Yaounde, Cameroun vice - visal. The timetable for the mixed-commission is in the appendix. The Time-Table drawn up for perhaps a settlement will last till 2005. What happens after the efforts of mixed – commission might be of interest for a further research.
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APPENDIX

WORKING CALENDAR OF THE MIXED COMMISSION

(Younde 6 August, 2003)

September 2003

Tripartite visits of the Mixed Commission to the Lake Chad area (3rd or 4th week of September).

October 2003

Preparatory meeting immediately preceding the October session of the Mixed Commission, on practical matters related to withdrawal of civil administration and military and police forces from the Lake Chad area.

Consideration of the progress report of the Sub-commission on Affected populations following its visit to the Lake Chad area.

Review of the progress of the Sub-commission of December in the implementation of its Work Programme

Review of the activities concerning fund-raising

Consideration of confidence building measures.

Consideration of practical matters relating to withdrawal starting on 8 December of civil administration and military and police forces from the Lake Chad area, taking into account the outcome of the preparatory meeting.
Request to Cameroun and Nigeria to submit their proposals to the Mixed Commission at its next meeting on how to proceed with the Maritime Boundary.

December 2003

1. Withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from the Lake Chad area starting on 8 December and ending by 31st December.

2. Completion of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from the Lake Chad area by 31 December.

3. Deployment of Mixed Commission observe personnel in the Lake Chad area.

4. Consideration of Cameroun and Nigerian proposals on how to proceed with the Maritime Boundary and of the question of possible establishment of a Sub-commission on matters related to the Maritime Boundary.

5. Review of the progress on the sub-commission on December in the implementation of its Work Program.

January 2004

Verification by the Mixed Commission observe personnel of the completion of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from the Lake Chad area.
Establishment of Cameroonian civil administration and deployment of security forces in the Lake Chad area.

Tripartite visit of the Mixed Commission to the affected land boundary areas.

**February 2004**

Tripartite visit of the Mixed Commission to Bakassi Peninsula.

Consideration of the final report of the Sub-commission on Affected populations following its visit to Bakassi Peninsula.

Review of the activities concerning fund-raising

Consideration of confidence building measures.

Preparatory meeting immediately preceding the February session of the Mixed commission on practical matters related to withdrawal of civil administration and military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula.

Follow up on the discussions on the Maritime Boundary

**March 2004**

Deployment of Mixed Commission observer personnel in Bakassi Peninsula.

**April 2004**

Beginning of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula.
Review of the progress of the Sub-commission on Demarcation in the implementation of its Work Program.

Review of the activities concerning fund-raising.

Consideration of confidence building measures.

Consideration of practical matters related to withdrawal of civil administration and military or police forces of Cameroon and Nigeria from the respective affected areas of the land boundary.

Follow up on the discussions on the Maritime Boundary.

May 2004

Completion of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula.

Verification by Mixed Commission oberserve personnel of the completion of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from bakassi Peninsula.

Establishment of Cameroonian civil administration and deployment of security forces in Bakassi Peninsula.
June 2004

Review by the Mixed Commission of the progress in the implementation of its programme of work.

Review of the progress on the Sub-commission of Demarcation in the implementation of its Work Program.

Review of the activities concerning fund-raising.

Consideration of confidence building measures.

Follow up on the discussion on the Maritime Boundary.

July 2004

Beginning of withdrawal of civil administration, military or police forces of Cameroon and Nigeria from the respective affected areas of the land boundary.

August 2004

Completion of withdrawal of civil administration, military or police forces of Cameroon and Nigeria from the respective affected areas of the land boundary.

Review of the progress of the sub-commission on Demarcation in the implementation of its Work Program.

Review of the activities concerning fund-raising.
Consideration of confidence building measures.

Follow up on the discussions on the Maritime Boundary.

2005

Final report to the Mixed Commission by the Sub-commission on Demarcation on the completion of the demarcation of the land boundary.